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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction – English Version
The labor market reform proposals by the Hartz commission have put the topic
of the flexibility of the German labor market again into the center of the political
debate. In this thesis different aspects of labor market flexibility are analyzed. In
lines with the question of labor market flexibility it is focused on dynamic aspects in
the employment trajectories of individuals which are investigated in three separated
studies.
First, by looking at changes in the stability of employment relationships it is studied
whether employment relationships became more flexible.
In recent years, a perceived decrease in the stability of employment relationships
has been intensively discussed. On the one hand, concerns about a potential decline
in the duration of employment relationships have been raised with respect to the
consequences on the individual careers paths and the human capital accumulation.
For example, many job switches and interrupting unemployment spells might have
negative effects on the individual careers. Depreciation of human capital and nega-
tive signals to potential future employers might lead to losses in earnings potential
and difficulties in job search. In addition, from a macroeconomic point of view, a
decline in the duration of employment relationships might threaten the foundations
of a highly educated workforce, as it is sometimes mentioned in connection with the
German apprenticeship system.
On the other hand, an increase in the flexibility of employment relationships might
be part of a necessary adjustment process to structural changes. It is not clear
whether this adjustment has already proceeded to a sufficient degree in European
countries. In the context of these considerations concerning the evolution of the
stability of employment relationships a careful empirical analysis of the development
1
2of the duration of employment relationships is necessary, where business cycle effects
are separated from a potential secular trend.
In view of a potential decline in the stability of employment relationships it is con-
ceivable to suggest additional governmental support on the individual level in order
to overcome dips in the employment situation. An outstanding example is the case
of East Germany where support was massively offered to smooth the consequences
of the transformation process after the reunification.
Active Labor Market Policy, like training programs and job creation scheme, might
provide help in this context. Additionally, they might also increase the flexibility of
the labor market, especially in the presence of minimum wages.
Unemployment might occur in the presence of minimum wages due to an insufficient
level of human capital. In this case is the individual marginal productivity lower
than the minimum wage. Programs of Active Labor Market Policy, like training
programs and job creation schemes, try to counteract here. Their intention is to
compensate a lack of human capital which can result from different origins. For
example, human capital might be depreciated due to structural changes or due to
long time of unemployment. But also an initial low level of professional education
could be responsible.
Consequently, these programs try to provide human capital, where training programs
mainly focus on cognitive skills whereas job creation schemes focus on noncognitive
skills. There are also additional channels how these programs might increase the
employment chances. For example, participation in these program might raise the
attachment of the participants with the labor market or successful participation
might send positive signals to potential future employers about the learning capa-
bilities.
In the following, Chapter 2 contains an in–depth empirical analysis of the duration of
employment relationships (here also called job duration or job stability) for 1980’s
and 1990’s in West Germany. A descriptive analysis of the evolution of elapsed
job duration of those currently in work is conducted based on data of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984-1999.
In addition, the evolution of the completed job duration is analyzed. A competing
risk Cox Proportional Hazard Rate model is estimated. It is distinguished between
different reasons for ending a job and different exit states. This way, not only a
secular trend can be identified but also potential reasons for the observed changes
in job stability can be empirically investigated.
The results show that job stability of men declined. Part of this can be attributed
to an increase in layoffs and part to an increase in transitions to unemployment.
However, these two developments are not significantly related to each other. For
3women no significant change in job stability is found. Some evidence is presented
that downsizing of large firms might be responsible for part of the decline in job
stability for men, whereas no significant impact of skill–biased technological change
on job stability or evidence for a general weakening of the attachment between firms
and their employees is found.
This chapter 2 is based on Bergemann and Mertens (2004). Following Bergemann
and Mertens (2001) the empirical approach with respect to the completed job du-
ration analysis is described in more detail. In addition, for both measures of job
duration sensitivity analyzes are included. The sensitivity analyzes are taken from
Bergemann and Mertens (2001) where here new estimations for the completed job
duration are presented. Furthermore, it is commented on similarities and differences
in the results and approaches of the main and the sensitivity analyzes.
Chapter 3 and 4 are evaluation studies for two different Active Labor Market pro-
grams, namely for training programs and job creation schemes. It is investigated
whether these programs increase the flexibility on the labor market by helping the
participants finding a job and/or remaining employed.
Chapter 3 evaluates the effects of training programs in East Germany on the employ-
ment chances of the actual participants for the time period 1990-1999. In course
of the economic transformation process after the reunification the human capital
of the East German labor force was heavily depreciated, while the wages were set
on a quite high level. In order to fight the high unemployment occurring shortly
after the reunification the training programs were designed to provide skills which
were in demand in a market economy but not sufficient in supply due to the former
educational system.
In order to evaluate the effects of training programs on the employment chances
of the actual participants chapter 3 develops a novel evaluation approach. This
approach builds upon a dynamic employment model which takes account of an
important stylized fact concerning the employment probability. One can commonly
observe that the probability to be employed in the next period is higher in case
a person is currently employed than if s/he were currently unemployed. On the
basis of this dynamic employment model the treatment–on–the–treated effect can be
estimated with an innovation of this paper. A conditional difference–in–differences
in hazard rate estimator is developed as an extension of the conditional difference–
in–differences estimator, which is a popular evaluation method usually applied to
employment rates or earnings. The conditional difference–in–differences in hazard
rate estimator assesses the treatment effects separately for the different transition
rates, here the reemployment rate and the rate to remain employed. The results of
this estimator are contrasted with evaluation results of a conditional difference–in–
differences estimator on unconditional employment rates, where – as commonly done
– state dependence is not taken into account. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis is
4conducted in order to compare the results of the conditional difference–in–differences
in hazard rate estimator with a further way to model state dependency.
Especially in East Germany unemployed often do not participate only once in a
program of Active Labor Market Policy but several times. Potential complementary
effects which can occur in the presence of multiple participation are often ignored
in evaluation studies. Here the effect of a training as the first participation in a
program of Active Labor Market Policy is estimated. In addition, it is differentiated
between different treatment sequences where the incremental and combined effect of
multiple participation is evaluated. The results are estimated on the basis of survey
data of the Labor Market Monitor of the state of Sachsen–Anhalt. This data set
is unique in the sense that it offers a monthly employment calendar for the years
1990-1999.
With regard to the transition rates it is found that the employment effects of partic-
ipation in a first training program are mostly insignificant but that there are some
significantly positive effects for selected starting dates of training programs. In con-
trast, with respect to unconditional employment rates the results show significantly
negative effects. Combined sequences of two programs with a first training program
are not successful with respect to the transition rates whereas the incremental effect
of the second treatment appears to have slightly positive effects on the probability
to remain employed.
In the sum, the results of chapter 3 indicate that modeling transition rates is more
appropriate than using unconditional employment rates. Using only employment
rates as success criterion could result in misleading conclusions concerning the ef-
fectiveness of programs of Active Labor Market Policy. The results also show that
modeling transition rates is more informative as it is possible to deduce whether
programs rather help to find a job and/or whether they rather stabilize employ-
ment. Furthermore, the results reveal the importance to take into account the time
the training program took place as the results show significant variations over time
concerning the outcome variables which corresponds to institutional changes.
This chapter 3 is based on a study of Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2004). It is enriched by a sensitivity analysis with respect to a different approach
to take account of state dependence in the outcome variable. This sensitivity analysis
is part of Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2001). The results of the two
approaches to take account of state dependency are compared.
Job creation schemes are also heavily used as programs of Active Labor Market
Policy in East Germany. Job creation schemes intend to created additional tem-
porary jobs mainly in the public or non–profit sector for the time of the subsidy.
Chapter 4 evaluates the effects of job creation schemes for the time 1990–1999 on
the employment chances on the basis of the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt.
5The individual treatment effects are estimated for two different groups, the group
of participants and a group which consists of the labor force which was hit fully
by the transformation shock, including participants. By estimating the average em-
ployment effects for this second group the size of the treatment effect is assessed for
the case that the group of participants would change. Thus, potential substitution
and displacement effects are not taken into account.
Population average treatment effects, as done here for the specific group of the labor
force in East Germany, are rarely estimated as it is difficult to set the hypothetical
treatment time of nonparticipants and to estimate the employment effects condi-
tional on the treatment times. However, such an approach is necessary, especially in
the context of East Germany where the institutional arrangements changed strongly
over the period considered.
Here, a solution in the context of the conditional difference–in–differences in hazard
rate estimator is proposed. First, the hypothetical start dates for the nonpartici-
pants are distributed over the whole time range 1990–1999, where the influence of
time invariant individual characteristics on the starting date is taken into account.
Secondly, when estimating the population average treatment effect provisions are
made in order to consider that individuals start a program at different points in
time.
The results indicate zero to positive effects on the reemployment probability and
mainly significantly positive effects on the probability to remain employed for the
actual participants. The effects are larger for programs that start later in time. The
estimated population average treatment effect does not deviate strongly from the
estimated treatment–on–the–treated effect. Thus, it is concluded that a change of
the participation group towards the average population would not influence strongly
the size of employment effects. As the treatment effects vary with the time the
programs started, the results confirm the relevance of the explicit modeling of the
starting date of the program for the nonparticipants and taking account of the
influence of the start date on the employment effect.
61.2 Einleitung – Deutsche Version
Die Vorschla¨ge zur Reform des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes durch die Hartz–
Kommission hat das Thema der Flexibilita¨t des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes wieder
in den Mittelpunkt der politischen Diskussion geru¨ckt. Die vorliegende Dissertation
beleuchtet verschiedene Aspekte der Arbeitsmarktflexibilita¨t. Im Einklang mit der
Themenstellung findet hier in drei – auch unabha¨ngig voneinander zu sehenden
– Studien die Bedeutung der Dynamik von Bescha¨ftigungsverla¨ufen besondere
Beru¨cksichtigung.
Die erste Studie bescha¨ftigt sich mit der Frage, ob Vera¨nderungen bezu¨glich der
Stabilita¨t von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen eingetreten sind. Hierdurch lassen sich
Ru¨ckschlu¨sse auf eine potentielle Flexibilisierung von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen
ziehen.
In ju¨ngster Vergangenheit wurde die Bedeutung eines mo¨glichen Ru¨ckgangs der
Stabilita¨t von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen versta¨rkt diskutiert. Einerseits wurden
Bedenken gea¨ußert, dass sich ein Ru¨ckgang der Dauer von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨lt-
nissen negativ auf die individuellen Bescha¨ftigungsverla¨ufe und Akkumulation von
Humankapital auswirken ko¨nnte. Genannt werden beispielsweise ha¨ufiger Stellen-
wechsel und zwischenzeitliche Arbeitslosigkeitsperioden, die zu einer Abwertung von
Humankapital und nachteiligen Signalen an potentielle Arbeitgeber fu¨hren ko¨nn-
ten. Hiermit wa¨ren Einkommensverluste und Schwierigkeiten bei der Arbeitssuche
verbunden. Daru¨ber hinaus ko¨nnten mit einem Ru¨ckgang der Dauer von Bescha¨fti-
gungsverha¨ltnissen die Grundlagen fu¨r ein gesamtgesellschaftlich hohes Qualifika-
tionsniveau gefa¨hrdet werden. Dieses Argument wird ha¨ufig im Zusammenhang mit
dem deutschen System der Lehrlingsausbildung angefu¨hrt.
Andererseits ko¨nnte eine Flexibilisierung von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen einen Teil
eines notwendigen Anpassungsprozesses im Rahmen des Strukturwandels darstellen.
In dieser Sichtweise stellt sich insbesondere fu¨r europa¨ische Volkswirtschaften die
Frage, ob eine entsprechende Anpassung bereits in hinreichendem Maße vorange-
schritten ist.
Vor dem Hintergund dieser U¨berlegungen ist eine sorgfa¨ltige empirische Analyse der
Entwicklung der Dauer von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen empfehlenswert, bei der
insbesondere zwischen zyklischen Effekten und Trends unterschieden wird.
Um die negativen Wirkungen eines Ru¨ckgangs der Stabilita¨t von Bescha¨ftigungs-
verha¨ltnissen fu¨r die einzelnen Betroffenen abzufedern, wa¨re es denkbar, dass
versta¨rkt staatliche Unterstu¨tzung angeboten wird. Ostdeutschland ist hierfu¨r ein
Extrembeispiel. Im Rahmen des Transformationsprozesses nach der Wiederver-
einigung wurde hier massiv staatliche Unterstu¨tzung geleistet.
7Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik, wie Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen und bescha¨ftigungs-
schaffende Maßnahmen, wa¨ren mo¨gliche Instrumente fu¨r eine derartige Intervention.
Daru¨ber hinaus ko¨nnten, sie insbesondere bei der Existenz von Mindestlo¨hnen, zur
Flexibilisierung des Arbeitsmarktes beitragen.
Mindestlo¨hne ko¨nnen zu Arbeitslosigkeit fu¨hren, falls Individuen nur u¨ber ein ge-
ringes Niveau an Humankapital verfu¨gen. In diesem Fall ist die individuelle Grenz-
produktivita¨t niedriger als der Mindestlohn. Instrumente der aktiven Arbeitsmarkt-
politik, wie Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen und bescha¨ftigungsschaffende Maßnahmen,
versuchen hier entgegenzuwirken. Ihre Zielsetzung besteht in der Kompensation der
Humankapitallu¨cke, welche unterschiedlicher Ursache sein kann. Beispielsweise kann
Humankapital durch Strukturwandel oder Arbeitslosigkeitsperioden abgewertet wer-
den. Auch eine unzureichende berufliche Erstausbildung kann hierfu¨r verantwortlich
sein.
Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen und bescha¨ftigungsschaffende Maßnahmen versuchen
daher Kenntnisse zu vermitteln, die die Produktivita¨t der Teilnehmer erho¨hen. Dabei
zielen Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen imWesentlichen auf kognitive und bescha¨ftigungs-
schaffende Maßnahmen auf nonkognitive Kenntnisse ab. Auch weitere Kana¨le, durch
die die Maßnahmen die Bescha¨ftigungsfa¨higkeit der Teilnehmer erho¨hen ko¨nnen,
sind denkbar. Beispielsweise, ko¨nnte durch sie die Arbeitsmarktbindung des Teil-
nehmers erho¨ht werden oder aber die erfolgreiche Teilnahme an einer Weiterbil-
dungsmaßnahme Lernfa¨higkeit signalisieren.
Im Folgenden beinhaltet Kapitel 2 eine tiefgehende empirische Analyse der Ent-
wicklung der Dauer von Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnissen in Westdeutschland, wobei im
weiteren vereinfachend von Bescha¨ftigungsdauer oder Bescha¨ftigungsstabilita¨t ge-
sprochen wird.
Eine deskriptive Analyse der Entwicklung der bisherigen Bescha¨ftigungsdauer wird
auf Basis von Daten des Sozio-Oekonomischen Panels fu¨r die Zeit von 1984 bis
1999 erstellt. Das Hauptaugenmerk des Kapitels 2 liegt auf einer Analyse der ab-
geschlossenen Bescha¨ftigungsdauer fu¨r die Zeit von 1984 bis 1997. Ein proportio-
nales Cox–Hazardraten–Modell mit konkurrierenden Risiken wird gescha¨tzt, wobei
unterschieden wird zwischen den verschiedenen Gru¨nden fu¨r die Beendigung eines
Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnisses und den verschiedenen U¨bergangszusta¨nden. Diese Vor-
gehensweise ermo¨glicht nicht nur einen potentiellen Trend sondern auch Gru¨nde fu¨r
die Vera¨nderung der Bescha¨ftigungsstabilita¨t zu identifizieren.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Bescha¨ftigungsstabilita¨t von Ma¨nnern abgenommen
hat. Ein Teil dieser Entwicklung ist vermehrten Entlassungen zuzuschreiben, ein
weiterer Teil vermehrten U¨berga¨ngen in Arbeitslosigkeit, wobei diese Entwicklun-
gen nicht miteinander verbunden sind. Hingegen sind fu¨r Frauen keine signifikanten
Vera¨nderungen zu verzeichnen. Des Weiteren sind Hinweise zu finden, dass insbeson-
8dere die Entlassungen in großen Firmen eine bedeutende Quelle fu¨r den Ru¨ckgang
der Bescha¨ftigungsstabilita¨t von Ma¨nnern darstellen. Technischer Fortschritt, der
Qualifizierte und Hochqualifizierte begu¨nstigt, scheint hier keinen besonderen Ein-
fluss auszuu¨ben. Ebenso gibt es keine Hinweise fu¨r eine generelle Schwa¨chung der
Bindung zwischen Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber.
Kapitel 2 basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit von Bergemann und Mertens (2004).
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird jedoch der empirische Ansatz fu¨r die Analyse der
abgeschlossenen Bescha¨ftugungsdauer in Anlehnung an Bergemann und Mertens
(2001) detaillierter beschrieben. Daru¨ber hinaus sind fu¨r die beiden Maßeinheiten
der Bescha¨ftigungsdauer Sensitivita¨tsanalysen hinzugefu¨gt. Die Sensitivita¨tsanaly-
sen sind der Studie von Bergemann und Mertens (2001) entnommen, wobei neue
Scha¨tzungen fu¨r die abgeschlossene Bescha¨ftigungsdauer durchgefu¨hrt wurden. Auch
werden zusa¨tzlich U¨bereinstimmungen und Unterschiede zwischen der Hauptanalyse
und den Sensitivita¨tsanalysen beschrieben.
Kapitel 3 und 4 umfassen Evaluationsstudien von zwei unterschiedlichen Instru-
menten der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik, namentlich Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen
und bescha¨ftigungsschaffende Maßnahmen. Hierbei wird untersucht, ob diese Pro-
gramme zur Erho¨hung der Arbeitsmarktflexibilia¨t beitragen, indem sie den Teilneh-
mern helfen, eine Bescha¨ftigung zu finden und erwerbsta¨tig zu bleiben.
Kapitel 3 evaluiert die Wirkung von Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen in Ostdeutschland
fu¨r die Zeitraum von 1990 bis 1999 im Hinblick auf eine Erho¨hung der Erwerbs-
chancen fu¨r die tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer. Das Humankapital der ostdeutschen Er-
werbsbevo¨lkerung war durch den Transformationsprozess in Folge der Wiedervereini-
gung einer starken Abwertung unterworfen. Gleichzeitig lagen die Lo¨hne auf einem
relativ hohen Niveau. Die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit in Ostdeutschland la¨sst sich zu-
mindest teilweise auf diesen Zusammenhang zuru¨ckfu¨hren. Um dem entgegenzuwir-
ken wurden im großen Stil Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen eingesetzt, die marktga¨ngiges
Wissen vermitteln sollten.
Um die Wirkung von Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen auf die Erwerbschancen der
tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer evaluieren zu ko¨nnen, entwickelt Kapitel 3 einen neu-
artigen Evaluationsansatz. Dieser Ansatz baut auf ein dynamisches Bescha¨ftigungs-
modell auf, welches einem wichtigen stilisierten Faktum in Bezug auf Bescha¨fti-
gungswahrscheinlichkeit Rechnung tra¨gt. Im Allgemeinen kann man beobachten,
dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit morgen erwerbsta¨tig zu sein gro¨ßer ist, im Falle man
ist heute erwerbsta¨tig anstelle man ist nicht erwerbsta¨tig. Auf Basis des dynami-
schen Bescha¨ftigungsmodells kann die durchschnittliche Teilnahmewirkung auf die
tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer mit einer Innovation dieses Kapitels gescha¨tzt werden. Ein
konditionaler Differenz–von–Differenzen in Hazard Raten Scha¨tzer wird eingefu¨hrt
als Weiterentwicklung des konditionalen Differenz–von–Differenzen Scha¨tzers. Der
konditionale Differenz–von–Differenzen Scha¨tzer ist ein beliebter Scha¨tzansatz, der
9u¨blicherweise in Bezug auf unbedingte Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsraten oder Lo¨hne ange-
wandt wird. Der konditionale Differenz–von–Differenzen in Hazard Raten Scha¨tzer
hingegen untersucht die Teilnahmewirkung auf U¨bergangsraten. In dieser Studie
finden die Wiederbescha¨ftigungsrate und die Verbleibsrate in Erwerbsta¨tigkeit
Beru¨cksichtigung. Die mit diesem Ansatz erzielten Ergebnisse werden den Ergebnis-
sen auf Basis von unbedingten Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsraten gegenu¨ber gestellt, bei denen,
wie es u¨blicherweise geschieht, die Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit nicht beru¨cksichtigt wird.
Zusa¨tzlich wird eine Sensitivita¨tsanalyse durchgefu¨hrt, die die Ergebnisse des kon-
ditionalen Differenz–von–Differenzen in Hazard Raten Scha¨tzers mit einer weiteren
Mo¨glichkeit vergleicht, die Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit zu beru¨cksichtigen.
Insbesondere in Ostdeutschland la¨sst sich beobachten, dass Arbeitslose ha¨ufig nicht
nur einmal an einem Programm der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik teilnehmen, son-
dern mehrmals. Evaluationsstudien ignorieren in der Regel potentielle Komple-
menta¨rwirkungen, die sich hieraus ergeben. Demgegenu¨ber wird in Kapitel 3 nicht
nur die Wirkung einer Teilnahme an einer Weiterbildungsmaßnahme als erste Teil-
nahme an einem Programm der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik gescha¨tzt, sondern auch
verschiedene Teilnahmesequenzen unterschieden, deren inkrementelle und kombi-
nierte Wirkung gescha¨tzt wird. Die Evaluationsstudie verwendet dabei Umfrage-
daten des Arbeitsmarktmonitors Sachsen-Anhalt. Dieser Datensatz ist einzigartig,
da er einen Kalender entha¨lt, dem die Erwerbszusta¨nde der Befragten fu¨r den Zeit-
raum von 1990 bis 1999 auf monatlicher Basis entnommen werden ko¨nnen.
Die Ergebnisse weisen vorwiegend auf eine insignifikante Wirkung einer ersten Teil-
nahme an einer Weiterbildungsmaßnahme auf die U¨bergangsraten hin, wobei jedoch
fu¨r einzelne Eintrittszeitpunkte signifikante positive Wirkungen vorzufinden sind.
Die Ergebnisse bezu¨glich der unbedingte Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsrate legen hingegen eine
negative Wirkung der Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen nahe. Die kombinierte Wirkung
einer Mehrfachteilnahme mit einer ersten Teilnahme an einer Weiterbildungsmaß-
nahme, hat keine signifikante Wirkung auf die U¨bergangsraten. Die inkrementelle
Wirkung der zweiten Teilnahme auf die U¨bergangsraten scheint hingegen positiv zu
sein.
Bei einer Gesamtbetrachtung der Ergebnisse des 3. Kapitels kann der Schluss ge-
zogen werden, dass es angemessener ist, die Programmteilnahme im Hinblick auf
ihre Wirkung auf U¨bergangsraten als auf unbedingte Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsraten zu eva-
luieren. Falls ausschließlich unbedingte Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsraten als Erfolgskriterium
herangezogen werden, besteht die Gefahr von irrefu¨hrenden Schlussfolgerungen
bezu¨glich der Effizienz von aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auch
die Erkenntnisgewinne, die die Modellierung von U¨bergangsraten mit sich bringen.
Es kann bestimmt werden, ob die Programme eher helfen eine Bescha¨ftigung zu
finden, und/oder ob sie eher helfen erwerbsta¨tig zu bleiben. Daru¨ber hinaus zeigen
die Ergebnisse die Bedeutung auf, den Zeitpunkt des Eintritts in die Maßnahme zu
beru¨cksichtigen, da die Wirkung diesbezu¨glich Variationen, die mit institutionellen
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A¨nderungen der Programme zusammen ha¨ngen ko¨nnten, aufweist.
Das Kapitel 3 basiert auf einer Studie von Bergemann, Fitzenberger und Speckesser
(2004). Es ist erweitert um eine Sensitivita¨tsanalyse, bei der ein zusa¨tzlicher An-
satz zur Beru¨cksichtigung der Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit in der Erwerbsta¨tigkeitsrate
gescha¨tzt wird. Diese Sensitivita¨tsanalyse ist Teil von Bergemann, Fitzenberger und
Speckesser (2001). Die Ergebnisse der zwei unterschiedlichen Wege zur Beru¨cksich-
tigung von Zustandsaba¨nigkeit werden miteinander verglichen.
Bescha¨ftigungsschaffende Maßnahmen sind ein weiteres Instrument der aktiven Ar-
beitsmarktpolitik, das im starken Maße in Ostdeutschland eingesetzt wird. Diese
Maßnahmen beabsichtigen zusa¨tzliche, zeitlich befristete Bescha¨ftigung zu schaf-
fen. Kapitel 4 evaluiert die Wirkung dieser Maßnahmen fu¨r den Zeitraum von
1990 bis 1999 im Hinblick auf eine Erho¨hung der Bescha¨ftigungschancen auf Basis
der Daten des Arbeitsmarktmonitors Sachsen-Anhalts. Die durchschnittliche Teil-
nahmewirkung wird fu¨r zwei unterschiedliche Gruppen gescha¨tzt: die Gruppe der
tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer und die Gruppe der erwerbsfa¨higen Bevo¨lkerung, welche
dem Transformationsschock unterlegen war. Indem die durchschnittliche Wirkung
einer (potentiellen) Teilnahme der Gruppe der erwerbsfa¨higen Bevo¨lkerung auf deren
Erwerbschancen gescha¨tzt wird, wird untersucht wie sich die durchschnittliche Teil-
nahmewirkung bei einer Modifikation der Teilnehmergruppe vera¨ndern wu¨rde. Ange-
sichts dieser Fragestellung werden keine Substitutions- oder Verdra¨ngungswirkungen
beru¨cksichtigt.
Durchschnittliche Teilnahmewirkungen fu¨r eine Grundgesamtheit, die u¨ber die Teil-
nehmer hinausgeht, sind bislang selten gescha¨tzt worden. Die Ursache mag in den
Problemen zu finden sein, die die Setzung von hypothetischen Eintrittszeitpunkten,
sowie die Scha¨tzung der Teilnahmewirkung in Abha¨ngigkeit von diesen Eintrittszeit-
punkten mit sich bringen. Jedoch ist ein solcher Ansatz insbesondere fu¨r Ostdeutsch-
land notwendig, da sich wesentliche A¨nderungen bei den Teilnahmeregelungen der
bescha¨ftigungsschaffenden Maßnahmen ergeben haben.
Eine Lo¨sung dieses methodischen Problems wird hier im Kontext des konditionalen
Differenz–von–Differenzen in Hazard Raten Scha¨tzers vorgeschlagen. Zuerst werden
die hypothetischen Eintrittszeitpunkte fu¨r die Nichtteilnehmer u¨ber den Zeitraum
von 1990 bis 1999 verteilt, wobei der Einfluss von zeitlich konstanten individuellen
Eigenschaften auf die Eintrittszeitpunkte beru¨cksichtigt wird. Zweitens werden bei
der Scha¨tzung der Teilnahmewirkung Vorkehrungen getroffen, um den Einfluss des
Eintrittszeitpunktes in angemessenem Maße zu beru¨cksichtigen.
Fu¨r die Gruppe der tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer zeigen die Ergebnisse eine bedingt
positive Wirkung auf die Wiederbescha¨ftigungswahrscheinlichkeit und eine signifi-
kant positive Wirkung auf die Verbleibswahrscheinlichkeit in Erwerbsta¨tigkeit. Im
Allgemeinen ist die Wirkung von Programmen, die zu einem spa¨teren Zeitpunkt be-
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gonnen haben gro¨ßer. Die gescha¨tzte Teilnahmewirkung der Gruppe der erwerbsfa¨hi-
gen Bevo¨lkerung weicht nicht stark von der gescha¨tzten Teilnahmewirkung auf die
tatsa¨chlichen Teilnehmer ab. Somit wa¨re von einer Variation der Teilnahmergruppe
keine wesentliche Vera¨nderung der durchschnittlichen Teilnahmewirkung zu erwar-
ten. Das Ergebnis, dass die Teilnahmewirkung im Hinblick auf den Eintrittszeitpunkt
variiert, besta¨tigt die Bedeutung der expliziten Modellierung des Eintrittszeitpunkts
fu¨r die Nichtteilnehmer sowie die Beru¨cksichtigung dieser bei der Scha¨tzung der Teil-
nahmewirkung.
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Chapter 2
Job Stability Trends, Layoffs, and
Transitions to Unemployment –
An Empirical Analysis for West
Germany
2.1 Introduction
In the recent past the question of job security and the stability of employment
relationships has been increasingly discussed. The general notion is that job stability
is on the decline in most OECD countries, although the actual empirical evidence is
scarce and ambiguous. Several studies for Germany and other OECD countries like
the United States, the United Kingdom and France show some limited evidence of
increasing job instability.1
It is well known to economists that job stability is not necessarily always a good
thing. Indeed, if we believed that separations were always efficient (see e.g.
McLaughlin 1991 or Parsons 1986), there would be nothing to worry about. How-
ever, most contracting mechanisms – like the bonding schemes or fixed wage con-
tracts in the early models by Oi (1962), Becker (1962) and Parsons (1972), for
example, or the later models with costly or suppressed renegotiations of wages by
Hashimoto (1981) and Hall and Lazear (1984) – yield separations that are not effi-
cient. Too much job stability can in fact be harmful at the macroeconomic level; for
example, if firms have difficulties restructuring their workforce in times of structural
change. Indeed, job relationships in Europe have often been termed too inflexible,
1See Bergemann and Schneider 1998; Burgess and Rees 1996, 1997, 1998; Booth et. al. 1999;
Swinnerton and Wial 1995; Diebold et al. 1997; Schmidt and Svorny 1998; Givord and Maurin
2004; and the articles in the Journal of Labor Economics 17 (4, part 2) and in Neunmark 2000;
OECD 1997; ILO 1996.
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as have the labor market institutions themselves; this phenomenon is sometimes
dubbed Eurosclerosis. Even at the individual level, job stability is not always desir-
able, as reflected by voluntary quits.
One major reason for some economists to be concerned about declines in job stability
is the potential effect on individual career paths. Too many job switches and periods
of unemployment may lead to losses in human capital, decreasing earnings potentials
and a limited capability to obtain work due to disadvantage signals (Spence 1973).
Furthermore, economy–wide long–term labor relationships might be one prerequi-
site for a highly educated workforce (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), which is, in turn,
amongst other things responsible for the economic success of a country. Therefore,
it is important to interpret potential declines carefully. The question of whether
jobs terminate due to quits or layoffs is of particular relevance, and is too often
neglected in the literature. While quits tend to be associated with improved job
conditions elsewhere, permanent layoffs and worker displacement usually lead to at
least temporary unemployment and frequently to wage losses upon re–employment.
In Germany the latter problem is of less relevance than in the United States, as wage
losses tend to be relatively small (compare Burda and Mertens 2001; Dustmann et
al. 2002). After looking at job stability patterns, we will therefore examine whether
individuals find another job immediately after leaving their old one. Furthermore,
we will test a number of hypotheses that have been put forward as potential expla-
nations for a decline in job stability: downsizing of firms, skill–biased technological
change, weakening bonds with the firm, and flexible work arrangements. Finally,
another important question is how to measure a potential decline in job stability
properly. We will address these questions using data from the German Socioeco-
nomic Panel (hereafter GSOEP).
After surveying very briefly the literature on job stability and describing the data
set, we will proceed to a detailed analysis of elapsed firm tenure. The elapsed firm
tenure of those currently in work is the most commonly used measure of job stability
and has not yet been properly explored for Germany. The GSOEP data show that
there was indeed some decline in elapsed tenure in West Germany during the 1980s
and 1990s. However, one serious problem of elapsed tenure is that it does not take
into account the problem of right censoring. We do not know how long the jobs
will actually last. This is a particular problem in times when many new hires are
made. Logically, we will observe a decline in average elapsed tenure in that case. To
combat the problem of right censoring, we use competing risk hazard rate models
in our major analysis of separation risks in section 2.5. These models show that
the decline in job stability can be attributed primarily to an increase in layoffs and
transitions to unemployment. Finally, in section 2.6 we summarize our findings and
give an outlook for future research.
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2.2 The Literature
Although the literature on job stability is primarily empirical,2 it is firmly based
on well–known theories describing mobility in the labor market. Human capital
theory offers an explanation for why separations usually decline with labor market
experience and tenure (see e.g. Becker 1962, Mincer 1962 and 1974, Oi 1962, Parsons
1972 and Hashimoto 1981). Search and matching theory also concludes that mobility
decreases with tenure and experience, as good matches are the ones that survive the
longest and older workers have simply had more time to locate well–paid jobs (see e.g.
Stigler 1962, Mortensen 1970, Burdett 1978, Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b). Therefore,
it seems reasonable to use the elapsed tenure of those currently employed, i.e. the
time spent with a particular employer, as a common measure of job stability. If
we find a general tendency toward decreasing average tenure over time, this will be
interpreted as an indication of declining job stability.
Most of the original US studies found little evidence for a drop in job stability
between the 1970s and early 1990s (see Farber 1995; Diebold et al. 1996, 1997).3
Only Swinnerton and Wial (1995, 1996) reported declines in job stability, although
these declines were far smaller in their re–estimated results. Farber (1995) notes
that men are increasingly less likely to be in long–term jobs, while women’s chances
of being in long–term employment have increased significantly. Moreover, Farber
concludes that groups that have experienced greater declines in earnings, such as the
young and especially the less educated, have also experienced a greater decline in job
stability. Some more recent evidence of declining job stability is collected in an edited
volume (Neumark 2000) and in a special issue of the Journal of Labor Economics
(1999 [4, part 2]). In the latter, Neumark et al. (1999) report that job stability
declined modestly in the first half of the 1990s. However, men with substantial
tenure experienced a sharp decline in job stability in the first half of the 1990s.
These results were confirmed by Jaeger and Stevens (1999), who show a declining
proportion of workers with less than 10 years of tenure. However, Gottschalk and
Moffitt (1999) found no such evidence when estimating Cox Proportional Hazard
Rate Models for different demographic groups. Separation rates did not increase; on
the contrary, the results indicate a decline in the hazard of job exits for white males
of all educational levels. These findings persist even when considering only those
workers who report involuntary job terminations. However, while there is evidence
2One exception being Valetta (1999b), who offers an implicit contract model to explain ineffi-
cient separations. In this model workers’ job security declines if they are dismissed although they
had reasonable expectations of not being dismissed.
3For overviews of the US literature see Schmidt and Svorny (1998) or Valetta (1999a). See also
the special issue of the Journal of Labor Economics 17 (October 1999, part 2), where Gottschalk
and Moffit present an interesting comparison of studies. The latest compilation of articles on the
topic can be found in Neumark (2000). Comparable studies for Europe are only available for the
UK (see e.g. Burgess and Rees 1996, 1997, 1998; Booth et al. 1999) and France (e.g. Givord and
Maurin, 2004).
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for some changes in job stability in the 1990s, these changes did not persist for
very long and, as Neumark (2000) argues, it would be premature to infer long–term
trends towards a decline in long–term employment relationships.
Apart from studies directly aimed at analyzing job stability patterns, the literature
on worker displacement yields some further interesting insights. In the United States
job losses have increased since the 1970s, with high–tenure and white–collar workers
being increasingly affected (see Hamermesh 1989; Farber 1993, 1997; Hall 1995;
Fallick 1996 and Kletzer 1998 for surveys). The figures reported by researchers such
as Farber (1997) cast some doubt on the notion that job stability has not changed:
some 13% of the workforce experienced job loss in the recession of 1981–1983. The
three–year rate of job loss decreased until 1987–89, and then rose to its highest level
since 1981: 15% of the workforce lost their job in the period of expansion between
1993 and 1995. As Kletzer (1998) puts it,“These high rates of job loss are consistent
with public perceptions of rising job insecurity.”
Previous studies of job stability in Germany have applied different measures, and
yielded apparently conflicting results. Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1998) re-
port decreasing numbers of job changes as evidence for an increase in job stability,
whereas Bergemann and Schneider (1998) use descriptive duration analysis to show
that job stability has declined. Likewise, Grotheer and Struck (2003) report that the
percentage of short jobs increased in the 1990s. Prolonged periods of unemployment
and nonparticipation might make explain these disparate results. With the present
paper, we intend to give a detailed overview of the evolution of job duration. We
start by presenting some statistics on elapsed tenure to gain a first insight into the
information provided by the GSOEP data.
Even more tricky than analyzing the pattern of job stability is explaining the rea-
sons for any changes observed. Several hypotheses have been formulated in the
literature; these will be tested in our empirical analysis. First of all, the business
cycle has a strong impact. We know that (voluntary) quits are pro–cyclical, while
(involuntary) layoffs are counter–cyclical, both influencing the tenure distribution.
In boom periods more new jobs are created, automatically leading to more jobs of
short duration. Hence, tenure decreases, even if layoffs are reduced. In recessions
there are more layoffs, fewer quits, and average tenure is likely to increase as new
hires are rare (Burgess and Rees 1996, Schettkatt 1996). It is therefore vital to con-
trol for business cycle effects. Secondly, changes in the composition of the workforce
may influence average job stability. We are able to control for such effects using the
abundant information provided by the GSOEP data.
Apart from those two rather conventional hypotheses, the influence of flexible work
arrangements (e.g. Levenson 2000), the downsizing of firms (Capelli 2000), skill–
biased technological change (Givord and Maurin 2003; Autor et al. 2002) and
weakening bonds with the firm (Valetta 1999b) will be discussed. We will test
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for all these hypotheses in our multivariate analysis in section 2.5. Before that,
however, we will take a look at the data and some cross–sectional findings.
2.3 The Data Set
The GSOEP is a representative panel survey of households and their members,
which has been running in West Germany since 1984. The concept of the GSOEP
is to annually re–interview the households and their split–offs, usually in March.4
In 1984, the sample consisted of approximately 4500 households and 9000 persons.
The GSOEP questionnaire covers a wide variety of economic and social character-
istics of households and their members. In particular, the occupational situation
of the interviewees is one of the main themes. No other German data set provides
this breadth of information, especially where the reasons for a job termination are
concerned. Of course, this data set also has its limitations, which we will take into
account in our empirical analysis as far as possible.
In the GSOEP, employed respondents are asked how long they have already been
with their current employer. This information allows us to easily calculate our
first major indicator “median of elapsed tenure”. However, extracting data on the
length of job spells for the duration analysis is not as trivial as it might seem.
Workers report changes in their employment situation together with the reasons for
this change in the year before or during the year of the interview (starting with
interview year 1985). Parallel to this, respondents complete a monthly calendar
providing information on their labor market states.
There are two main ways of extracting job spells from this information: either by
completely relying on the information on the reported changes in the employment
situation or by combining this information with the monthly calendar. Appendix
2.D.1 contains a short description of the first approach. In our main analysis we de-
cide to use as much information as possible by combing both data sources, although
in this case we have to make specific setting if an individual reports contradictory
information.5 Combing these two data sources is preferable for two main reasons.
First, when exclusively using the information on job changes one is only able to
extract job spells which cover at least one interview date. Thus, one would loose
information on a significant part of short job spells. Secondly, only the calendar
offers information on the destination states after the end of a job.
4For further information about the GSOEP, see SOEP Group (2001).
5For a more extensive discussion, consult the Appendix 2.B.
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After combining the two data sources, we add the information on the elapsed tenure
to the job spell information in case a job spell is left censored, information provided
mainly by way of the calendar. This results in a so–called stock sample, which must
be taken into account in the duration analysis.
Having thus created a (job) spell data set, we add individual and job–specific in-
formation to each spell. The individual information is available for all job spells,
whereas the job–specific information is only available if the respondent was actually
in the job at the time of an interview. Consequently, we only have job–specific
information on a representative basis for jobs lasting at least 12 months.
The analysis distinguishes two different sets of destination states. The first set
relates to the reason for job termination: quits, which are initiated by the employee;
layoffs, which are initiated by the firm; and a third category, termed ‘other reasons’,
that includes such reasons as the end of a fixed–term contract and retirement. It
also includes sabbatical leave and maternity leave if these result in termination of
the job. The GSOEP only taps the reason for the termination of the job that ended
closest to the interview date, even if the individual had more than one job between
two interviews. Therefore, we are less likely to know the reasons for exits from
short jobs. Finally, it is important to note that the questions tapping the reasons
for job separation were changed in 1991. We conducted extensive checks, which
confirmed that the variable we generated to reflect the reasons for job change is
essentially consistent over time. However, there is one minor exception: in 1990,
maternity leave as reason for job termination was introduced as an explicit response
alternative. Therefore, we find an increase in exits in our variable “other reasons”
as this variable contains job exits due to maternity leave. In order to correct for
the effect of this change in the questionnaire, we incorporate a dummy variable in
our multivariate analysis. Unfortunately, the wording of the question changed again
after 1997, but now making it impossible to create a consistent variable. Therefore,
our multivariate analysis only covers the 1990s until 1997.
In our second part of the analysis, we investigate a second set of destination states.
These are the labor market states that an individual enters after exiting a job: un-
employment, employment (full– or part–time) or education and nonparticipation
combined. The data on these destination states are drawn from the monthly cal-
endar. The same problem arises with respect to maternity leave as, here again,
maternity leave was not introduced as an employment status in its own right until
the 1991 questionnaire.
We selected the original West German sample A, containing German citizens only,
for our analysis. We did not include East Germany, where job tenure patterns in the
1990s were obviously subject to different mechanisms than in West Germany. Only
workers aged between 16 and 56 were included in the analysis of elapsed tenure, and
only workers who started the job aged between 16 and 56 in the multivariate analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Gender (in Years)∗
∗ Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1999. Only German citizens living in West Germany
(Sample A), aged 16–56, working full– or part–time. Excluding civil servants, apprentices and self–
employed respondents, workers in agriculture, non–profit organizations and private households, and
observations with missing values for age, sex, job status, industry affiliation or tenure.
Civil servants, apprentices and the self–employed were dropped from our sample,
as were workers in agriculture, non–profit organizations and private households.
Finally, we did not include workers with missing values for age, sex, job status,
industry affiliation or tenure in the elapsed tenure analysis.6
2.4 The Empirical Analysis of Elapsed Tenure
The results presented in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 substantiate the established fact
that median elapsed tenure differs significantly by gender.7 Women’s median tenure
fluctuates at around 6 years. Men’s median tenure drops from 9.4 years in 1984 to
8.7 years in 1985, and stays relatively constant until the end of the 1980s. It declines
further at the beginning of the 1990s, but returns to 8.5 years in 1994. Thereafter,
median tenure falls to 7.5 years in 1999. Even if we assume that 1984 was a year
with exceptionally high elapsed tenure, there are some signs of a decline in median
elapsed tenure for men, primarily in the 1990s.
6For the missing value treatment in the duration analysis, see section 2.5.2
7Here, as in the following duration analysis, we do not use weights. We conducted, however, a
sensitivity analysis for the elapsed tenure measure using the GSOEP weights for the time 1984–
1997. Here we essentially receive the same results. Compare Appendix 2.C, where we also use a
different selection rule with respect to age. Individuals up to age 65 are included.
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Age and Hours Worked (in
Years)∗
∗Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1999. For sample selection, see note to
Figure 2.1
21
It is also important to distinguish different age groups because older workers are
obviously able to accrue longer tenure than young workers. Age is therefore used
as a (non–ideal) proxy for labor market experience. In Figure 2.2, median elapsed
tenure is reported for the groups aged 16–25, 26–45 and 46–56 years. A gender
difference is evident only in the older age groups. The tenure of female workers
aged between 16 and 25 is comparable to that of their male counterparts. What is
noticeable, however, is that median elapsed tenure decreases slightly for the young
and middle–aged men between 25 and 45 years of age, but increases substantially for
males aged between 46 and 56 during the early 1990s before starting to fall again.
The female experience is strikingly different from the results reported by Farber
(1995), Marcotte (1995) and Burgess and Rees (1998) for the United States and the
UK. It seems that, while women in the US and the UK have been able to accrue
longer tenure over time, West German women have only been able to maintain the
level acquired in the mid–1980s.
Another interesting detail in the tenure pattern has been pointed out by Gregg and
Wadsworth (1995), who show significants differences in the median elapsed tenure
of part–timers and full–timers in the UK. Moreover, part–timers face increasing
separation rates over time. Therefore, Figure 2.2 shows median elapsed tenure by
regular hours worked. Men in part–time jobs (including marginal employment)8
have lower median elapsed tenure than full–time workers. However, only around 3%
of male respondents were not in full–time jobs (own calculations from the GSOEP,
see also Hoffmann and Walwei 1998).9 As no clear pattern can be observed for
part–time workers, the reported decrease in median elapsed tenure can be assumed
to be caused by males in full–time work only. As expected, women are more likely
to work part–time (around 30%). It is interesting to see that, for women, part–time
work is in fact associated with slightly higher median tenure than full–time work
– at least until 1996. Apart from that, there are no clear tendencies over time for
females in either full–time or part–time work.
Similarly, tenure by industry differs more strongly for men than for women, as shown
by Figure 3, which depicts the most important sectors. We subsumed manufactur-
ing, construction, energy and mining to the “industry” sector, where we observe a
decrease of around one year of tenure. In the late 1990s, however, this trend reversed.
Services, credit and insurance, and trade are pooled into “trade and services”. Here,
we observe a significant decline in median tenure of around 2 years.
Because we still do not know the reasons for the slight decline observed in median
elapsed tenure for men, we cannot know whether this is a positive or an alarming
8Marginal employment in Germany was defined as either working less than 15 hours per week in
the period of observation or receiving monthly wages below a certain threshold (e.g. approximately
310 Euro in 1998).
9In 1988, around 3000 male workers were in full–time employment and only around 60 in part–
time or marginal employment.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Industry (in Years)∗
∗Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1999. For sample selection, see note to
Figure 2.1
development. Considering the business cycle, as pointed out in section 2.2, (vol-
untary) quits are pro–cyclical, while (involuntary) layoffs are counter–cyclical, and
both influence the tenure distribution. Between 1984 and 1989, the West German
economy recovered from the recession of the early 1980s, leading to falling unem-
ployment rates and slightly better job prospects for workers, as shown in Figure 2.4.
In 1990, the year of re–unification, however, there was a pronounced boom, bringing
West German capacities to their limits. This was primarily due to the increased de-
mand for West German products in East Germany. This boom ended dramatically
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Figure 2.4: Unemployment and the Business Cycle in West Germany ∗
∗Source: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000) as well as Working Group ”Volk-
swirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder” (2004).
in 1993, followed by a recession from which the West German economy has been
recovering very slowly ever since. Unemployment in West Germany has increased
and growth rates are at relatively low levels. The business cycle does seem to have
had some influence on the evolution of elapsed tenure, but it cannot account fully
for the pattern observed. Figure 2.1 shows that median tenure was slightly higher
in the recession of 1993–94 than in the following years. But comparing 1987 and
1997, two years with relatively similar GDP growth rates, we see that median tenure
declined by nearly one year.
A related and alternative explanation for the decline in job tenure is the increasing
number of employees in West Germany, as increasing numbers of new hires lead to
a decline in elapsed tenure. If new hires were the reason for decreasing job stability,
there would be nothing to worry about. As shown by Figure 2.4, new hires only
accounted for the decline in median elapsed tenure in the last two years of our
observation period. From 1993 to 1997, the number of employees declined.
Having ruled out these two possibilities, the effects of the “usual suspects” can be
investigated, namely, structural change, “globalization” and technological progress
leading to both increased layoffs and quits as new job opportunities arise. The result
would again be reduced average tenure. Astonishingly little is known about these
interdependencies, although the effects on wage differentials have been of some con-
cern.10 Moreover, few previous studies have focused on the reasons for increasing
10See e.g. Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Krugman 1994; Leamer 1994, 1997.
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job instability. Booth et al. (1999) show that, over a period of some forty years,
the likelihood of individuals exiting their jobs has increased in the UK, with lay-
offs increasing more than quits. Their findings clearly illustrate the increased job
instability in the 1980s. For the US, Valetta (1999b) shows that male workers with
substantial job tenure experienced a rising incidence of permanent layoffs between
1976 and 1992. Keeping this in mind, we now go on to explore the development of
job duration in West Germany, the reasons for separation and the employment state
after separation in more detail.
2.5 Do Jobs Tend to End Earlier and, if so, Why?
A good way to look at the development of job duration is to perform duration
analysis. This type of analysis has several advantages. The basic building blocks of
duration analysis are hazard rates, which indicate the rate at which a job will end at
a specific point of time, given that it has lasted until that time. Changes in this rate
can be interpreted as changes in the evolution of job stability. A second advantage
of duration analysis is that it offers estimation approaches that are insensitive to
changes in the inflow rate. Remember that elapsed tenure is a retrospective measure,
where the inflow rate is very influential.
Thirdly, duration models use information on the exact termination date of each job
and control for the right censoring of spells (i.e. the fact that the jobs observed at a
certain point in time will continue for an unknown time span). Furthermore, elapsed
tenure is usually only considered on a yearly basis (as are retention rate estimates).
The GSOEP, however, includes monthly information on job duration that can and
should be exploited. Finally, our duration analysis in the tradition of Booth et al.
(1999) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) is multivariate, with all observations and
influences being combined in a single estimation, adding to the clarity of the results.
In more conventional multivariate analyses separate models are needed for workers
with different elapsed tenures.11
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this shift in the type of analysis also entails
a shift in perspective. We sample jobs rather than people. As most people tend to
be in long–term jobs, but most jobs are short lived, the average duration of a job
spell is rather short compared to the elapsed firm tenure (Topel and Ward 1992,
Farber 1999). Indeed, we believe that it is important to test the influence of short
jobs when addressing the question of changing job stability.
Many previous studies on job stability have neglected another important aspect –
what happens to workers who leave a job? Do they become unemployed, employed,
or do they even leave the labor force altogether (see also Neumark, 2000)? It would
11For Logit regressions on the probability of being in short or long jobs, see Mertens 1999.
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certainly be more alarming to find that job duration declines due to increased transi-
tions to unemployment rather than to increased transitions to new jobs or training.
Therefore, following our analysis of job duration until layoffs or quits, we perform
an analysis of job duration until transition to unemployment or to a new job in
another firm. An advantage of this analysis is that the employment calendar in the
GSOEP provides us with data on the transition state for a large proportion of the
short jobs. However, the downside is that we do not have job–specific information
for a significant share of the short jobs.
2.5.1 Empirical Modeling
The basic tools to model duration data are survival functions F¯ (x) and hazard
functions h(t) at some duration t . Duration t is commonly defined as a measure of
length of a spell between certain events.
F¯ (x) gives the probability that a duration will last longer than t. Formally, for
continuous time:
F¯ (x) = P [T ≥ t] = 1− F (x) = 1−
∫ t
0
f(s) ds(2.1)
with denoting F (x) the distribution function and f(t) the density function for some
duration t.
The hazard function h(t) gives the rate per time period at time that the probability
of a spell terminating is amassed conditional on the spell not being terminated prior
to t. For continuous duration the hazard function h(t) is defined by
h(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t)
=
f(t)
F¯
(2.2)
It should be noted, that the hazard and survival function are closely related (as well
as with the density and the distribution function). One can be derived by the other
using the following relationship.
F¯ (x) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
h(s) ds
)
(2.3)
However, individuals might face different risks of terminating a spell according to
their environmental and individual characteristics. Furthermore, the risk might
change over the duration of a spell: an observation, which is commonly subsumed
under the heading ‘duration dependence’. Consequently, the hazard function should
be modeled such that it not only depends on time but also on covariates i.e.:
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h(t) = θ(t|x)(2.4)
We chose the popular Semi–Parametric Proportional Cox Model as a basis for our
estimation. The model works on the usual assumption of a proportional effect of
covariates on the hazard rate θ(t) .
θ(t|x) = θ0(t) exp(xβ)(2.5)
The major advantage of this model is that it leaves the form of the so–called ’baseline
hazard’ θ0(t) unspecified. Thus, no special assumption concerning the duration
dependence is necessary.
We extend this standard Cox Model in three ways to address our research question.
First, the model is specified in an independent competing risk form to distinguish
between the determinants that are responsible either for the different reasons of
job termination or for the different transition states. In the independent competing
risk specification, the hazard of dismissal is, for example, estimated by treating
termination due to quitting or due to other reasons as censored, and vice versa.
Second, to capture time trends in the hazard of job termination, we incorporate
covariates into the regression (xaτ ) which capture the influence of calendar time τ on
the hazard rates (either dummies for each year of the 1984–1997 period or a time
trend variable taking value 1 for 1984 to 14 for 1997).
Third, we remove the proportionality assumption for these calendar time variables
and allow for different effects on the hazard rates, depending on how long the job
had already lasted. In varying combinations, we distinguish job durations of up to
one year, more than one year but less than or equal to 10 years, and more than 10
years. Furthermore, we try to take account of the changing economic conditions as
well as changing individual determinants over the length of a spell xbτ by allowing
these covariates to vary on an annual basis.
We estimate exit–specific hazard rates of the Semi–Parametric Proportional Cox
Model consisting of elements of the following equation:
θe(t|x) = θe0(t) exp(x
a
τβ
a
e + I(t ≤ 12)x
a
τβ
a1
e + I(t ≤ 120)x
a
τβ
a2
e + x
b
τβ
b
e)(2.6)
where θe0(t) is the ’baseline’ hazard for the respective termination state e and
x = (xaτ , x
b
τ ) are the time–varying covariates. These hazard rates are estimated
separately for each gender, as the employment behavior of men and women shows
clear differences.
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Note that our model can deal with left–truncated spells. This is necessary as part
of our sample is a stock sample, meaning that our analysis includes job spells for
which we know the start date and that they had not ended by the date on which the
stock sample was drawn. Had these spells ended before this date, we would not have
observed them. By far the largest part of our stock sample was drawn in January
1984. Starting with January 1984, we have data on the monthly employment status
and job changes of interviewees who regularly took part in the GSOEP. We therefore
observe the end (or the time of censoring) of all jobs started in 1984 and later.
However, jobs started before 1984 are only included in our sample if they ended in
1984 or later. The rest of the stock sample is drawn from newcomers to the GSOEP.
It is crucial to use a stock sample approach in order to be able to analyze jobs that
have already existed for a long time. If we used only a flow sample, we would only
be able to analyze jobs lasting a maximum of 14 years. Furthermore, by adding the
stock sample we are able to increase our sample size considerably. We are not aware
of other studies in the area of job stability that have exploited these advantages
of a stock sample.12 To incorporate the stock sample in our empirical analysis,
we assume that there is no unobserved heterogeneity – a common assumption in
the job stability literature. If we rule out unobserved heterogeneity, the following
relationship is valid and is taken into account in the likelihood contribution of the
stock sample:
θe|p(r|p, x, S) = θ(r + p|x)(2.7)
with p denoting the elapsed duration, r the residual duration and S presence in the
stock.
2.5.2 Multivariate Estimation Results
Let us first consider whether the risk of a job spell ending has increased in recent
years. As mentioned in the data section, we can only use data collected between
1984 and 1997, as a subsequent change in the wording of the job change questions
made it impossible to create a consistent variable over time. We start with an
analysis as comparable as possible to the analysis of elapsed tenure by ignoring
the reason for separation. Therefore, we regress job duration on yearly dummies
for job durations of up to 12 months and job durations of more than 12 months
12See Appendix 2.D for a duration analysis of job spell data on the basis of a flow sample. Here
the job spell data is used as described in Appendix 2.D.1. The basic results are similar to the one
in section 2.5.2. However, due to the small sample size and the different extraction method, we
can not conduct such a differentiated analysis with respect to the reasons of change in job duration
and the transition rates.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Coefficients for the Evolution of the Hazard of Job Termina-
tion – Men∗
∗Note: Results are based on a duration models. The estimated coefficients on calendar time
dummies are depicted. See text for details. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. Only German citizens living in West
Germany (Sample A), aged 16–56 at the beginning of the job spell, working full– or part–time.
Excluding civil servants, apprentices and self–employed respondents, workers in agriculture, non–
profit organizations and private households, and observations with missing values for age, sex or
education. For job spells longer than 12 months, observations with missing values on the reason
for separation, job status, industry or firm size are also excluded.
(see Figures 2.5 and 2.6).13 Our base category is the year 1986, which is the third
13For jobs of up to 12 months duration, we do not exclude spells with missing values for variables
such as job status and industry affiliation, as the sample size would otherwise be too small.
29
Figure 2.6: Estimated Coefficients for the Evolution of the Hazard of Job Termina-
tion – Women∗
∗Note: Results are based on a duration models. See text for details. Dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. For sample selection, see note to Figure
2.5.
year in a row with relatively stable growth rates (see figure 2.4). For jobs lasting
longer than 12 months, the results are consistent with the results of our preceding
analysis on elapsed tenure. There are some indications of an increase the hazard of
job termination for men, less so for women. In contrast to job durations of more
than 12 months, we find a slightly declining hazard for jobs lasting up to 12 months,
indicating that short jobs somewhat became longer, especially for men. It should be
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Coefficients for the Evolution of the Hazard of Job Termina-
tion – Competing Risk Model — Hazard of being Laid off∗
∗Note: Results are based on competing risk models. See text for details. Dotted lines represent
95% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. For sample selection, see note to Figure
2.5.
mentioned that here, and in the following step of our duration analysis, the results
for women have to be interpreted very carefully, as due to identification problems,
we cannot yet control for the change in the wording of the questionnaire since 1991.
With these results in mind, we now go on to look at whether there are any changes
in the way a job ended. Using our spell data, we are able to address this question in
a differentiated analysis. As outlined above, job–specific information is consistently
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Coefficients for the Evolution of the Hazard of Job Termina-
tion – Competing Risk Model – Hazard of Quitting∗
∗Note: Results are based on competing risk models. See text for details. Dotted lines represent
95% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. For sample selection, see note to Figure
2.5.
available only for jobs lasting longer than 12 months. Moreover, these are the jobs
for which data on the reason for separation are most often available. Therefore,
only jobs lasting longer than 12 months are included in the analysis of the reason
for job termination. This approach is justified by the fact that short jobs are often
substantially different in nature from jobs lasting longer than 12 months, consisting
mainly of holiday jobs for students or short–term replacement jobs. This might
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Figure 2.9: Estimated Coefficients for the Evolution of the Hazard of Job Termina-
tion – Competing Risk Model – Hazard of Leaving due to Other Reasons∗
∗Note: Results are based on competing risk models. See text for details. Dotted lines represent
95% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. For sample selection, see note to Figure
2.5.
also explain the diverging evolution over time of the hazard of job termination.
Nevertheless, when analyzing jobs by destination state, we will again consider job
durations of up to 12 months.
In order to get an idea of how job duration evolved until dismissal, quit or termi-
nation for other reasons, we first regress job duration until each of these three exit
states on calendar time dummies. Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 present the estimation
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results. The coefficients on the yearly dummies vary strongly over time. Roughly
speaking, the hazard of men being laid off declines until 1989, increases again until
1993, and then remains at a relatively high level compared to the 1984–1992 period
(the year 1985 being an exception, with relatively high hazard rates). There is a
similar pattern for women, but neither the decline up to the year 1989 nor the sub-
sequent increase is as pronounced as for men. Indeed, women’s hazard of being laid
off in the mid–1980s is similar to that in the late 1990s, following the peak in 1993.
Because the coefficients on the year dummies capture not only a potential secular
trend, but also other calendar time effects, parts of the movement can logically be
explained by business cycle effects. The direction of movement strongly coincides
with the West German economic cycle (see Figure 2.4 and section 2.4).
Turning now to the hazard of quitting, we find exactly the opposite pattern to the
hazard of being laid off. Compared to the year 1986, however, the coefficients are
rarely significant and the trend is much less pronounced. The hazard of men leaving
their job due to other reasons increased in the economic boom period of 1991, as
compared to 1986, and remained at a relatively high level. For women, however, we
see a strong increase in the hazard of job termination due to other reasons starting in
1990. This can probably be partly explained by the introduction of maternity leave
as an explicit response category in the questionnaire (see the data section above).
To examine whether the evolution of the hazard of job termination due to dismissal,
quit or other reasons can be understood as a secular trend, we will now partly
compress and partly expand our econometric model. Instead of the yearly dummies,
we include a time trend variable, taking value 1 in 1984, 2 in 1985 and so forth, up
to value 14 in 1997. We expand the model by controlling for the influence of the
business cycle by including the average growth rate of real GDP at the current point
in time and lagged by one year, as well as the average of the two– and three–year
lagged growth rates. Additionally, we control for possible changes in the composition
of the workforce by including determinants known to influence job duration (e.g.
Mertens 1998) in the econometric model. Two different types of covariates can
be distinguished. First, individual characteristics known to influence job duration
such as age and kind of professional education. Second, job–specific variables such
as part–time status (regular part–time and marginal employment), firm size and
industry affiliation. Finally, we incorporate a dummy in the econometric model for
women to account for the change in the wording of the questionnaire as of 1990.
The evolution of layoffs and quits over time is of particular interest. Therefore, let us
first consider the coefficient on the time trend in Table 2.2, Appendix 2.A. Despite
controlling for the business cycle, as well as individual and job characteristics, we
find a clear tendency towards an increase in the hazard of men being laid off. The
coefficient is positive and significant. The hazard of men quitting, on the other hand,
is not influenced by calendar time, but there is an increasing trend in the hazard of
men leaving a job due to other reasons. For women, there is no significant trend in
34
the hazard of being laid off, quitting or leaving due to other reasons.
Let us now consider the influence of the economic conditions on job duration. As
expected, the state of the economy has a significant impact on job duration. In
an economic slowdown, the risk of being given notice increases, whereas in an eco-
nomic upturn, the odds of resigning increase. The hazard of men leaving due to
other reasons increases in times of positive economic development. These results
again emphasize the importance of distinguishing between business cycle influences
and secular trends in job duration. This fact was not taken into consideration by
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999), for example. Similar to our study, they included
a linear trend term for the year of observation in their analysis, but they did not
include measures of labor market tightness.
The results concerning the influence of age on job duration can be summarized as
follows: Men aged 56 and older are more likely to be laid off. The younger workers
are, the more likely they are to quit voluntarily. For men, the hazard of leaving due
to other reasons initially decreases with age, but increases again among those aged
56 and older. For women, it increases for the age 26–35 group, then decreases, and
increases again among those aged 56 and older. Education also plays only a limited
role in determining job duration. Having a college degree increases the odds of men
resigning, whereas women with a college degree are more likely to leave the job due
to other reasons.
Working part–time increased the odds of both men and women quitting, and of men
ending their job due to other reasons. For women, working part–time is associated
with less risk of being laid off.
Firm size has the expected effect on job separation. The risk of being laid off is higher
in small firms than in medium–sized or larger firms, and individuals employed in
large firms are less likely to quit. As expected, industry affiliation also influences
job duration. For example, working in the credit and insurance sector decreases the
hazard of being laid off, and working in public administration reduces the hazard
of women quitting. Finally, it should be mentioned that the hazard of women
ending a job due to other reasons has increased significantly since 1990. This can
be attributed to the introduction of maternity leave as a potential reason for job
termination in the GSOEP questionnaire.
We will now continue to study potential reasons for the decline in job security.
Naturally, one reason that suggests itself is a change in labor market regulations.
However, only a few small changes occurred during the observation period, and
were introduced either at the beginning or at the end of this period (see Walwei,
1998). Thus, they can hardly explain the trend observed. Since 1985, the regulations
concerning fixed–term contracts have become slightly less restrictive, and a formal
reason is no longer necessary to justify a contract of this type. Furthermore, since
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October 1996, the maximum length of fixed–term contracts has been increased from
18 to 24 months, and employment protection has been slightly weakened. The list
of social criteria used to determine which employees should be dismissed last has
been trimmed. Finally, firms with less than 11 employees no longer fall under the
employment protection law. Before October 1996, the number of employees was 6.
Finally, more account should now be taken of the firm’s interests when applying
employment protection law – a ruling which is difficult to implement.
The rise in flexible work arrangements such as part–time work has also been sug-
gested as a possible explanation for the decline in job stability (see e.g. Levenson,
2000). As we controlled for potential changes in the composition of part–time vs.
full–time contracts in our reference model, the trend towards an increase in the haz-
ard of men being laid off or ending a job due to other reasons cannot attributed to
any change in the composition of hours worked. In order to identify any changes in
the hazard of ending a part–time job, we interact the time trend with a part–time
dummy in an extended model.14
Other reasons that have been proposed for a decline in job security include downsiz-
ing of firms (see e.g. Cappelli, 2000), skill–biased technological change (Givord and
Maurin, 2003), and weakening bonds with the firm (Valetta, 1999b). We will test
the downsizing hypothesis by interacting the trend variable with firm size in order
to test whether larger firms are mainly responsible for the increased incidence of
layoffs. To test for skill-biased technological change, we will interact the skill level
of the individual with the time trend. If skill–biased technological change is respon-
sible for the trend in the hazard of job termination, we would expect low–skilled
workers to be most strongly affected by the changes.
In addition, we examine whether long–tenured workers are at higher risk of being laid
off by including a time trend variable only valid for individuals with more than 10
years of tenure. This constitutes another aspect of skill–biased technological change,
which eliminates routine tasks where high–tenured workers are at a comparative
advantage (Autor et al., 2003). If high–tenured workers are found to have not only
an increasing hazard of being laid off, but also an increasing hazard of quitting, this
might be understood as a general weakening of the bonds between the firms and
their workers (Valetta, 1999b).
The results of our extended model (see Appendix 2.A, Table 2.3) show that men in
part–time jobs do not face an increasing hazard of being laid off as compared to men
in full–time jobs; rather, the hazard of being laid off from a part–time job declines
over time.
14Another flexible work arrangement which might be responsible for the trends in the hazard
rate is fixed–term contracts. Unfortunately, the GSOEP variable on limited term contracts has
many missings, meaning that a reliable analysis of limited term contracts is not possible in our
context.
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Another important result of our extended model is that the increased risk of men
being laid off is concentrated in large firms. This can be interpreted as some evidence
for the hypothesis that the downsizing of large firms has lead to decreased job
security.
We find no evidence for an increase in the risk of long–tenured employees being
laid off. In fact, we see the opposite pattern, with long–tenured male employees
experiencing a decline in the hazard of being laid off. This might be due to stricter
court rulings concerning the dismissal of long–tenured employees (see Franz and
Ru¨thers 1999). Likewise, there is no evidence that low–skilled employees experience
an increase in the hazard of being laid off. As neither the hazard of quitting nor the
hazard of being laid off rises for long–tenured employees, we find no evidence for a
general weakening of the bonds between firms and their employees.
We now turn to the second aspect of job stability, namely, whether individuals are
unemployed, employed, in training or out of the labor force after a job ends. Table
2.4 in Appendix 2.A summarizes the estimation results when time trend variables
are used to capture the evolution of the hazard of job termination with transition
to unemployment, employment or nonparticipation. We use all job durations in this
analysis because, in contrast to the reason for job termination, the transition state
is available for nearly all jobs, irrespective of their length. The downside of this,
however, is that we cannot control for job–specific characteristics, except for part–
time status.15 To capture potential diverging trends for jobs of different durations,
we incorporate interaction terms for job durations of up to 12 months.
Let us first summarize the results for men. There is a significant increase over time
in the hazard of entering unemployment for men in a job already lasting one year
or longer. For men in short jobs, in contrast, the hazard of entering unemployment
declines significantly over time, as a test of the joint significance of the time trend
and the interaction term for short job durations revealed. With respect to transi-
tions towards new jobs or nonparticipation, there are no significant changes in the
hazard rates for men who had already been in a job for more than 12 months. For
women, we do not detect any significant changes in the hazard of entering unemploy-
ment, but the hazard of changing jobs increased slightly and the hazard of entering
nonparticipation increased significantly for women who had already been in a job
for longer than 12 months. The fact that short jobs are substantially different in
nature from jobs lasting longer than a year is again shown in the hazard of entering
nonparticipation. This hazard declined significantly for both men and women for
jobs of up to 12 months duration.
15The results for the hazard of transitions from jobs lasting more than 12 months to unemploy-
ment, a new job or nonparticipation persist when we analyze these jobs only and include further
job–specific covariates. Extending the model concerning termination due to layoffs, quits and other
reasons in the same way does not provide any additional insights into the reasons for the evolution
of the hazard of entering one of the three transition states. Therefore, we only present this short
version.
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An important result of this analysis of transition states is the increasing hazard over
time of entering unemployment for men in jobs of more than 12 months. A natural
hypothesis is that this development coincides with the increase in the hazard of men
being laid off. To investigate this, we now distinguish between layoffs leading to
unemployment and layoffs leading to a new job or nonparticipation. Furthermore,
we analyze transitions into unemployment initiated by quits or other reasons. The
hazards of these three competing risks are again only estimated for job durations of
more than 12 months, as the reasons for job termination play a role here (see Table
2.5 and 2.6 in Appendix 2.A).
Astonishingly, we do not find such a close relationship between layoffs and transitions
to unemployment. The results for men show a positive but insignificant coefficient
on the trend variable. In contrast, there is a slight trend towards an increase in
the hazard of men being laid off when the dismissal is followed by a new job or
nonparticipation Furthermore, there is a slightly significant trend for transitions
into unemployment initiated by quits or other reasons.
2.6 Conclusion
Our results provide some evidence to support the view that job stability in West
Germany declined in the 1980s and 1990s. However, not all demographic groups
in the labor market were equally affected. Using repeated cross–sections from the
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), we show that male workers aged between
16 and 56 experienced a decrease in median elapsed tenure from 9.4 years in 1984
to 7.5 years in 1999. While women in countries like the US or the UK were able
to accrue higher median tenure, there was no such an increase in Germany between
1984 and 1997.
These simple cross–sectional results are confirmed by our analysis of the hazard of
job termination. Estimating a Cox Model with only calendar time dummies, we
show that there are signs of an increase in the risk of job termination over the
observation period for men who had already been in a job for 12 months.
Extending our analysis to a Competing Risks Model with respect to the reasons for
job termination, and controlling for the business cycle as well as demographic and
job characteristics, we are able to show that this increase was caused primarily by
a rise in layoffs and terminations due to other reason.
When analyzing the hazards of becoming unemployed, entering a new job or non-
participation, we find that men face an increasing risk of becoming unemployment
if they have already been in their job for more than one year. In addition, women
face an increasing hazard of nonparticipation if they have already been in a job for
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more than one year.
However, the increased risk of men being laid off does not coincide with an increased
risk of men entering unemployment, as one might have expected. Instead, there are
signs that the increased hazard of being laid off coincides with transitions to a new
job or to nonparticipation. Similarly, the increased hazard of entering unemployment
is related to transitions that are initiated by quits or other reasons.
The results of the duration analysis described thus far are only valid for jobs which
have already lasted one year. The pattern of results for short jobs is substantially
different, however. For job durations of up to one year, we find a decreasing hazard
of job termination, especially for men, coinciding with a decreasing hazard of being
laid off, becoming unemployed, and entering nonparticipation.
Where the reasons for the decline in job stability are concerned, some of the increased
risk of job termination seems to be related to the downsizing of large firms, as
the increased risk of men being laid off is concentrated in these firms. However,
the hypothesis that skill–biased technological change or a general weakening of the
bonds between firms and their workers are responsible for this development cannot
be confirmed for West Germany.
Considering our empirical results, it would certainly be exaggerated to claim that
there has been a serious deterioration in job stability. Still, there is cause for con-
cern. With men increasingly exposed to layoffs and increased transitions to unem-
ployment, the willingness to accrue education and specific capital may be limited.
Moreover, although wage losses upon re–employment are not as large as in the
United States for the majority of workers, prolonged unemployment may lead to
severe income losses (Burda and Mertens 2000). Finally, it may be the case that
increasing layoff risks affect ‘outsiders’ more severely, leading to stronger dualization
of the labor market. On the other hand, it could be argued that the decrease in job
stability simply shows that the German economy is adjusting to the globalization
and technological innovation process – especially considering that the increased risk
of men being laid off is not accompanied by a similar significant increase in the risk
of transitions to unemployment. The interpretation that the economy is becoming
more flexible, with positive side–effects on macroeconomic development is, however,
questionable in view of persistently high unemployment rates. Further studies are
clearly needed to shed more light on the background to this development.
Appendices to Chapter 2
2.A Tables
Table 2.1: Median Tenure in Years
Men Women
Median tenure N of observations Median tenure N of observations
1984 9.4 1891 5.5 1305
1985 8.7 1726 5.5 1258
1986 8.5 1649 6 1189
1987 8.5 1629 6.1 1160
1988 8.5 1560 6 1140
1989 8.5 1540 6 1158
1990 7.8 1541 5.8 1172
1991 7.6 1548 5.7 1212
1992 7.8 1509 5.8 1184
1993 8 1486 5.8 1179
1994 8.5 1398 6.1 1141
1995 8 1372 6 1072
1996 7.7 1361 6.4 1083
1997 7.8 1318 5.5 1093
1998 7.6 1261 5.8 1057
1999 7.5 1277 5.4 1087
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1999. Only German citizens living in West
Germany (Sample A), aged 16–56, working full– or part–time. Excluding civil servants, apprentices,
self–employed respondents, workers in agriculture, non–profit organizations and private households,
and observations with missing values for age, sex, job status, industry affiliation or tenure.
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Table 2.2: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to the Reasons for Termination of Jobs Lasting Longer than One Year – Reference
Model
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Note: Robust standard errors with respect to individuals reported in brackets; * indicates signif-
icance at the 5% significance level, ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance
level.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. Only German citizens living in West
Germany (Sample A), aged 16–56 at the beginning of the job spell, working full– or part–time.
Excluding civil servants, apprentices and self–employed respondents, workers in agriculture, non–
profit organizations and private households, and observations with missing values on the reason
for separation, age, sex, education, job status, industry or firm size. Data on GDP growth rates
are taken from the Working Group “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder”(2004).
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Table 2.3: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to the Reasons for Termination of Jobs Lasting Longer than One Year – Extended
Model
For notes and sources, see Table 2.2.
43
Table 2.4: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to Transition States
Note: Robust standard errors with respect to individuals reported in brackets; * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10%
significance level.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984–1998. Only German citizens living in West
Germany (Sample A), aged 16–56 at the beginning of the job spell, working full– or part–time.
Excluding civil servants, apprentices and self–employed respondents, workers in agriculture,
non–profit organizations and private households, and observations with missing values for age,
sex, or education. For jobs lasting more than 12 months, observations are also excluded if reasons
for job separation, job status, industry or firm size are missing. Data on GDP growth rates are
taken from the Working Group“Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder” (2004).
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Table 2.5: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Combina-
tions of Reasons for Job Separation and Transition States for Jobs Lasting Longer
than 12 Months – Men
For notes and sources. see Table 2.2.
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Table 2.6: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Combina-
tions of Reasons for Job Separation and Transition States for Jobs Lasting Longer
than 12 Months – Women
For notes and sources. see Table 2.2.
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2.B The Data Set Combining Reported Job
Changes with Monthly Spell Data
The data were extracted using the CD–Rom Version 2000 and SAS V8.
Steps:
1. Extraction of Cross–Sectional Data
2. Calendar Information
3. Creation of Change Variables
4. Splitting Spells
5. Adding Cross–Sectional Information to the Calendar Information
6. Reasons for Job Termination
7. Combining Spells with Adjacent Spells
8. Left–Censored Spells
9. Additional Data Sources
10. Selection
1. Extraction of Cross–Sectional Data The cross–sectional information is
extracted and pooled into one data set where variables are named according to the
wave of origin, i.e. branch85, branch86, etc.
2. Calendar Information The calendar information is rather simple and in-
cludes only a few important variables: persnr, spelltype, begin, end, censor. Spelltyp
can take the following values:
1=full–time
2=short work hours
3=part–time
4=vocational training
5=unemployed
6=retired
7=maternity leave (only since 1990)
8=school, college
9=military
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10=housewife, husband
11=second job
12=other
These form the basis for our analysis. However, there are several steps necessary to
transform calendar information into job–spell information. First, we create a new
variable “typnew” as follows, to distinguish major labor market groups:
typnew=.;
IF (spelltyp=1 or spelltyp=2) THEN typnew=1; /* Full–time*/
IF (spelltyp=4 or spelltyp=8) THEN typnew=2; /* School, training*/
IF spelltyp=5 THEN typnew=3; /* Unemployment */
IF spelltyp=3 THEN typnew=4; /* Part–time */
IF (spelltyp=6 or spelltyp=7 or spelltyp=9 or spelltyp=10 or spelltyp=11 or spell-
typ=12 ) THEN typnew=5; /*Non–participation */
IF spelltyp=99 THEN typnew=99; /*missing*/
Parallel spells might be problematic in the following analysis. Take, for example, a
worker with a full–time job, who reports a parallel spell at school or in a part–time
job. For our job change analysis we are primarily interested in the main occupation.
Therefore we eliminate parallel spells using the following procedure:
i) Within spelltypes ”typnew” parallel spells are eliminated by shortening the first
spell.
ii) Between spelltypes ”typnew” the following hierarchy is used: full–time work,
school/training, unemployment, part–time work, non–participation.
3. Creation of Change Variables The cross–sectional and calendar information
is then combined into a single data set. First of all, two switch variables are created
from the information on changes in the current year (e.g. in the 1989 interview for
switches since January 1989) and from the information on switches in the previous
year (e.g. in the 1989 interview for switches between January 1988 and December
1988). The data structure is such that one switch can be mentioned twice if there
is a switch, for example, in March 1988 and there are interviews in April 1988 and
March 1989. The exact question asked in the GSOEP in 1989 is:
”When did you give up your last job?
–1988 in the month of...... (previous year)
–1989 in the month of...... (current year)
The creation of two change variables, however, might create unrealistically short
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spells if respondents remember switches inaccurately. Therefore we assume that
switches occurring in the interval [-2 months, 2 months] are the same job change.
Thus, if a switch is reported for“March 1988” in 1988 and for “April 1988” in 1989,
we use the information provided closer to the event reported, i.e. March 1988.
4. Splitting Spells The change variables are then used to split employment
spells, full–time and part–time spells. Again, there might be problem with the
information provided in the data set when respondents switch between full–time
and part–time work (reported in the calendar) and report that switch with slight
deviations in the cross–sectional question. To avoid unrealistically short spells, we
check whether the split procedure creates short spells of up to two months. If this
is the case, the split is not performed.
5. Adding Cross–Sectional Information to the Calendar Information Fol-
lowing the split procedure, we match spells with the relevant cross–sectional infor-
mation. We create a data set with time–varying variables. First, there is information
relevant to all spells within a year, like education and age. These data are added
by simply checking whether the spell includes a certain year. By running the match
procedure backwards from 1998 to 1985, we are sure to catch the earliest observation
for each spell.
Second, there is job–relevant information (industry, occupation, firm size, worker
status) from the cross–section that should only be used for the employment spell
at the time of the interview. Therefore, we use the interview date to match the
information. If the interview date is missing we use March, because this is the most
frequent interview month.
6. Reasons for Job Termination If the interviewee indicates that s/he has
given up a job since the beginning of the year prior to the interview, the following
questions are posed :
(i) When did you give up your last job?
(ii) Why did you leave this job? Which of the following applies?
We classify the answers to this question into three groups.
1) Lay–off: Terminations initiated by the firm.
2) Quits: Terminations initiated by the worker.
3) Other reasons: End of fixed–term contract, maternity leave, (early) retirement,
and leave of absence.
However, the possible answers to the question “Why did you leave the job” changed
over our period of observation. One change was that severance by mutual agreement
was a possible answer in the 1985–1990 period, whereas no such answer was possible
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in the interviews of 1991–1998. However, in the first period an additional question
was posed concerning the motivation for job termination, such that we are able
to deduce whether, in case of a mutual agreement, the termination was initiated
by the firm or by the worker. We conducted a number of sensitivity checks and
did not find any indication for a structural break in the frequency of our reason
for job termination variable for the questionnaire years 1990 to 1991 (when using
our classification). A problematic change in the questionnaire was that, as of 1991,
maternity leave was given as a possible reason for job termination. We could not
generate corresponding information for the preceding years. Therefore we will take
this structural break into account in our multivariate analysis.
7. Combining Spells with Adjacent Spells The calendar reports short–time
work which is not a job switch. Therefore, we combine short–time work with the
immediately preceding employment spell. Along the same lines, we combine adjacent
full–time and part–time spells for which no reason for separation is known. The
latter does not seem to influence the results significantly.
8. Left–Censored Spells The GSOEP gives a left–censored status to employ-
ment spells for which the start date is not known. In these cases, we match cross–
sectional information on the time spent with the current employer, in order to deduce
the start date of the job. In this way, left–censored spells become left truncated (a
stock sample) and can be used in the duration analysis. We also use this approach
for employment spells starting before 1984, as we do not have spell split informa-
tion for the year 1983, the first year the monthly calendar was implemented in the
GSOEP.
9. Additional Data Sources We merged information on the yearly growth rate
of real GDP in the German states to the individual job spells. These data are pro-
vided by the Working Group ”Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Laender”,
see http : //www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis− V GR .
10. Selection The following selection applies:
• Aged 16–56 at the beginning of the spell
• Without self–employed respondents
• Without apprentices
• Without civil servants
• Without agriculture (including forestry and fisheries)
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• Without non–profit organizations
• 1984–1997
• NB: We could not include years 1998 onwards because the wording of the
questionnaire changes in 1999 with respect to the job change information and
thus, from 1998 onwards, we are unable to create the same variable for job
change reason as before.
• Without spells that report end of training as reason for switch
• Without spells that report end of own business as reason for switch
• Full–time and part–time
• Sample A (West Germans)
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2.C Sensitivity Analysis for Elapsed Tenure 1984–
1997 Using Weights
Figure 2.10: The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Age Groups Using Weights
Note: All observations are weighted by the GSOEP sample weight. Source: Own calculations
based on the GSOEP 1984–1997. Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample A),
aged 16–65, working full– or part–time. Excluding civil servants, apprentices and self–employed
respondents, workers in agriculture, non–profit organizations and private households, and
observations with missing values for age, sex, job status, industry affiliation or tenure.
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Figure 2.11: The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Hours Worked Using
Weights
Notes and sources see figure 2.10
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Figure 2.12: The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Industry Using Weights
Notes and sources see figure 2.10
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2.D Sensitivity Analysis for Duration Analysis Us-
ing a Flow Sample from Reported Job Changes
2.D.1 The Data Set
In the GSOEP, workers report changes of the employment situation in the year
before or during the year of the interview. With the help of this information we
trace the job back to the point of time when it started. In the consecutive waves,
we check whether and why jobs possibly ended. In this way, jobs, which cover the
minimum of one interview date, can be detected. As the GSOEP consistently offers
this information on the job start date only since the beginning of 1985, we only take
spells into considerations, which began since 1985. The observation period ends
in December 1996. There exists a problem if more than one job change occurred
between two interview dates. In this case, the exact termination date of the first
job is not available. However, we know the time period (maximum of one year), in
which the job ended. We set the end of the job heuristically in the middle of this
period. Jobs of people who drop out of the GSOEP are treated as censored.
We select for our analysis only the original West German sample A, containing
German citizens only. In the multivariate analysis we only select workers, who
started the job at age between 16 and 56. Civil servants, apprentices and the self–
employed were equally dropped from our sample, as were workers in agriculture,
non–profit organizations and private households. Finally, we did not include workers
with missing values on either reason for termination, age, sex, education, firm size,
and industry affiliation.
Here, we restrict ourselves on extracting a flow sample, which is equivalent to saying
that we only extract job spells which start during the observation period, in which
we can also observe their end, in case they would end. This is the approach usually
taken when analyzing job stability with duration analysis (see Booth, et. al., 1999
or Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1999).
2.D.2 Multivariate Estimation Results
To receive results that are comparable to the analysis of elapsed tenure, we first
ignore the reason for separation. We regress job duration with the aid of the Cox
Proportional Hazard Rate Model on a time trend (and a dummy for the change
in questionnaire for women), whereby the time trend is modeled as a time varying
variable which takes the value 1 when the job was held in 1985, 2 when held in 1986
and so forth. Note that here and in the following we analyze all jobs, irrespectively
of the job duration. The results are documented in Appendix section 2.D.3, Table
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2.7. The data confirm the statements of the analysis on elapsed tenure. We find
a tendency for a decline in job duration for men over time but no such result for
women. In a second step, job duration until dismissal, quit or termination due to
other reasons is purely regressed on the time trend and the dummy for the change in
questionnaire for women. Appendix section 2.D.3, Table 2.8 presents the estimation
results. As the coefficients show, job duration of men until layoff decreased signifi-
cantly over time. For women, there also seems to be such a tendency over time, but
this might also be due to the interaction with the change of questionnaire dummy.
There are indications that job duration until quitting of men has slightly increased.
Job duration of men ending out of other reasons decreased slightly over time. Since
the change of questionnaire there is a significant increase in the frequency of an-
swers of women to leave the job due to other reasons. Further determinants are
included in the econometric model. Firstly, the growth rate of the real GDP is
incorporated to capture the changes in the economic conditions of West Germany.
Secondly, individual and job specific characteristics, similar to the reference model
are included.
Table 2.9 in Appendix section 2.D.3 presents the estimation of the hazards of job
termination for this model. Let us first consider the influence of the economic
conditions on job duration. The state of the economy has a significant impact
on job duration. In an economic slowdown, the risk of being given notice increases,
whereas in an economic upturn the odds to resign increase. However, the significance
of the coefficient on the growth rate in the model of quits for women on the 10%
level might indicate that the relationship is not as simple as it is modeled here.
The issue of particular interest is the evolution of layoffs and quits over time. There-
fore, let us turn to the coefficient on the time trend. First, the results for men are
reported. There is still a clear tendency towards an increase in the hazard of being
laid–off in this model. The coefficient is positive and significant. The hazard of
quitting, on the other hand, is not influenced by the time. There is still an increas-
ing trend in the hazard of leaving a job due to other reasons. The hazard of being
laid off for women looses its significant time trend in the reference model and female
quits and leaving due to other reasons continues depicting no significant change.
One might conjecture that the decrease of the job duration of men until termination
due to other reasons is the result of the extended early retirement programs and so
called ‘social plans’. With the aid of the social plans to reduce the workforce, it
was a relatively frequent practice to dissolve the working contract of older workers
while paying the difference between unemployment benefits up to the year of early
retirement (Bo¨rsch–Supan and Schnabel 1997). This can be interpreted as a kind
of discharge in early retirement, which often occurred in mutual agreement.
The results concerning the influence of age on job duration can be summarized as
follows: Young men at the age of 25 to 35 years are less likely to be laid off. Voluntary
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quitting is, however, more likely the younger the workers are and the probability to
leave the job due to other reason decreases first with age but increases again in the
age of 56 and older.
This fact as well as the argumentation on the early retirement programs suggests
a special influence of age on job duration. Therefore, we interact the time trend
with the age dummies. As Table 2.10 in Appendix section 2.D.3 shows, however,
that the increased risk over time for men of being laid off and to end a job due
to other reasons is relative equally distributed over age. Thus, the conjecture that
early retirement programs and social plans might play a role for the increased risk
for men of ending a job can not be confirmed with this data. However, it should be
noted that due to the flow sample approach we have only few to zero observations
for the oldest age categories. Women, in contrast, who are of age 36 to 45 became
more likely whereas older women became less likely to be laid off over time. With
respect to the hazard of job termination due to other reasons there is a slight decline
in the female age category of 26–35.
Further results on the determinants of job duration can be summarized as follows.
Vocational education has surprisingly little influence in determining job duration.
Working in a small firm increases the odds to be laid off for men and to quit for
men and women. Working in a large firm reduces the odd to quit and to leave the
job due to other reasons for men, and it reduces the risk to be laid off for women.
Finally the results concerning industry affiliation should be reported. As expected,
industry affiliation influences job duration, too. The dummies are in the specification
for men to leave the job for other reasons and for women in the specification of layoffs
and quits jointly significant on the 5% level. The direction of the effects is also less
surprising. For example, working in the construction industry increases the hazard
of being laid off for men, whereas working in public administration reduces the risk
for men and women.
To summarize, the main results of this sensitivity analysis with respect to the
development of job stability on the basis of a pure flow sample and a different data
extraction method are similar to the main analysis. Slight differences emerge with
respect to the influence of age and industry affiliation which are most likely due to
the underrepresentation of long job spells in the flow sample.
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2.D.3 Tables
Table 2.7: Hazard of Job Termination Using a Flow Sample from Reported Job
Changes
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on individuals, * indicates significance at the
5% significance level, ** at the 1%significance level and + at the 10% significance level.
Source: Own calculation using the GSOEP.Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample
A) full–time and part–time employees, without missing values on reason for separation, age, sex,
education, firm size and industry affiliation.
Table 2.8: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to the Resons for Termination Using a Flow Sample from Reported Job Changes
For note and sources, see Table 2.7.
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Table 2.9: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to the Reasons for Termination Using a Flow Sample from Reported Job Changes
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For notes and sources, see Table 2.7. Data on GDP growth rates are taken from the Working
Group “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder”(2004).
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Table 2.10: Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job Termination with Respect
to the Reasons for Termination Using a Flow Sample from Reported Job Changes
– Extended Model
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For notes and sources, see Table 2.7. Data on GDP growth rates are taken from the Working
Group “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder”(2004).
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Chapter 3
Evaluating the Dynamic
Employment Effects of Training
Programs in East Germany Using
Conditional
Difference–in–Differences
3.1 Introduction
After the formation of the German “Social and Economic Union” in 1990, the East
German economy underwent enormous changes. It had to transform from a com-
mand driven backward economy to a market economy at an unprecedented speed.
The transformation process brought about high unemployment in East Germany.
To increase the employment chances of the unemployed, the German government
decided to provide on a high scale Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) in East
Germany. These programs mainly consisted of training and temporary employment
schemes. In 2002, more than a decade after the reunification, the German Federal
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA) still spent around 20 Billion
Euro (≈ 0.9% of the GDP) for ALMP (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 2003). About
50% of this budget is spent in East Germany even though the labor force in East
Germany is less than one sixth of Germany as a whole. Quite a significant share of
the labor force in East Germany has been participating in programs of ALMP since
1990.
Contributing to the debate on the effectiveness of ALMP, this paper estimates the
employment effect of public sector sponsored training programs in East Germany
at the individual level for the time period 1990 to 1999. In the early 90s, training
was often considered to be the most effective among the ALMP programs. It was
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intended to provide skills that are in demand in a market economy but not in
sufficient supply due to the former educational system. Consequently, it took a
prominent role in the ALMP programs in East Germany.
In our empirical analysis we focus on the group of individuals who belonged to
the active labor force in 1990. This group was hit fully by the transformation
shock. We use data from the Labor Market Monitor for the state of Sachsen–Anhalt
(Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen–Anhalt LMM–SA), a data set allowing for monthly
information on employment and program participation.
We implement a semiparametric conditional difference–in–differences estimator
(CDiD) (Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd, 1998). In the light of the state depen-
dence of the employment process we extend the CDiD approach to use transition
rates between different labor market states as outcome variables instead of exclu-
sively use employment rates in levels as often done in the literature.
For the implementation of the CDiD estimator, we apply propensity score matching
in the first stage and then estimate average effects of treatment–on–the–treated.
The analysis matches treated individuals to nonparticipants using kernel matching
to account for selection on observables. Selection on time invariant unobservable
characteristics is controlled for using a conditional difference–in–differences estima-
tor. Our inference uses a bootstrap approach taking account of the estimation error
in the propensity score. We perform a sensitivity analysis on the implementation
details of the evaluation approach.
Our results indicate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate than using
unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success criterion
could result in misleading conclusions concerning the effectiveness of ALMP pro-
grams. With regard to the transition rates, we find that the employment effects are
mostly insignificant and that there are some significantly positive effects for selected
start dates.
In addition, our results show the usefulness of exploiting the additional information
which transition rates can provide as opposed to unconditional employment rates.
With the aid of transition rates we are able to determine whether ALMP programs
help to find a job and/or whether they rather stabilize employment. Our results
show significant variation over time concerning these two outcomes.
We make three additional points in the methodological debate on program evalua-
tion: First, anticipation effects regarding future participation or eligibility criteria
(Ashenfelter’s Dip) requiring a certain elapsed duration of unemployment for par-
ticipation are likely to affect strongly the results of any difference–in–differences
estimator (Heckman and Smith, 1999). Using institutional knowledge to bound
the start of the Ashenfelter’s Dip, we suggest a long–run difference–in–differences
estimator to take account of possible effects of anticipation or participation rules.
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Second, we suggest a heuristic cross–validation procedure for the bandwidth choice
which is well suited to the estimation of conditional expectations for counterfactual
variables.
The third point relates to the fact that in East Germany individuals often participate
more than once in a program during a short time period. Some observers (e.g. Hagen
and Steiner, 2000) suggest that multiple program participation occurs because the
participants cannot (or do not want to) find a job after the end of the first program.
In order to keep their transfer income (and possibly in order to lower the level of
official unemployment), these persons participate in a further program “carousel
effect”). To address this issue, our study estimates the effects of participation in
training as first program and of participation in a second program afterwards, be it
a second training program or a job creation program. Regarding participation in a
second program, we estimate both the incremental effect of the second program and
the combined effect using our difference–in–differences approach.1
Former studies on the effect of ALMP in East Germany on the individual employ-
ment chances provide mainly negative though unclear evidence, see the surveys in
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2002) and Hagen and Steiner (2000). The existing
studies suffer greatly from data limitations, either they are plagued by a small num-
ber of participants (German Socio-Economic Panel, e.g. Lechner, 1998) or the data
is limited to the early 1990’s and does not allow for constructing the employment
history on a monthly basis (Labor Market Monitor for East Germany, e.g. Fitzen-
berger/Prey, 2000).2
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 gives a short description of the insti-
tutional background for ALMP in East Germany and discusses descriptive evidence.
Section 3.3 develops the microeconomic evaluation approach used here. The imple-
mentation of the approach is described and the empirical results of the evaluation
are discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. The appendix 3.A includes de-
tailed tables and appendix 3.B a sensitivity analysis with respect to the underlying
behavioral model.
1Some progress has been made in the methodological literature in order to extend standard
static evaluation approaches to the dynamic selection issue involved here, see Lechner/Miquel
(2001). The requirements on the data when applying the Lechner/Miquel approach are unlikely
to be satisfied in our case (see section 3 below) and we are not aware of an actual application of
this approach.
2Our earlier paper Bergemann et al. (2000), where the impact on employment rates is estimated
for the period 1990 to 1998, is an exception. Reliable administrative data on ALMP has so far not
been made available.
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3.2 Training in East Germany
3.2.1 Background
Between 1969 and 1997, training as part of Active Labor Market Policy in Germany
was regulated by the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG). Despite
a number of changes in the regulation over this time period, the basic design of train-
ing programs remained almost unchanged until the AFG was replaced by the new
Social Law Book III (SGB III) in 1998. The German Federal Labor Office (Bunde-
sanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA) was in charge of implementing these programs in addition
to being responsible for job placement and for paying out unemployed benefits.
Training programs under the AFG rule fell into four categories:3 Further Vocational
Training (Fortbildung), Re–training (Umschulung), Short–term training (Kurzzeit-
maßnahmen nach § 41a AFG) and Integration subsidies (Einarbeitungszuschuss,
§§ 33 – 52 AFG). With German unification, these programs were extended to East
Germany after July 1990 (§ 249 AFG). Policy makers intended to foster the adjust-
ment of the East German human capital stock to Western levels. The large and
prolonged use of ALMP was also justified by equity goals (the standard of living
in East Germany should converge quickly to Western levels) and by political goals
(political stability after a massive transformation shock and avoiding large scale
outmigration).
3.2.2 Training under the Labor Promotion Act 1990–1997
Further vocational training (§ 41 AFG) consists of the assessment, maintenance, and
extension of skills. The duration of the courses depends on the characteristics of the
participants. The courses regularly take between 2 and 8 months and are mainly
offered by private sector training companies.
Re–training enables vocational re–orientation if no adequate employment can be
found because of skill obsolescence. Re–training is supported by the BA for a period
up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified vocational training degree.
Short–term training aim at increasing the employment chances by skill assessment,
orientation, and guidance. The courses are intended to increase the placement rate
of the unemployed. Mostly, they do not provide occupational skills but aim at
maintaining search intensity and increasing hiring chances. The courses usually last
from two weeks to two months.
Integration Subsidies involve payments to employers providing employment to pre-
viously unemployed workers who need a training period. The worker earns a regular
3We ignore German language courses which have different target groups.
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wage from the employer. This program is included in official numbers of partici-
pation in training programs. However, it is not analyzed in our empirical analysis
because the data used do not allow to identify it.
Except for integration subsidies, all participants in full–time courses are granted
an income maintenance payment (Unterhaltsgeld) if the conditions of entitlement
are satisfied. To qualify, persons must meet the requirement of being previously
employed for a minimum duration during a set period of time, i.e. at least one year
in employment or receipt of unemployment benefit or subsequent unemployment
assistance. The set period may be extended for individuals returning to the labor
market.
The income maintenance payment amounts to the same level as unemployment
benefits, i.e. to 67% (60%) of previous net earnings for participants with (without)
at least one dependent child. The income maintenance payments used to be higher
in the early 1990’s (see below). If a person does not fulfill the requirement of previous
employment, but received unemployment assistance until the start of treatment, the
income maintenance may be paid as well. Participants re–qualify for unemployment
benefits providing an additional incentive for participation. The BA also covers all
the direct training costs such as course fees.
3.2.3 Changes in Programs and Incentives
During the 1990’s, legislation modified the types of programs, the level of income
maintenance payments, and the eligibility criteria. Short–term training programs
were abolished formally in 1992 and in 1993, a new program started with the same
purpose. However, participants were no longer considered as taking part in training
programs and were therefore recorded as unemployed. Income maintenance pay-
ments were reduced after 1993 from 68% (63%) of the net earnings during previous
employment for participants with (without) children to 63% (60%).
Before 1994, participation in a training program was accessible for participants
without having experienced unemployment beforehand as long as the case worker
considered participation in training as “advisable”. This type of training intended
to prevent future unemployment, to increase the labor market prospects of the
employed in the future, or to foster re–integration of individuals returning to the
labor market. Starting in 1994, the access was restricted to individuals fulfilling the
criteria for “necessary” training which basically restricted the program to formerly
unemployed participants. However, especially in East Germany, the participation
under the weak criterion of “being threatened by unemployment” was still possible.
The changes resulted in a new mix of participants in training programs and they
somewhat shifted the focus of training. A credible evaluation strategy has to account
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for these changes.
The end of explicit short–term training programs made the remaining programs
longer and more expensive on average. In addition, the remaining program mix
was less explicitly focussed on a immediate placement of participants. The mix of
programs observed after the change is more strongly focussed on providing additional
skills and helping participants to signal their skills. We suspect therefore that, on
the one hand, incentives to participate are stronger on average than for the program
mix before the reform. This may result on average in stronger anticipation effects
such that in the prospect of participation unemployed individuals decrease their
search effort for a new job.
On the other hand, training programs became less attractive, especially for workers
who are still employed, both due to the lower income maintenance payments and
due to the focus on previously unemployed individuals. Over time, a change in the
selection of the program group occurred restricting training to problem groups with
a priori significantly lower employment chances.
3.2.4 Aggregate Participation
Training programs were implemented in East Germany immediately after unification
(see figure 3.1): 98,500 persons started to participate during the last three months
of 1990. In 1991, the maximum was reached with 892,145 entries. Only in 1992,
there was a similar magnitude. Afterwards the number was much lower and it went
down to 166,000 in 1997. During the most recent years, participation recovered at a
level slightly above 180,000 reflecting the ongoing importance of these programs in
East Germany. The share of entries into re–training in percent of training in total
varies between 15% in 1991 and 28% in 1993, the share for integration subsidies
declines from 15% in 1991 to 8% in 1997. No separate figures are available neither
for short–term training and further vocational training for the early 1990’s nor for
the subprograms after 1997 due to the change in the regulation.
Stocks of participants show a similar pattern (see figure 3.2). The maximum was
reached in 1992, amounting to 492,000 participants on average. Participation has
been declining afterwards (2000: 139,700, 2002: 129,000 participants). The trends
for the subprograms (not reported in figure 3.2) are analogous.
Direct costs for participation paid by the BA (see figure 3.2, right axis) – income
maintenance, course fees, travel costs etc. – continuously increased over time. In
1991, when short–term training programs still existed, annual costs were at 8,000
Euro per participant. With 14,600 Euro in 1995 and the most recent number being
20,600 Euro, the programs observed became much more expensive over time.
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Figure 3.1: Entries into Training in East Germany, Annual Totals
0
250
500
750
1 000
1990* 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t 
e
n
tr
ie
s
 (
1
0
0
0
)
Further training* Retraining Integration subsidy
∗ In 1990, only in October, November and December training programs took place. Following the
1998 reform, further training can no longer be subdivided into three categories. Source: Bunde-
sanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1993, 1997, 2001a, 2003a), own calculations
Figure 3.2: Participation Stocks in Training and Expenditure per Participant / Year,
Annual Average
0
200
400
600
1990* 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t 
s
to
c
k
s
 (
1
0
0
0
)
0
10
20
30
C
o
s
ts
 p
e
r 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
-y
e
a
r 
(1
0
0
0
 €
)
Participant stocks Expenditure (€ per participants-year)
∗ For 1990 no yearly stock can be calculated. Source: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1993, 1997,
2001a, 2003a), own calculations
70
3.3 Evaluation Approach
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality
(Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974), see the survey Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999). We
focus on estimating the average causal effect of treatment–on–the–treated (TT) in
the binary treatment case.4 TT is given by
E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 1) ,(3.1)
where the treatment outcome Y 1 and the nontreatment outcome Y 0 are the two
potential outcomes and D denotes the treatment dummy. Our outcome variable of
interest is a dummy variable for employment, possibly conditional on employment
in the previous month resulting in a transition dummy. The observed outcome Y
is given by Y = DY 1 + (1 −D)Y 0. The evaluation problem consists of estimating
E(Y 0|D = 1) since the counterfactual outcome in the nonparticipation situation is
not observed for the participating individuals (D = 1). Thus, identifying assump-
tions are needed to estimate E(Y 0|D = 1) based on the outcomes for nonparticipants
(D = 0).
We apply a conditional difference–in–differences (CDiD) approach which combines
two widely used concepts to estimate the average nontreatment outcome for the
treated E(Y 0|D = 1). One is to consider the situation of program participants
before treatment (before–after–comparison) and the other is to consider a con-
trol group of comparable persons who did not participate. The major drawback
of the before–and–after comparison lies in the assumption of a constant average
nontreatment outcome over time for the treated population. This is violated, if
over time labor market outcomes change irrespective of participation, i.e. formally
E(Y 0t0|D = 1) 6= E(Y
0
t1|D = 1) where t0 is a point of time before treatment and
t1 after treatment. Another issue involves participation rules and possible antic-
ipation effects of the treatment (Ashenfelter’s Dip) resulting in Y 0t0 already being
affected by the treatment in the future. Regarding the selection of an appropriate
control group, it is usually not warranted to assume that the average nonpartici-
pation outcome of the participants is the same as for the nonparticipants, i.e. we
have E(Y 0|D = 1) 6= E(Y 0|D = 0). Thus, a readily available sample estimate for
E(Y 0|D = 0) is not a consistent estimate for the counterfactual E(Y 0|D = 1).
4The framework can be extended to allow for multiple, exclusive discrete treatments. Lechner
(1999) and Imbens (2000) show how to extend standard propensity score matching estimators
for this purpose and e.g. Larsson (2003) provides an application to ALMP in Sweden based on a
large and quite homogeneous treatment and comparison group. Although, it would be a natural
extension in our application to explicitly allow for multiple, exclusive treatments by ALMP, we do
not think that our data is sufficiently rich enough for this purpose. In addition, our analysis is
much more demanding since we argue that matching on observable covariates will not suffice to
control for selection bias and since we model the effects on transition rates between different labor
market states. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to estimating TT for training where the comparison
group is the group of all individuals who either do not participate in any program or who only
participate in other programs where the latter two are weighted by their sample frequencies.
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3.3.1 Selection on Observables and Matching
Assuming the Conditional Mean Independence Assumption (CIA)
E(Y 0|D = 1, X) = E(Y 0|D = 0, X)(3.2)
implies that the nontreatment outcome of the participants and of the nonparticipants
are now comparable in expectation when conditioning on X. Then, to estimate the
expected nonparticipation outcome for the participants with observable characteris-
tics X, it suffices to take the average outcome for nonparticipants with the same X.
This is the basis of the popular matching approach, see Heckman/Ichimura/Todd
(1998), Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998), Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999),
or Lechner (1998). This approach estimates the expected nontreatment outcome
for a participant i with characteristics X by the fitted value of a nonparametric re-
gression in the sample of nonparticipants at point X. The nonparametric regression
can be represented by a weight function wN0(i, j) that gives the higher a weight to
nonparticipants j the stronger his similarity to participant i regarding X. For each
i, these weights sum up to one over j (
∑
j∈{D=0} wN0(i, j) = 1). The estimated TT
is then
1
N1
∑
j∈{D=1}

 Y 1i −
∑
j∈{D=0}
wN0(i, j)Y
0
j

 ,(3.3)
with N0 the number of nonparticipants j and N1 the number of participants i.
Matching estimators differ with respect to the weights attached to members of the
comparison group. The most popular approach in the literature is nearest neighbor
matching just using the outcome for the closest nonparticipant (j(i)) as the compari-
son level for participant i, see Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999) and Lechner (1998).
In this case, wN0(i, j(i)) = 1 for the nearest neighbor j(i) and wN0(i, j) = 0 for all
other nonparticipants j 6= j(i). Following Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998),
we implement a different matching approach using a nonparametric local linear ker-
nel regression to estimate the expected nonparticipation outcome of participants
with certain characteristics, see also Pagan/Ullah (1999). This amounts to specify-
ing the weight function based on a kernel function which has as its argument the
distance in terms of characteristics of the individuals.5 This so called kernel match-
ing has a number of theoretical advantages compared to nearest neighbor matching.
The asymptotic properties of kernel based methods are straightforward to analyze
and it has been shown that bootstrapping provides a consistent estimator of the
sampling variability of the estimator in (3.3) even if matching is based on close-
ness in generated variables (this is the case with the popular method of propensity
score matching which will be discussed below), see Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd
5We also checked the sensitivity of our results by using nearest neighbor matching without and
with caliper (the latter allows only for matches which are sufficiently close). For our application, it
turned out that the choice of matching approach had no notable impact on the estimated treatment
effects. We only report the results using kernel matching.
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(1998) or Ichimura/Linton (2001) for an asymptotic analysis of kernel based treat-
ment estimators. We are not aware of similar results for nearest neighbor matching.
It is difficult to match with respect to a high–dimensional vector of observable
characteristics X (“curse–of–dimensionality”), see Pagan/Ullah (1999). Therefore,
the evaluation literature uses extensively the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
that the CIA in equation (3.2) implies that participants and nonparticipants become
comparable in expectation when conditioning on the treatment probability P (X)
(propensity score) as a function of the observable characteristics X, i.e.
E(Y 0|D = 1, P (X)) = E(Y 0|D = 0, P (X))(3.4)
provided 0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1. This result reduces the matching problem to one
dimension effectively using the “closeness” in the propensity score as the weighting
scheme. However, the propensity score has to be estimated. We implement kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score. We take account of the sampling
variability in the estimated propensity score by applying a computationally quite
expensive bootstrap method to construct the standard errors of the estimated treat-
ment effects. To account for autocorrelation over time, we use the entire time path
for each individual as block resampling unit. All the bootstrap results reported in
this paper are based on 200 resamples.
For the local linear kernel regression in the sample of nonparticipants, we use the
Gaussian kernel, see Pagan/Ullah (1999).6 Standard bandwidth choices (e.g. rules
of thumb) for pointwise estimation are not advisable here since the estimation of the
treatment effect is based on the average expected nonparticipation outcome for the
group of participants, possibly after conditioning on some information to capture the
heterogeneity of treatment effects. Since averaging pointwise estimates reduces the
variance, it is clear that the asymptotically optimal bandwidth should go to zero
faster than an optimal bandwidth for a pointwise estimate, see Ichimura/Linton
(2001) on such results for a different estimator of treatment effects.7
To choose the bandwidth, we suggest the following heuristic leave–one–out cross–
validation procedure which mimics the estimation of the average expected nonpar-
ticipation outcome for each period. First, for each participant i, we identify the
nearest neighbor nn(i) in the sample of nonparticipants, i.e. the nonparticipant
whose propensity score is closest to that of i. Second, we choose the bandwidth to
6A kernel function with unbounded support avoids some of the problems involved with local
linear kernel regression, namely, that the variance can be extremely high in areas where there is
not a lot of data, see Seifert/Gasser (1996) and Fro¨lich (2001) for a critical assessment of local
linear kernel regression.
7This is also the rationale for researchers using nearest neighbor matching with just the closest
neighbor thus focussing on minimizing the bias.
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minimize the sum of the period–wise squared prediction errors
T∑
t=1

 1
N1,t
N1,t∑
i=1

Y 0nn(i),t − ∑
j∈{D=0}\nn(i)
wi,jY
0
j,t




2
where the prediction of employment status for nn(i) is not based on the nearest
neighbor nn(i) himself and t = 1, ..., T denotes the month (T = 120 for our data).
The optimal bandwidth affecting the weights wi,j through the local linear regression
is determined by a one–dimensional search. The resulting bandwidth is typically
smaller than a rule–of–thumb value for pointwise estimation, but this is not always
the case, see Ichimura/Linton (2001) for similar evidence in small samples based
on simulated data. Since our method for the bandwidth choice is computationally
quite expensive, it is not possible to bootstrap it. Instead, we use the bandwidth
found for the sample in all resamples.
3.3.2 Employment Model and Ashenfelter’s Dip
We specify the econometric model for employment in order to be clear about which
treatment parameters are estimated. The dummy variable for employment Yit of
individual i in month t exhibits strong state dependence, i.e. holding everything else
constant the probability to remain employed P (Yit = 1 | Yi,t−1 = 1) given that i is
employed in the previous month is likely to be much higher than the reemployment
probability P (Yit = 1 | Yi,t−1 = 0) given that i is not employed in the previous
month.8 Therefore, the dynamic employment process for individual i is specified
using separate outcome equations depending on the state in the previous month as
Yit =


ae(Xi, t) + δ
e
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
e
i + u
e
i,t for Yi,t−1 = 1 (employed before)
an(Xi, t) + δ
n
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
n
i + u
n
i,t Yi,t−1 = 0 (not empl. before)
(3.5)
where Di,t(τ) is a dummy variable for treatment in period τ , a
e(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t)
are functions describing the state dependent employment probabilities as a flexible
function of observed time invariant characteristics Xi and month t, δ
e
i,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ are
the individual specific, state dependent effects of treatment on the employment
probabilities, cei , c
n
i are state dependent permanent individual specific effects, and
uei,t, u
n
i,t are the idiosyncratic, period specific effects. To simplify the notation, we
only consider the effects of treatment in one period τ . Furthermore, we assume
that the effect of treatment occurs after treatment, i.e. δki,t,τ = 0 for t < τ and
k = e, n.9 We will discuss below Ashenfelter’s Dip as linking treatment and the
idiosyncratic error term before treatment. We allow the individual treatment effect
8In this section, the index i denotes any individual whereas in the remainder of the paper i
applies only to treated individuals.
9This assumption is similar to the timing–of–events approach in the literature using duration
models to estimate treatment effects, see Abbring/Van den Berg (2003).
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δki,t,τ (k = e, n) to depend upon observed characteristicsXi and the individual specific
effects cki . They are also allowed to vary by i, t, and τ conditional upon Xi and c
k
i .
For the idiosyncratic error terms, we assume that uei,t, u
n
i,t are mean independent of
treatment in the past.
Regarding the issue of selection bias, the evaluation approach should allow that
treatment Di,t(τ) is affected by the observed covariates (Xi, t), by the treat-
ment effects δei,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ and by the individual specific effects c
e
i , c
n
i . Furthermore,
we should not impose strong functional form restrictions on the specification of
ae(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t). The evaluation approach should be as nonparametric as possible
relying on the smallest plausible set of assumptions.
It is often observed, that shortly before the participation in a labor market pro-
gram the employment situation of the future participants deteriorates dispropor-
tionately. A similar finding termed Ashenfelter’s Dip was first discovered when
evaluating the treatment effects on earnings (Ashenfelter, 1978). Later research
demonstrated that the same phenomenon can also occur regarding employment, see
Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999), Heckman/Smith (1999), and Fitzenberger/Prey
(2000). We argue that in our context Ashenfelter’s Dip is caused by participation
rules or anticipation effects. Therefore, we allow that Di,t(τ) can be correlated with
uki,τ−s (k = e, n) with s = 1, . . . , ad and ad denotes the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip.
Even though no tough participation rules were applied in East Germany in the early
1990’s, it is clear that in most cases unemployment must have lasted some time be-
fore treatment could start. A reason for anticipation effects can be that unemployed
workers or workers at the risk of becoming unemployed reduce their search effort if
they know that participation in an active labor market program is an option in the
near future. Analogously, unemployed individuals expecting to start a new job in
the future are not likely to receive treatment.
It is conceivable to interpret Ashenfelter’s Dip as a treatment effect thus violating our
timing–of–events assumption. We stick to this assumption since both anticipation
effects and participation rules have no bearing on the economic mechanisms at work
during and after treatment. Therefore, we assume that these preprogram effects are
not linked to the outcome variable once treatment has started, i.e. uki,τ−s (k = e, n)
are not correlated with uki,t with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ τ .
10
In our empirical analysis, we allow for a maximum length of time (ad months) for
Ashenfelter’s Dip. ad is set according to institutional features of the programs under
consideration. After inspection of the data, we set ad conservatively and we let it
vary over time (see section 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). While it is likely that shortly after
10This is in contrast to Heckman/Smith (1999) who model the recovery process to be expected
(based on nontreatment outcomes) after the treatment being parallel to the deterioration during
Ashenfelter’s Dip. The state dependence in our employment process results in a recovery process
which does not have to be parallel to what happens before the treatment.
75
German unification the anticipation of program participation occurs only shortly
before the begin of the program and participation rules were applied in a very lax
way, ad increases with the rise of unemployment during the early 1990s.
3.3.3 Conditional Difference–in–Differences
While the matching approach addresses selection bias due to observed variables,
selection bias due to unobserved characteristics has to be addressed differently. We
allow the selection into treatment to be affected by the permanent unobserved effects
in our employment model in equation (3.5). For instance, unobserved characteristics
could be due to differences in the motivation of participants or could reflect that
programs are targeted to individuals with some particular problems in the labor
market.11 The difference–in–differences estimator can be used when selection effects
are additively separable and time invariant. Then, it is possible to use the frame-
work in section 3.3.1 by merely analyzing the before–after–change in the outcome
variable instead of its level. We implement a conditional difference–in–differences
(CDiD) estimator using preprogram differences in the outcome variable after match-
ing to control for remaining unobservable differences. In order to avoid the “fallacy
of alignment” (Heckman/LaLonde/Smith, 1999), we have to take account of possi-
ble preprogram effects via Ashenfelter’s Dip. We extend the CDiD as used in the
literature to fully capture the state dependence in the employment process.
Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Employment Rate
Following the approach in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998),12 we use kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score to match participants i and non-
participants j in the same time period t and then the simple CDiD–estimator for
the treatment effect on the employment rate13 in period t1 is given by
1
N1
N1∑
i=1

Y 1i,t1 − Y 0i,t0 −∑
j
wi,j(Y
0
j,t1 − Y
0
j,t0)


where period t1 lies after and t0 before treatment of individual i, N1 is the number
of participants i for whom the t1 − t0 difference can be determined, and due to
11We do not pursue to estimate an econometric selection model since the scarce data do not
allow for credible exclusion restrictions in the participation equation, see section 3.4.1.
12See also Blundell et al. (2003) for an application of the CDiD, where age and regional variation
is used to take account of selection effects.
13Although our model is defined in discrete time we use the word ‘rate’, as it can be aggregated
to a probability in discrete time.
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Ashenfelter’s Dip t0 must lie before τ − ad.14
CDiD is a valid estimator if the employment process in equation (3.5) does not
exhibit state dependence and if the idiosyncratic error term is conditionally mean
independent of treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(ui,t|D = 1, Xi) =
E(ui,t|D = 0, Xi) = 0 for t ≥ τ and t < τ − ad, a
e(Xi, t) = a
n(Xi, t), ci = c
e
i = c
n
i ,
and ui,t = u
e
i,t = u
n
i,t. However, the common individual specific effect ci does not
have to be conditionally mean independent D and Xi.
Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR)
Based on the employment model in equation (3.5), we develop the following Condi-
tional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR) estimator as an exten-
sion of the CDiD estimator to a state dependent employment process. We simply
estimate the treatment effect on the probability to be employed via CDiD condi-
tional on employment status in the previous month by
1
N l
∑
i∈N l
gi

Y 1i,t1 − Y 0i,t0 −∑
j
wi,j(Y
0
j,t1 − Y
0
j,t0)

(3.6)
where l denotes the employment status in the previous month (l = 1 if previously
employed and l = 0 if previously nonemployed), N l is the set of treated individuals
for whom Yi,t1−1 = Yi,t0−1 = l, where t1 after and t0 before treatment of individual
i. N l is the number of individuals in N l. Also, only nonparticipants j for whom
Yj,t1−1 = Yj,t0−1 = l. gi is a set of weights to account for the fact that N
l does
not include the entire treatment sample. For l = 0 and l = 1, expression (3.6)
estimates the reemployment probabilities when unemployed and the probability to
remain employed, respectively.
To properly account for selection bias in the nonparticipation outcome, CDiDHR
only requires the idiosyncratic error terms to be conditionally mean independent of
treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(u
e
i,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(u
e
i,t|D = 0, Xi) =
E(uni,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(u
n
i,t|D = 0, Xi) = 0 for t ≥ τ and t < τ − ad. Analogous
to CDiD, the individual specific effects cli do not have to be conditionally mean
independent of treatment status D and covariates Xi. Also for CDiDHR, t0 must
lie before−ad, i.e. before anticipation and participation rules can take effect, because
of the possibility of Ashenfelter’s Dip.
A disadvantage at first glance lies in the fact that using weights gi = 1, CDiDHR
does not identify the unconditional TT E(δki,t1,τ |D = 1) but instead the TT
14We do not take symmetric differences (τ0 − t0 = t1− τ1 with τ0 begin of program and τ1 end
of program) as in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998) or Heckman/Smith (1999). We think
their approach assumes an implausible symmetry between those effects driving Ashenfelter’s Dip
and the recovery process after participation, see also discussion in footnote 10 above.
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E(δki,t1,τ |D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l) conditional on the employment status l both in
the previous month (l = 0 if k = n and l = 1 if k = e) and in the month before
the baseline period t0. The latter TT is not the same as the unconditional TT with
the potential treatment effects δki,t,τ being defined irrespective of the employment
status of individual i in the previous month. To estimate the unconditional TT,
it would be necessary both to account for the differences in the distribution of the
Xi characteristics and of the individual specific effects c
k
i with k = e, n, since the
individual specific treatment effects in the employment model (3.5) as well as the
observed employment status in the previous month presumably depend upon both
Xi and the c
k
i ’s. Differences in Xi and the c
k
i ’s result in a sorting of high employment
individuals into the group of employed individuals in the previous month and vice
versa.
In section 3.4, we define the weights gi to integrate out the distribution of Xi in the
treatment sample by using a regression model where the mean effect is evaluated at
the average of the Xi in the treatment sample. Effectively, we then identify the TT
EXi,D=1{E(δ
k
i,t1,τ |D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l, Xi)|D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l}
conditional on the employment status l in the previous month and in the month
before the baseline period t0 where the outer expectation EXi,D=1 integrates out
with respect to the distribution of Xi in the sample D = 1. Thus, conditioning
on (Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l) only affects the distribution of the individual specific
effects and the latter is partly controlled for through the correlation between Xi and
the cki ’s. Regarding the information in the c
k
i ’s not controlled for, our treatment
effect weights the individual treatment effects by the frequencies that individuals
are employed and not employed in the previous period before and after treatment,
respectively.
Our approach estimates the unconditional TT under the following two stringent
conditions: First, the treatment effects are conditionally mean independent of the
individual specific effects when also conditioning on Xi, i.e. E(δ
k
i,t1,τ |c
e
i , c
n
i , Xi) =
E(δki,t1,τ |Xi). Second, we do observe each treated individual in both employment
states before anticipation and participation rules take effect so that the before–
after–difference can be calculated for some t0 in the past. The second assumption
is quite innocuous in our application since we consider the preprogram situation up
to 18 months in the past. The preprogram level is then the average transition rate
conditional on the employment state in the previous month. For almost all treated
individuals, these averages are available for both states. The first condition does
not hold when the selection into treatment depends upon the treatment effects δki,t1,τ
conditional upon Xi via the individual specific effects. We do not think that the
latter condition is likely to hold.
There is no ready procedure to estimate the unconditional TT by also integrating
out the individual specific effects without imposing further stringent assumptions.
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Thus, we only integrate out the Xi distribution in the treatment sample. It is quite
plausible that, conditional on Xi, both treatment effects δ
k
i,t1,τ are positively corre-
lated with the individual specific effects and that the two individual specific effects
are positively correlated. Then, our approach will overestimate the TT for the prob-
abilities to remain employed and it will underestimate the TT for the reemployment
probabilities. Given this, we will nevertheless be able to draw conclusions on the
effectiveness of training programs based on the estimation results.
In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the basis of a different employment
model (for more details see appendix 3.B). In this model the state dependence of
employment is captured by a first order autoregressive component in employment
(ρY ). If this model holds, treatment effects can be estimated unconditional of the
previous employment states with the aid of a conditional Double–Difference–in–ρ–
Differences (CD2iρD) estimator. However, this model is very restrictive, notably it
is assumed that the individual specific effects are constant with respect to the two
previous employment states.
3.3.4 Multiple Treatments and Carousel Effects
To take into account multiple sequential treatments such that an individual partici-
pates in labor market programs more than once, we extend our evaluation approach
to the analysis of a first and second treatment. We specify the TT of participation
in a second program compared to the situation of not having participated in this
specific treatment sequence. The treatment dummy D is defined such that D = 1
indicates treatment in this specific treatment sequence and D = 0 indicates all three
other alternatives, i.e. (i) no program participation, (ii) a first training program and
no further treatment or another second program not considered here, or (iii) a first
treatment other than training.
The estimation of the combined effect of the sequence of the first and second treat-
ment is a straight forward application of the single binary treatment case. Indi-
viduals with at most one training program participation D = 0 are matched to
individuals who participate in a second program D = 1. For CDiD(HR), we use the
differences between the period after the second treatment and the period before the
first treatment.
To evaluate the incremental effect of the second program we suggest the follow-
ing heuristic two step procedure. Based on the timing of events, the incremental
treatment effect is estimated by CDiD(HR) using the outcome before and after the
second treatment in the matched sample. Treating previous program participation
as nonemployment, the average incremental effect of the second program is obtained.
The matching procedure uses all nonparticipants of the second program, i.e. the es-
timated effect relates to the composition of this group. To properly account for
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selection into the second treatment, we assume that the impact of the individual
specific effects enters the individual treatment effects δki,t,τ for the first program as
an additive constant. Unfortunately, our approach does not allow for the selection
into the second program to depend directly upon the individual treatment effect of
the first program.
Evaluating the combined and incremental effects of multiple program participation,
it is possible to investigate whether multiple treatments occur for individuals with
particularly bad labor market prospects, whether a further treatment improves the
outcome, or whether it just occurs because the participants are unlikely to find a job
after the first treatment and this is still the case after further program participation
(“carousel effect”). In our approach, a pairwise (“data hungry”) evaluation (see
Lechner (1999) and footnote 4 above for the evaluation of heterogeneous treatments)
can be avoided.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Data
Our analysis uses the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt15 (Arbeitsmarktmoni-
tor Sachsen–Anhalt, LMM–SA) for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. The LMM–SA is
a panel survey of the working–age population of the state (Bundesland) of Sachsen–
Anhalt with 7,100 participants in 1997, 5,800 in 1998, and 4,760 in 1999. 1999 is the
last year in which the survey was conducted. Only in the three years used, retro-
spective questionnaires on the monthly employment status between 1990 and up to
December 1999 were included. The monthly data provide all possible labor market
states, i.e. employment, unemployment, or participated in a program of ALMP, as
well as periods in the education system, inactivity, or in military. Individuals who
did not participate in the 1998 survey are recorded until at least September 1997,
those who dropped out in 1999 at least until October 1998.
Selection of Sample
Unfortunately, in the three survey years used the categories of the labor market
states differ. For compatibility, the data set also includes a combined monthly
calendar for the three survey years (compiled by the ZSH institute). This
calendar distinguishes the following categories: Education, full–time employed,
part–time employed, unemployed, job–creation scheme, training, retirement, preg-
nancy/maternity leave, not in active workforce.
15Although the data refer to the state of Sachsen–Anhalt only, the results are likely to be
representative for East Germany as a whole (see Schulz, 1998). For further information on the
data set, see Ketzmerik (2001).
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We only consider individuals with complete information on their labor market his-
tory between January 1990 and at least until September 1997 (i.e. individuals who
completed the retrospective question in 1997). The individuals are between 25 and
50 years old in January 1990 and employed before the start of the “Economic and
Social Union” in June 1990. This way, only individuals are included who had be-
longed to the active labor force of the former GDR, who therefore were fully hit by
the transformation shock, and who are not too close to retirement.16 Individuals,
who are later on in education or on maternity leave are excluded completely from
the analysis. The goal is to construct a consistent data base excluding individuals
who have left the labor market completely. In addition, individuals without valid
information on those individual characteristics, on which we build the matching, are
excluded. We aggregate the remaining labor market states to the four categories em-
ployment, which comprises part– and full–time employment, nonemployment, which
comprises unemployment and out of labor force, training and job creation.
Our outcome variable employment is defined with nonemployment as alternative
resulting in a binary outcome variable. Modeling transitions between unemployment
and being out of labor force is here an impossible task. People move occasionally
back and forth between the two states in the data and it is not obvious whether
the individuals precisely distinguish between unemployment and being out of labor
force, since no formal definition of unemployment is given in the questionnaire.
Table 3.1: Program Participation (number of individuals) in the LMM–SA during
1990 and 1999
One Program JCa TRb
At least once 689 1021
As first program 484 889
Program Sequencesc JC–JC JC–TR JC alone
First and Second 105 113 266
Program Sequences TR–JC TR–TR training alone
First and Second 176 150 563
a: Training b: Job Creation Scheme
c: For instance, TR–JC indicates that a first participation in training and a
second treatment in JC occurred
The resulting sample consists of 5,165 individuals and it is likely to be quite repre-
sentative for the labor force in the former GDR. Table 3.1 summarizes participation
in ALMP based on our data. The two programs considered, Training (TR) and
16Massive early retirement programs were implemented in the early 1990s in order to reduce the
labor force.
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Job Creation Schemes (JC), were implemented at a large scale. In total, 27% of
our sample participated at least once in one of the two programs. While 13% (689
cases) participated at least once in JC, TR was the most important program with
a rate of 20% (1,021 cases).17 Our data do not distinguish between further training
and retraining. Therefore, the estimated treatment effects are an average of the two
programs.
After a first training program, a second treatment in training or JC occurred in 326
cases, i.e. more than 36% of the 889 cases in a first treatment in TR participated in
another program at least a second time. Because of the importance of the timing of
events, we differentiate between the effects of a first and a second treatment. This
paper focuses on the effects of TR, thus restricting ourselves to TR being the first
treatment. Using the evaluation approach described in section 3.3, we estimate first
the effects of FTR (participation in training as the first program) (889 cases) and
then the effect of the second treatment for the two sequences TR–TR (150 cases)
and TR–JC (176 cases). No further treatment afterwards is analyzed, since the
number of cases is very small.
Recall Errors
Retrospective data, which in our case covers at least 8 years, entails the danger of
recall errors. In the following, we will argue that recall errors are less problematic
in our analysis than it is typically the case with retrospective data.
First of all, note that the individuals were asked about their employment history
starting with the year 1990. This year constitutes a turning point in the biography
of East Germans, as the political and economic system changed dramatically. The
connection of biographic events with historic events, as done here, typically improves
the validity of recall data (Loftus/Marburger, 1983, Robinson, 1986). Additionally,
starting with the salient year 1990 the individuals had to answer in chronological
order, which is now commonly viewed as the best technique in collecting life history
data in a single survey (Sudman/Bradburn, 1987). Second, our broad definition of
employment states circumvents some of the recall errors which are present when
analyzing more than two labor market states. It helps especially to merge the
states unemployment and out of the labor force. For instance, after some time
in unemployment, women tend to label this as having been out of the labor force
(Dex/McCulloch, 1998). Third, our evaluation design (CDiDHR estimator) allows
for recall errors occurring in the same fashion among treatment and matched control
group. In particular, if both groups forget to mention transitions in a similar way
then the errors simply cancel out.
Thus, recall errors in our analysis might only increase the standard errors of our
17The question in the LMM–SA on training does also include privately financed training. How-
ever, calculations based on the German Socioeconomic Panel for East Germany show that a very
high share of training is in fact public sector sponsored training (in 1993 more than 88%).
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estimates. However, if we were estimating individual labor market flows, recall
errors would be more worrying (Paull, 2002) and it might be useful to change the
methodological approach (e.g. following Magnac/Visser, 1999).
3.4.2 Implementation of Evaluation Approach
We estimate the following five treatment effects: (1) FTR: participation in training
as the first program, (2) TR–TR: incremental effect, (3) TR–TR: combined effect,
(4) TR–JC: incremental effect, and (5) TR–JC: combined effect. For FTR, TR–TR,
and TR–JC,18 the treatment probability (propensity score) is estimated by separate
parametric probit models. Since the data do not provide time–varying information
(except for the labor market status), the regressors are the static observable charac-
teristics education, occupational degree, gender, age, residence (at the time of the
survey) and interactions of gender and education or occupational degree (results can
be found in appendix 3.A table 3.4). The probit model does not model when the
participation in the program actually takes place. We do not think that the data is
sufficiently rich to model the timing. Using a bootstrap estimator for the covariance
matrix of the estimated treatment effects, we capture the estimation error in the
propensity score.
For matching based on the propensity score, the group of “nonparticipants” {D = 0}
represents the entire sample of individuals who are not participating in the treatment
sequence under consideration but who might be a participant in another program.
We do not match on the employment history shortly before the program (see Lech-
ner, 1998, for such an approach) due to the possibility of Ashenfelter’s Dip. Our
CDiD(HR) estimators control for remaining long–run preprogram differences after
matching upon the propensity score.
Figures 3.3 – 3.6 show the high degree of overlap in the distributions of the estimated
propensity score19 between participants (Treated) and nonparticipants (Nontreated)
for the treatments FTR and TR–TR (the graphs are similar in nature for TR–JC).
The graphs are stratified conditional upon nonemployment and employment in the
previous month, respectively. Since the employment status changes over time and
since after 1997 no complete data is available for all individuals, the overlap can
change over time. Here, the graphs show the overlap of the distributions for the
two months 5/1993 and 5/1997, being representative for other periods. Only in rare
cases, such as FTR in 5/1993 and being previously nonemployed, we find a slightly
less than perfect overlap. Based on this evidence, there is no serious problem of lack
of common support for matching and we match the entire treatment sample.
18Recall from the previous subsection that the evaluation of combined and incremental treat-
ments only differ regarding the choice of the preprogram period for the CDiD(HR) estimators.
19The graphs depict the fitted values of the latent index for the probit model. The estimated
treatment probability is the cdf of the standard normal applied to this index.
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Figure 3.3: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR – Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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Figure 3.4: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR – Employ-
ment in Previous Month
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So far, we have not been explicit about the post program evaluation period. We
use two different starting points in time, which are widely used in the literature:
The evaluation of treatment effects starts either after the end of the program or
with the beginning of the program. The former approach excludes the treatment
period from the employment history when evaluating the success of the respective
treatment because treatment is viewed as time spent outside of the labor market.
This exclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory since labor market history continues,
especially so for the nonparticipants. In contrast, the second approach views the
treatment just as a different nonemployment state while searching for a job.
The start of the evaluation period depends also upon the outcome variables consid-
ered. For employment rates and reemployment probabilities, the evaluation period
starts one month after the last or the first month of the treatment depending on
whether evaluation starts after or at the beginning of the treatment. For proba-
bilities to remain employed, the evaluation period starts one month later than for
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Figure 3.5: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for TR–TR – Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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Figure 3.6: Overlap of Distributions of the Propensity Score Index for TR–TR –
Employment in Previous Month
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the other two outcome variables, since we first have to observe employed former
participants. We choose the length of the evaluation period to be 36 months (as far
as being observed in the data set – otherwise set to missing). As preprogram pe-
riod, we take 18 months before the beginning of the treatment. For the incremental
effect of TR–TR and TR–JC, the preprogram period is taken before the beginning
of the second treatment and for the combined effect before the beginning of the first
treatment.
Based on the estimated propensity scores, we construct matched samples of par-
ticipants and comparable “nonparticipants” (matched nonparticipants) both during
the preprogram and the evaluation period. Alignment occurs in the same calendar
month. The characteristics and outcomes of matched nonparticipants are the fitted
values obtained by the local linear kernel regression of characteristics and outcomes,
respectively, on the estimated propensity score in the sample of nonparticipants as
a whole. Table 3.2 and 3.3 give evidence on the balancing properties in the matched
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samples for the two cases FTR and TR–TR (combined effect). The first column
shows the average characteristics in the whole sample. The remaining columns
show the average characteristics conditional upon employment state in the previous
month. For example, when calculating the average characteristics for the previously
nonemployed, the individual contribution to the mean characteristics is weighted by
the number of months the individual’s state was nonemployment during the time
period under consideration. For the matched nonparticipants, the average reported
uses all available observations.
Table 3.2: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation in FTR, Evaluation
Starts at the Beginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar– Parti– Matched Nonpar– Parti– Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev– averaged over prev–
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25–34 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.43
Age 35–44 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41
Age 45–50 0.23 0.37 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.16
Dessau 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14
Halberstadt 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09
Halle 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.18
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24
Merseburg 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.11
Stendal 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Un-, semi-
or other skilled 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.41 0.46 0.46
Craftsman 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06
Technical college 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20
University education 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.27 0.27
Female 0.48 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.58
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.17 0.27 0.29
Craftswoman 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Female, tech. college 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14
Female, uni. education 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13
Table 3.2 and 3.3 show that participants are younger than the nonparticipants and
that women participate at a higher rate in training than men. There is no clear
cut difference in the skill distribution. It is evident, that the matching process bal-
ances well the characteristics of the participants and the matched nonparticipants
conditional upon employment status in the previous month. For example, 27% of
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Table 3.3: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation in TR–TR (Combined
Effect), Evaluation Starts at the Beginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar– Parti– Matched Nonpar– Parti– Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev– averaged over prev–
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25–34 0.37 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.44
Age 35–44 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.42
Age 45–50 0.23 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.15
Dessau 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.15
Halberstadt 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07
Halle 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.25
Merseburg 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.10
Stendal 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Un-, semi-
or other skilled 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.62 0.41 0.52 0.53
Craftsman 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04
Technical college 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.21
University education 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.22
Female 0.48 0.57 0.79 0.79 0.46 0.68 0.67
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.56 0.18 0.36 0.40
Craftswomen 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Female, tech. college 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17
Female, uni. education 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11
the previously nonemployed nonparticipants were aged between 25 and 34 in 1990,
whereas 40% of the participants belonged to this age group. In the matched sam-
ple, 36% of the matched nonparticipants belong to this age group. The balancing
works especially well for the previously employed in all cases and for the previ-
ously nonemployed in most cases. However, the labor market region does not seem
perfectly balanced for the latter group.
Furthermore, table 3.2 and 3.3 shed some light on the differences in characteristics
across employment states in the previous month. Previously employed participants
are younger than previously nonemployed. Male participants were more often pre-
viously employed compared to females. In the case of FTR, previously employed
participants more often have a university education.
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3.4.3 Specification of Outcome Equation
In the matched samples, the CDiD(HR) estimators are based on a flexible semi-
parametric linear probability model for the employment dummy as outcome vari-
able. The state of nonemployment includes the participation in ALMP programs
such that previous and subsequent participation in a program are both accounted
for as nonemployment. We estimate an average employment effect of a program
relative to all possible nonemployment states for the treated individuals thus esti-
mating TT (with CDiDHR conditioned on the employment status in the previous
month). For CDiDHR, we also control for observed, time–invariant characteristics
Xi in the outcome equation. The Xi variables enter the equation as deviations from
their averages in the treatment sample.
We assume treatment of individual i begins in period τ and we consider the em-
ployment outcome Y before the begin of treatment t0 = −18, . . . ,−ad − 1, as well
as during the time of Ashenfelter’s Dip and the evaluation period of 36 months
t1 = −ad, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 36. Now, t0 is defined relative to the start of the treat-
ment, whereas the definition of t1 depends on the evaluation perspective and the
success criterion. When then evaluation starts at the begin of the program then
t1 is measured relative to τ in case the unconditional employment probability or
the reemployment probability are the outcome variables, whereas t1 is measured
relative to τ + 1 in case of the probability to remain employed. However, when the
evaluation starts after the end of the program τ is replaced by the last month of the
program.
We estimate the following three steps both for CDiD (sample of all participants)
and CDiDHR (separately depending on the employment status in the previous
month):
1. We calculate the average long–run preprogram difference between participant
i (treatment starts in τ) and comparable nonparticipants as
aˆi,τ =
1
18− ad(τ)
−ad(τ)−1∑
t0=−18
(Y 0i,t0 −
∑
j
wi,jY
0
j,t0) .
2. Then, aˆi,τ is subtracted from the difference during Ashenfelter’s Dip and dur-
ing the evaluation period resulting in the following model to estimate the
treatment effects (I(.) denotes the indicator function, νi,t1 the error term)
Y 1i,t1 −
∑
j
wi,jY
0
j,t1 − aˆi,τ =
36∑
s=−ad(τ)
δsI(t1 = s)(3.7)
+ (γad1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2)I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0) + (γpo1 τ + γ
po
2 τ
2)I(t1 > 0) + νi,t1 .
For CDiDHR, we include deviations of theXi characteristics from their average
in the treatment sample as additional regressors in equation (3.7).
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3. The average long–run preprogram differences aˆi,τ are regressed on a second
order polynomial in the starting month of the treatment. We will report the
predictions from this regression
αˆ(τ) = α0 + α1τ + α2τ
2(3.8)
to illustrate how the average long–run preprogram differences (≡ residual se-
lection effect due to permanent individual specific effects) between participants
and nonparticipants after matching depend upon the timing of the program.
The following definitions complement the description:
α0, α1, α2 coefficients measuring the long–run preprogram differences
depending upon the month when the program starts τ ,
ad(τ) month before the begin of the program when Ashenfelter’s
Dip starts depending upon τ ,
δs, γ
ad
1 , γ
ad
2 , γ
po
1 , γ
po
2 coefficients modeling the DiD effect relative to the long–run
preprogram differences aˆi,τ , and
wi,j weights implementing local linear kernel regression on the
estimated propensity score.
Estimating equation (3.7) as a linear regression, the CDiD(HR) estimators are im-
plemented in a semiparametric way by including the employment situation before
treatment in the dummy regression of outcomes and by allowing the effect of the
program to depend both upon the time since treatment (t1 > 0) and upon the be-
gin of the program τ . The long–run preprogram employment differences aˆi,τ prove
critical for the alignment of the CDiD(HR) estimators. Dummy variables for the
effect of Ashenfelter’s Dip are included to capture the decline in the employment
probability shortly before the program. The specification allows the employment
differences before and after the program to depend in a flexible way upon τ . Also
the length of Ashenfelter’s Dip is allowed to depend upon the time when the program
starts. During the period shortly after unification, it is likely that the dip is fairly
short since program participation could not have been anticipated long before and
participation rules were applied in a very lax way. The situation changes with the
occurrence of high unemployment when people realized that labor market problems
were quite severe and that ALMP at a large scale was likely to be a permanent
feature of the labor market.
To capture Ashenfelter’s Dip, the following heuristic approach is chosen. For the first
program, a visual inspection of the average employment differences between treated
and matched controls before and after the program as a function of the time when
the program starts indicates that the dip occurs during one to two months in 90/91
and increases over time to something of at most six months for TR and to at most
nine months for JC. In order to obtain a lower bound for the employment effect of a
program (the employment of the future participants decreases during the dip), we are
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conservative in defining ad(τ). Before November 90, we set ad(τ) = −1. Between
November 1990 and July 1994, ad(τ) increases linearly in absolute value from 2
months to 6 months for TR and 9 months for JC, respectively, where ad(τ) is rounded
to the nearest integer. After July 1994, ad(τ) remains constant. Our approach is
conservative in the sense that taking a shorter period for Ashenfelter’s Dip would
effectively result a higher difference–in–differences estimate of the treatment effect.
For a program, which started in τ , the following expression captures both the es-
timate for the disproportionately decline in employment during Ashenfelter’s Dip
and the estimated TT after the program
DiD(t1, τ) =
{
δt1 + γ
ad
1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2 for −ad(τ) ≤ t1 ≤ −1
δt1 + γ
po
1 τ + γ
po
2 τ
2 t1 = 1, ..., 36
.(3.9)
If we assume for CDiDHR that the linear specification of the outcome equation in
the Xi characteristics holds exactly, then DiD(t1, τ) estimates the TT conditional
on previous employment status while integrating out the distribution of the Xi in
the treatment sample, see also section 3.3.3.
For the multiple, sequential treatments, DiD(t1, τ) estimates the incremental em-
ployment effect of the second treatment when the begin of the second program is
taken as the begin of the treatment. The combined effect of the program sequence
is obtained taking the begin of the first program. For the incremental effect, the
effect of a first treatment is possibly included in the permanent preprogram effect
for the participants. Since all TT’s are estimated for the specific selection of indi-
viduals participating in a certain treatment, it is clear that the TT for FTR and
the incremental TT do not have to add up to the combined effect of the treatment
sequence.
3.4.4 Estimated Treatment Effects
Before turning to the CDiD(HR) estimates for the treatments considered, we dis-
cuss the outcomes in the matched sample for the treatment FTR. Figure 3.7 reports
the average differences in employment rates for the matched sample with individ-
uals starting treatment in the two–year periods 1990/91, 1991/92, etc. If the CIA
E(Y 0|D = 1, X) = E(Y 0|D = 0, X) did actually hold with respect to the time
invariant characteristics Xi, then the average differences in employment rates for
the matched samples would be a proper estimate of TT. Right after treatment,
the employment rates of the participants are between 40 and 60 percentage points
(ppoints) lower that for comparable nonparticipants. There is a noticeable recovery
for the participants afterwards – basically the time path reflects the changes for
participants since employment rates for nonparticipants are almost constant – but
the difference comes nowhere close to zero except at the end for 1997/98 (the latter
can be dismissed since it is based on a very small number of cases). Even three years
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Figure 3.7: Differences in Outcome Variable (Matched Sample): First TR Beginning
in Two–Year–Interval 90/91,. . . ,97/98
First Program is TR – Differences in Outcome Variable after Matching
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after treatment, employment rates are still between 20 (90/91) and 40 (mid to late
90s) ppoints lower than for comparable nonparticipants. Thus, under the CIA as
stated above one had to conclude that FTR results in a considerable reduction of
employment rates, which is a common result found in the literature when matching
is based on observable characteristics (see the survey in Hagen/Steiner, 2000).
Considering the preprogram effects in figure 3.7 raises a number of issues, which
are addressed by our CDiD(HR) estimators, and could lead to a different conclu-
sion. While in 1990/91 there is no preprogram difference 13 to 18 months before
the treatment, long–run preprogram differences in the order of 10 to 20 ppoints
exist for later years. We take this as an indication for the importance of remaining
unobservable differences in the matched sample. Thus, our CDiD(HR) estimators
take account of possible individual specific effects. It is also apparent here that a
simple CDiD estimate based on the difference between long–run postprogram and
long–run preprogram outcomes will result in a negative estimate for TT (as we will
see in the following). There is also a strong decline in employment rates shortly be-
fore the program starts and the decline starts earlier in the later years. In 1990/91,
the decline starts within the last six months before the treatment and the aver-
age differences immediately before the start of the program amount to 33 ppoints,
whereas in 1997/98 the employment rate of the treated declines already 16 months
before the treatment. We take this as an indication for Ashenfelter’s Dip which a
credible difference–in–differences estimator has to take account of. Basing CDiD
on the difference between postprogram outcomes and preprogram outcomes shortly
before the begin of the program would erroneously result in a positive estimate for
TT. Finally, analyzing employment rates entails the danger that one misses the
state dependence in employment. The continuous decline before the program and
the recovery process after the program suggest that employment rates do not adjust
instantaneously. Thus, one should check for state dependence as well.
In the following we discuss the results obtained by CDiD and CDiDHR for the treat-
ments considered. We mainly rely on graphical illustrations of the DiD estimates in
equation (3.9) and the average preprogram levels aˆi,τ . To avoid estimates which are
based on the extrapolation of the parametric model in equation (3.7), our graph-
ical illustrations only report point estimates representing at least 10 observations.
Tables 3.5–3.11 in the appendix 3.A report all the estimated coefficients.
CDiD Results
Figure 3.8 depicts the estimated CDiD employment effects DiD(t1, τ) in equation
(3.9) for FTR20 during the evaluation period t1 = 1, , . . . , 36 and for the period of
20Since we consider the CDiDHR estimates more credible, we do not report here the CDiD
results for the treatments TR–TR and TR–JC to save space. Also for the same reason, we only
report the FTR results for the evaluation period starting after the end of the program.
92
Figure 3.8: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiD – Evaluation Starts after End of
Treatment
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Ashenfelter’s Dip t1 = −ad(τ), . . . ,−1. We only report the results for the evaluation
period starting after the end of the program. The effects for the evaluation period
starting at the begin of the program are also similar in nature. To illustrate the
changes over time, the estimates are shown in four separate graphs for the starting
dates τ being the month of December in the years 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996.
The thick, changing line in the graphs represents the estimated DiD(t1, τ) for t1 =
−ad(τ), . . . , 36. The dotted lines around represent the 95%–confidence interval. The
constant line with dotted lines around represents the estimated long–run preprogram
differences αˆ(τ) (“alpha”) with associated 95%–confidence interval. The confidence
intervals are based on the bootstrap covariance estimates.21
For all cases, the CDiD employment effects of FTR prove significantly negative
during the postprogram period, as to be expected from figure 3.7. However, the
negative employment effect becomes weaker over time. For the treatment starting
in 1990, we estimate an effect -14 ppoints 36 months after the treatment, the corre-
sponding estimate for the year 1996 is -10 ppoints. Our estimates also clearly show
that the employment rates become considerably lower shortly before the program
starts (Ashenfelter’s Dip) and this effect becomes more pronounced over time. There
are also important changes in the long–run preprogram differences over time. For
participants starting treatment in 1990, αˆ(τ) is not significantly different from zero.
For 1992, we find already significantly reduced long–run preprogram differences (-16
ppoints) and this feature becomes more important over time (1996: -22 ppoints).
This finding corresponds to training programs becoming more focussed on groups
with severe problems of finding regular employment during the course of the 1990s,
see section 3.2.
CDiDHR Results
The CDiDHR esimates take the state dependence in the employment process explic-
itly into account. The outcome variable used is either the reemployment probability
of the previously nonemployed or the probability to remain employed for the pre-
viously employed. Figures 3.9 to 3.20 display the estimated CDiDHR employment
effects DiD(t1, τ) in equation (3.9). All graphs for CDiDHR are organized in the
same way as described above for CDiD referring to figure 3.8.
Beginning with the treatment FTR, figure 3.9 summarizes the estimated TT on the
reemployment probability. Evaluation starts after the first month of the program.
The first graph of figure 3.9 shows the employment effects of a FTR treatment which
began in December 1990. We find positive employment effects during the evalua-
tion period, which are, however, rarely significant. For example, one year after the
21When comparing the bootstrap standard errors to conventional heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors, we find that bootstrap standard errors of both DiD(t1, τ) and αˆ(τ) are higher,
the increase being stronger for the latter. This is also the case for the CDiDHR estimates.
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Figure 3.9: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Nonemployment in the Pre-
vious Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
95
Figure 3.10: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Nonemployment in the
Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
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program started the participants have a 4 ppoints higher reemployment probabil-
ity than in the nonparticipation case. These positive effects of a FTR vanish for
programs starting later. For December 1994 and later, the effect takes sometimes
negative values, which are significant shortly after the program started. This is not
too surprising since one would expect a reduced search effort when the program has
just started. During Ashenfelter’s Dip, we find a slight decline in the reemployment
probability for the group of participants. This decline is not significant in most cases
and it is much less pronounced than for the CDiD employment effects. The long–
run preprogram difference is significantly negative shortly after the reunification (-6
ppoints), it becomes less negative over time, and it is effectively zero for Decem-
ber 1996. This is in contrast to the CDiD results where the long–run preprogram
difference does increase over time.
Letting the evaluation period start after the end of the program, figure 3.10 natu-
rally shows more positive effects on the reemployment chances of former participants.
Also for all cases there is a significantly positive spike in the first month after treat-
ment. This spike can not be interpreted as pure employment effect. This is because
it could reflect the endogenous, premature termination of the program due to a job
offer and then the clock starts to run. However, we also observe smaller but signifi-
cantly positive program effects after the first month. For example, 12 months after
the program the reemployment probability increased by approximately 8 ppoints.
For later starting dates, the positive effects are reduced and more often insignificant.
FTR can have different effects on the probability to remain employed. Figure 3.11
provides results when the evaluation period starts two months after the begin of
the program. The estimated effect is close to zero for programs which start in
December 1990. However, for later starting dates, the effect becomes significantly
positive. For example, one year after the program started in December 1996 the
probability to remain employed increases by approximately 6 ppoints. Ashenfelter’s
Dip is very pronounced here with strong significantly negative effects. Anticipation
but also participation rules might play a role here. Shortly after the unification,
the long–run preprogram difference is slightly negative and significant. It becomes
more negative in later periods (-5 ppoints for programs which started in December
1996). In contrast to the results for the reemployment probability, the preprogram
effects for the probability to remain employed are very similar in nature to the CDiD
results above. Changing the evaluation period to start two months after the begin
of the program, the results for the probability to remain employed do not change
qualitatively (see figure 3.12).
Naturally the question arises, why the results differ for the two outcome variables,
reemployment probability and probability to remain employed. We think that the
results are driven mainly by changes in the content of the training programs over
time. Shortly after unification a large part of training consisted in short courses
mainly aiming at increasing the placement potential, see section 3.2.3. This could be
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Figure 3.11: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Employment in the Previous
Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 3.12: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Employment in the Previous
Month – Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
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an explanation for the small positive effect on the reemployment probability. How-
ever, later on, the composition of training courses changed towards longer courses
intended to provide substantive skills. These additional skills could improve the
quality of the match between participants and employers thus increasing the em-
ployment stability, once a participant finds a job. However, these additional skills
do not seem to help finding a job at a faster rate.
Also, changes in the search behavior of East Germans due to a better understanding
of the labor market and the benefit system in unified Germany might play a role
for the differences. Shortly after unification, unemployed East Germans, not being
used to a labor market in a market economy, probably tended to accept quickly
a new job without focussing on wages and a high expected job duration. As a
result, a positive effect of training programs might show up in an increase of their
reemployment probability rather than in an increase of the probability to remain
employed. Later on, individuals searching for a job became perhaps more aware
of the importance of finding a ‘good’ job, which is not only important for their
job stability, but also for the level of potential future unemployment benefits being
defined by the earnings in the last job. In addition, the entitlement for transfer
payments is prolonged by taking part in a training program for some time after
the program, lowering the opportunity costs of job search for participants compared
to other unemployed individuals. Thus, participants tended to search longer to
find a ‘better’ job match resulting in a positive effect on the probability to remain
employed.
However, an important caveat regarding the interpretation of the CDiDHR results
is in order here. Since our estimated TT conditions on previous employment, it is
likely that the estimates for the probability to remain employed overestimate and
the estimates for the reemployment probability underestimate the true TT for the
FTR treatment sample as a whole, see section 3.3.3. For this group, it might well
be the case that reemployment chances increase on average and the positive effect
on employment stability is smaller.
Another feature of the results which should be explained are the changes in the
long–run preprogram differences. The CDiDHR estimator matches participants and
nonparticipants month by month conditional upon the same employment status
in the previous month. Shortly after the unification the labor market was quite
turbulent. Everybody faced a high risk of becoming unemployed, resulting in a
relatively small difference in the long–run preprogram difference in the probability to
remain employed. However, some individuals found quickly another job and did not
participate in a training program, leading to a large long–run preprogram difference
in the reemployment probability at the begin of the 90’s. Later on, unemployment
became persistent. The difference in transitions out of nonemployment between
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Figure 3.13: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Nonemploy-
ment in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
Figure 3.14: Incremental Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Nonemploy-
ment in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 3.15: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Employment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
Figure 3.16: Incremental Employment Effects of TR-TR – CDiDHR – Employment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 3.17: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Nonemployment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
Figure 3.18: Incremental Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Nonemploy-
ment in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 3.19: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Employment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
Figure 3.20: Incremental Employment Effects of TR-JC – CDiDHR – Employment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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participants and nonparticipants was then less pronounced.22 The change in the
long–run preprogramm differences in the probability to remain employed most likely
reflects the stricter targeting of labor market policy on unemployed individuals.
Let us now turn to the results for the multiple, sequential treatments TR–TR and
TR–JC. For the combined effect, the evaluation period starts at the begin of the
respective program sequence, whereas for the incremental effect it starts at the begin
of the second treatment. Figures 3.13, 3.15, 3.17, and 3.19 show the estimates for
the combined effects. The combined effects on the transition probabilities are mostly
close to zero and always insignificant. This implies that ex ante it was not a success-
ful strategy on average to assign the group of participants to the program sequences
TR–TR or TR–JC. Also the incremental effects on the reemployment probability
are not significantly different from zero (figures 3.14 and 3.18). However, we do
find significantly positive incremental effects for the probability to remain employed
(figures 3.16 and 3.20), especially for TR–JC. Note that the number of preprogram
observations conditioning on being employed in the previous month is particularly
small in these cases. Taken literally, the results obtained imply that the partic-
ipation in a second program after a first training program improved employment
stability for the group of participants. Put differently, even though the two treat-
ments combined do not appear successful ex ante, ex post after the first training
program, the second program seems partly successful.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the average employment effects for participants in Public
Sponsored Training in East Germany during the time period 1990 to 1999. Mod-
eling employment as a state–dependent outcome variable, we develop a new semi-
parametric conditional difference–in–differences estimator for the treatment effect.
For the implementation of this estimator, we use the transition rates between em-
ployment and nonemployment as our outcome variables and we compare the results
with the effects on the employment rate per se. We account for the likely occur-
rence of Ashenfelter’s Dip caused by anticipation effects and institutional program
participation rules. In addition, we develop a heuristic approach to estimate the
effects of multiple sequential program participation. Thus, we estimate the effect
of treatment–on–the–treated for individuals who participated in training as their
first treatment. We also consider the cases where participation in a second training
program or in a job creation scheme occurs afterwards. We take account of the
sampling error in matching by bootstrapping.
We find negative effects of training on the employment probability. However, tak-
22Note that this explanation of the changes in the long–run preprogram difference does not
violate the assumption of permanent fixed effects since participants change over time.
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ing account of the state dependency of the employment process, the bleak picture
concerning the effects of training brightens. This is especially the case for the reem-
ployment probabilities. Concerning training programs which took place shortly after
reunification, we find some positive program effects on the reemployment probability
- although we have been twice conservative in modeling the effects. First, our align-
ment of the difference–in–differences estimation on a long–run preprogram difference
is conservative (which is of course also true for the other estimates). Secondly, due
to the potential positive correlation between the individual specific and the program
effect when being nonemployed in the previous month, for which we do not control,
we estimate a lower bound for the reemployment probability. Thus, our results indi-
cate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate and more informative than
using unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success cri-
terion might result in misleading conclusions concerning the effectiveness of ALMP
programs.
Further results include that the program effects depend heavily on the time the
programs took place corresponding to the institutional changes during the 1990s.
Combined sequences of two programs with a first training program (e.g. a combina-
tion “training first and then job experience through a Job Creation program”) are
not successful from an ex ante point of view. In contrast, the incremental effects of
the second treatment appear to have slightly positive effects on the probability to
remain employed. Again, there is no positive effect on the reemployment probability
when being nonemployed.
Overall, our results are not as negative as previous results in the literature and
it is unlikely that training on average reduces considerably the future employment
chances of participants. We also find noticeable differences among different treat-
ment types. At the same time, it remains questionable whether on average training
programs are justified in light of the large costs incurred. Our study makes some
methodological progress, particularly regarding modeling the dynamic employment
process in the context of program evaluation. In future research, we intend to re-
fine the estimation of the unconditional effect of treatment–on–the–treated. Finally,
our results are also of interest for other transformation countries considering the
introduction of training programs as part of ALMP.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Detailed Tables
Table 3.4: Propensity Score Estimations
FTR TR–TR TR–JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -1.036 ( 0.161 ) -2.084 ( 0.140) -1.625 ( 0.211 )
Age in 1990: Age 25–34 is omitted category
Age 35–44 -0.094 ( 0.047 ) -0.078 ( 0.081) 0.140 ( 0.084 )
Age 45–50 -0.311 ( 0.058 ) -0.342 ( 0.109 ) 0.224 ( 0.094 )
Labor Market Region: Dessau is missing category
Halberstadt -0.109 ( 0.090 ) -0.253 ( 0.164) -0.026 ( 0.144 )
Halle -0.163 ( 0.077 ) -0.126 ( 0.128 ) -0.423 ( 0.137 )
Magdeburg -0.126 ( 0.073 ) -0.121 ( 0.121 ) -0.140 ( 0.117 )
Merseburg -0.110 ( 0.082 ) -0.156 ( 0.140 ) -0.176 ( 0.136 )
Sangerhausen 0.009 ( 0.087 ) -0.093 ( 0.149 ) 0.154 ( 0.132 )
Stendal -0.214 ( 0.097 ) -0.414 ( 0.190 ) -0.181 ( 0.159 )
Wittenberg -0.146 ( 0.111 ) -0.183 ( 0.193 ) 0.036 ( 0.166 )
Professional education (all): Unskilled, semi–skilled or other skills
are missing category
Skilled Worker 0.097 ( 0.156 ) - ( - ) -0.645 ( 0.211 )
Craftsman -0.020 ( 0.176 ) -0.182 ( 0.269 ) -0.915 ( 0.312 )
Technical college 0.271 ( 0.173 ) 0.129 ( 0.221 ) -0.391 ( 0.244 )
University education 0.204 ( 0.159 ) 0.288 ( 0.144 ) -0.295 ( 0.204 )
Professional education (women)
Skilled worker 0.500 ( 0.063 ) 0.762 ( 0.119 ) 0.747 ( 0.122 )
Craftsman 0.819 ( 0.182 ) 0.630 ( 0.397 ) 1.295 ( 0.322 )
Technical college 0.035 ( 0.104 ) 0.456 ( 0.214 ) 0.074 ( 0.190 )
University education 0.137 ( 0.082 ) 0.191 ( 0.143 ) 0.296 ( 0.127 )
107
108
Table 3.5: Coefficient estimates for CDiD
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap – s.e.
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.109538 ( 0.031724 )
τ -0.010506 ( 1.62E-03 )
τ 2 7.93E-05 ( 1.43E-05 )
Outcome–equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.015666 ( 0.051966 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.053436 ( 0.051006 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.098527 ( 0.049093 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.147712 ( 0.047869 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.18752 ( 0.046773 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.250343 ( 0.047172 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.331277 ( 0.072718 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.310247 ( 0.073391 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.293056 ( 0.072545 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.287756 ( 0.07347 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.27302 ( 0.073619 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.265125 ( 0.073884 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.254978 ( 0.074463 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.24921 ( 0.074907 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.236731 ( 0.074903 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.222417 ( 0.074433 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.210578 ( 0.074053 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.196867 ( 0.074775 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.181907 ( 0.074531 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.178723 ( 0.07364 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.167247 ( 0.074247 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.162639 ( 0.073198 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.157038 ( 0.073196 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.150819 ( 0.072676 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.144263 ( 0.073454 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.146938 ( 0.073612 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.148433 ( 0.074218 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.136203 ( 0.073933 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.139326 ( 0.074613 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.149236 ( 0.074444 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.154556 ( 0.072969 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.146676 ( 0.073267 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.145388 ( 0.073807 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.132021 ( 0.0731 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.137155 ( 0.073106 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.133065 ( 0.073812 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.131043 ( 0.073167 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.5: Coefficient estimates <continued>
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap – s.e.
I(t1 = 32) -0.132572 ( 0.072657 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.125412 ( 0.072885 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.122935 ( 0.073045 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.117068 ( 0.074169 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.113323 ( 0.073629 )
AD : τ -4.41E-03 ( 2.01E-03 )
AD : τ 2 1.53E-05 ( 1.72E-05 )
PO : τ -2.89E-03 ( 3.63E-03 )
PO : τ 2 3.63E-05 ( 3.49E-05 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(ad(τ) ≤ τ < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(τ > 0)
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Table 3.6: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – FTR –
Nonemployment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.065 ( 0.023 ) -0.065 ( 0.023 )
τ 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 ) 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 )
τ 2 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 ) 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) -0.027 ( 0.049 ) -0.035 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.034 ( 0.050 ) -0.041 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.033 ( 0.049 ) -0.042 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.039 ( 0.048 ) -0.048 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.040 ( 0.048 ) -0.049 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.043 ( 0.048 ) -0.052 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.029 ( 0.037 ) 0.314 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.023 ( 0.037 ) 0.090 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.023 ( 0.036 ) 0.097 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.034 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.030 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.041 ( 0.036 ) 0.110 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.055 ( 0.038 ) 0.099 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.042 ( 0.037 ) 0.114 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.037 ( 0.038 ) 0.120 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.054 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 11) 0.040 ( 0.037 ) 0.101 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.053 ( 0.038 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.063 ( 0.039 ) 0.125 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.063 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.058 ( 0.038 ) 0.109 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.046 ( 0.038 ) 0.105 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.070 ( 0.039 ) 0.117 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 18) 0.050 ( 0.038 ) 0.094 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.064 ( 0.039 ) 0.102 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.097 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.049 ( 0.039 ) 0.089 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.060 ( 0.039 ) 0.103 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.092 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.059 ( 0.037 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.071 ( 0.039 ) 0.115 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.101 ( 0.045 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.6: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 28) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.113 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.054 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.087 ( 0.040 ) 0.098 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.097 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.068 ( 0.040 ) 0.095 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.076 ( 0.038 ) 0.115 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 34) 0.045 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.065 ( 0.041 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.077 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
AD:τ 1.83E-03 ( 1.98E-03 ) 2.21E-03 ( 1.98E-03 )
AD:τ 2 -2.08E-05 ( 1.76E-05 ) -2.40E-05 ( 1.76E-05 )
PO:τ -1.19E-03 ( 1.31E-03 ) -2.57E-03 ( 1.65E-03 )
PO:τ 2 5.28E-06 ( 1.05E-05 ) 1.61E-05 ( 1.35E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 6.54E-03 ( 1.65E-02 ) -7.19E-03 ( 1.69E-02 )
Age 45–50 -1.40E-02 ( 1.62E-02 ) -2.81E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Halberstadt 5.19E-04 ( 1.74E-02 ) -1.90E-02 ( 1.90E-02 )
Halle -2.33E-02 ( 2.48E-02 ) -3.49E-02 ( 3.17E-02 )
Magdeburg 5.95E-03 ( 1.53E-02 ) -4.47E-03 ( 1.70E-02 )
Merseburg -5.56E-03 ( 1.82E-02 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Sangerhausen 1.42E-02 ( 1.72E-02 ) 2.92E-03 ( 1.96E-02 )
Stendal -2.51E-02 ( 2.95E-02 ) -4.48E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Wittenberg -8.81E-02 ( 7.32E-02 ) -1.15E-01 ( 8.92E-02 )
Skilled Worker -2.78E-02 ( 3.32E-02 ) 2.46E-02 ( 2.79E-02 )
Craftsman 5.39E-05 ( 2.38E-02 ) 3.03E-02 ( 3.50E-02 )
Technical college -2.69E-02 ( 3.04E-02 ) 1.11E-02 ( 4.19E-02 )
University education -3.35E-02 ( 3.40E-02 ) -1.89E-02 ( 4.15E-02 )
Female skilled worker 1.86E-02 ( 2.60E-02 ) -2.01E-02 ( 2.09E-02 )
Craftswoman 2.37E-02 ( 4.28E-02 ) 1.74E-02 ( 4.94E-02 )
Female and technical college 2.12E-02 ( 2.88E-02 ) -5.28E-03 ( 3.83E-02 )
Female and university education 2.70E-02 ( 3.25E-02 ) 3.04E-02 ( 4.04E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 3.7: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – FTR –
Employment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.005 ( 0.006 ) 0.005 ( 0.006 )
τ -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 ) -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 )
τ 2 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 ) 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) -0.011 ( 0.050 ) -0.008 ( 0.051 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.080 ( 0.048 ) -0.078 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.068 ( 0.043 ) -0.068 ( 0.044 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.099 ( 0.039 ) -0.100 ( 0.040 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.096 ( 0.033 ) -0.097 ( 0.033 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.141 ( 0.038 ) -0.151 ( 0.038 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.016 ( 0.024 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.016 ( 0.025 ) -0.008 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.060 ( 0.043 ) -0.035 ( 0.018 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.014 ( 0.020 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.001 ( 0.025 ) -0.011 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.028 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.010 ( 0.025 ) -0.032 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.008 ( 0.024 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.012 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.010 ( 0.021 ) -0.009 ( 0.014 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.027 ( 0.022 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.020 ( 0.020 ) -0.022 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.041 ( 0.023 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.004 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.031 ( 0.023 ) -0.022 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.009 ( 0.016 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.012 ( 0.018 ) -0.004 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.030 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.022 ( 0.018 ) -0.017 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.017 ( 0.018 ) -0.021 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.018 ( 0.017 ) -0.007 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.015 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.015 ( 0.018 ) -0.033 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.020 ( 0.018 ) -0.031 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.010 ( 0.017 ) -0.017 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.005 ( 0.017 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.028 ( 0.020 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
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Table 3.7: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 28) -0.005 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.011 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.024 ( 0.018 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.001 ( 0.017 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.020 ( 0.019 ) -0.008 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.028 ( 0.021 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.010 ( 0.019 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
AD:τ 1.27E-04 ( 1.66E-03 ) 2.62E-04 ( 1.67E-03 )
AD:τ 2 -8.62E-06 ( 1.38E-05 ) -1.06E-05 ( 1.38E-05 )
PO:τ 1.67E-03 ( 1.00E-03 ) 1.95E-03 ( 8.69E-04 )
PO:τ 2 -8.36E-06 ( 9.53E-06 ) -1.15E-05 ( 8.49E-06 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -3.48E-03 ( 9.25E-03 ) -6.46E-03 ( 8.75E-03 )
Age 45–50 2.68E-02 ( 2.66E-02 ) 2.41E-02 ( 2.21E-02 )
Halberstadt 2.14E-02 ( 1.99E-02 ) 1.81E-02 ( 1.79E-02 )
Halle 2.78E-02 ( 2.55E-02 ) 2.27E-02 ( 2.05E-02 )
Magdeburg 1.29E-02 ( 1.48E-02 ) 1.05E-02 ( 1.22E-02 )
Merseburg 2.01E-02 ( 1.54E-02 ) 3.12E-02 ( 1.44E-02 )
Sangerhausen 9.00E-03 ( 1.60E-02 ) 5.61E-03 ( 1.39E-02 )
Stendal 1.61E-02 ( 1.73E-02 ) 1.52E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Wittenberg 8.23E-03 ( 1.97E-02 ) 5.98E-03 ( 1.68E-02 )
Skilled Worker -3.27E-02 ( 3.50E-02 ) -1.22E-02 ( 3.92E-02 )
Craftsman -2.92E-02 ( 3.61E-02 ) -1.65E-02 ( 3.95E-02 )
Technical college -3.31E-02 ( 3.57E-02 ) -2.07E-03 ( 4.08E-02 )
University education -3.84E-02 ( 3.43E-02 ) -2.12E-02 ( 3.89E-02 )
Female skilled worker 4.50E-04 ( 1.84E-02 ) -2.71E-04 ( 1.55E-02 )
Craftswoman -2.15E-02 ( 3.59E-02 ) -2.87E-03 ( 2.85E-02 )
Female and technical college -2.11E-03 ( 2.15E-02 ) -8.30E-03 ( 2.28E-02 )
Female and university education 2.12E-03 ( 1.64E-02 ) 7.07E-03 ( 1.40E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 3.8: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–TR
– Nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.066 ( 0.037 ) -0.011 ( 0.029 )
τ 1.62E-03 ( 1.46E-03 ) -5.12E-04 ( 7.82E-04 )
τ 2 -1.28E-05 ( 1.31E-05 ) 5.53E-06 ( 5.35E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.013 ( 0.067 ) -0.062 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −5) 0.008 ( 0.066 ) -0.052 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.013 ( 0.066 ) -0.043 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −3) 0.012 ( 0.065 ) -0.059 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = −2) 0.009 ( 0.065 ) -0.060 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.003 ( 0.068 ) -0.069 ( 0.061 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.235 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.015 ( 0.088 ) -0.232 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.234 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.020 ( 0.089 ) -0.211 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.014 ( 0.089 ) -0.225 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.244 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.019 ( 0.089 ) -0.232 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.014 ( 0.090 ) -0.232 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.018 ( 0.093 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.222 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.018 ( 0.089 ) -0.215 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.002 ( 0.093 ) -0.211 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.011 ( 0.090 ) -0.229 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.019 ( 0.098 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.014 ( 0.096 ) -0.208 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.021 ( 0.094 ) -0.228 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.014 ( 0.091 ) -0.216 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.013 ( 0.091 ) -0.203 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.214 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.009 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.237 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.223 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.022 ( 0.090 ) -0.195 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.211 )
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Table 3.8: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) 0.025 ( 0.099 ) -0.237 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.005 ( 0.092 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.026 ( 0.097 ) -0.223 ( 0.212 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.009 ( 0.092 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.010 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.007 ( 0.089 ) -0.206 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.012 ( 0.093 ) -0.220 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) -0.221 ( 0.213 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.008 ( 0.089 ) -0.241 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
AD:τ 1.34E-05 ( 2.95E-03 ) 1.82E-03 ( 1.57E-03 )
AD:τ 2 -2.12E-06 ( 2.80E-05 ) -1.28E-05 ( 1.03E-05 )
PO:τ 3.62E-04 ( 3.68E-03 ) 6.61E-03 ( 5.77E-03 )
PO:τ 2 -3.23E-06 ( 3.36E-05 ) -4.39E-05 ( 3.84E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -1.56E-02 ( 4.56E-02 ) -1.29E-02 ( 2.32E-02 )
Age 45–50 5.54E-03 ( 5.43E-02 ) 8.92E-03 ( 2.95E-02 )
Halberstadt 3.16E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) 5.70E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Halle 2.90E-02 ( 4.80E-02 ) 3.84E-02 ( 4.32E-02 )
Magdeburg 3.22E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 4.28E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Merseburg 2.60E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 5.02E-02 ( 5.05E-02 )
Sangerhausen 2.95E-02 ( 5.16E-02 ) 5.49E-02 ( 4.33E-02 )
Stendal 2.79E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 3.58E-02 ( 5.61E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.74E-01 ( 2.02E-01 ) 2.84E-02 ( 3.81E-02 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -8.01E-02 ( 1.34E-01 ) -1.52E-02 ( 5.37E-02 )
Technical college -7.34E-02 ( 1.19E-01 ) -4.57E-02 ( 5.38E-02 )
University education -7.28E-02 ( 1.24E-01 ) -1.35E-01 ( 9.07E-02 )
Female skilled worker - ( - ) -3.95E-02 ( 3.19E-02 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) -7.93E-03 ( 5.48E-02 )
Female and technical college -9.49E-02 ( 1.26E-01 ) 9.53E-03 ( 3.35E-02 )
Female and university education 3.06E-02 ( 6.58E-02 ) 1.20E-01 ( 6.71E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 3.9: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–TR
– Employment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.159 ( 0.055 )
τ -1.19E-03 ( 7.88E-04 ) 1.58E-03 ( 2.02E-03 )
τ 2 9.24E-06 ( 8.27E-06 ) -7.81E-06 ( 1.61E-05 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.134 ( 0.179 ) -0.280 ( 1.371 )
I(t1 = −5) 0.111 ( 0.184 ) -0.374 ( 1.368 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.027 ( 0.169 ) -0.350 ( 1.367 )
I(t1 = −3) 0.011 ( 0.157 ) -0.257 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.106 ( 0.146 ) -0.331 ( 1.343 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.058 ( 0.137 ) -0.351 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.111 ( 0.130 ) 0.207 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.108 ( 0.125 ) 0.257 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.147 ( 0.233 ) 0.243 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.075 ( 0.109 ) 0.254 ( 0.439 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.039 ( 0.103 ) 0.283 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.028 ( 0.103 ) 0.278 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.034 ( 0.101 ) 0.180 ( 0.449 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.032 ( 0.102 ) 0.279 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.030 ( 0.101 ) 0.184 ( 0.460 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.056 ( 0.104 ) 0.278 ( 0.451 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.004 ( 0.107 ) 0.288 ( 0.452 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.058 ( 0.129 ) 0.291 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.103 ( 0.131 ) 0.366 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.030 ( 0.102 ) 0.241 ( 0.454 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.030 ( 0.103 ) 0.324 ( 0.441 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.019 ( 0.102 ) 0.298 ( 0.431 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.064 ( 0.102 ) 0.286 ( 0.427 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.351 ( 0.434 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.050 ( 0.108 ) 0.344 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.012 ( 0.106 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.014 ( 0.105 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.004 ( 0.109 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.095 ) 0.336 ( 0.437 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.113 ( 0.119 ) 0.275 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.033 ( 0.098 ) 0.332 ( 0.434 )
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Table 3.9: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) -0.025 ( 0.109 ) 0.333 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.042 ( 0.102 ) 0.330 ( 0.433 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.048 ( 0.102 ) 0.377 ( 0.448 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.402 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.016 ( 0.112 ) 0.405 ( 0.448 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.066 ( 0.103 ) 0.397 ( 0.445 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.007 ( 0.106 ) 0.330 ( 0.462 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.027 ( 0.111 ) 0.391 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.109 ) 0.390 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.033 ( 0.119 ) 0.395 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.031 ( 0.117 ) 0.392 ( 0.448 )
AD:τ -4.09E-03 ( 6.84E-03 ) 6.09E-03 ( 3.77E-02 )
AD:τ 2 1.04E-05 ( 6.51E-05 ) -2.41E-05 ( 2.40E-04 )
PO:τ -1.40E-03 ( 5.62E-03 ) -4.71E-03 ( 1.35E-02 )
PO:τ 2 2.49E-05 ( 6.86E-05 ) 4.54E-05 ( 1.02E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 1.83E-02 ( 4.14E-02 ) -7.00E-02 ( 1.77E-01 )
Age 45–50 2.07E-01 ( 1.94E-01 ) - ( - )
Halberstadt 3.78E-02 ( 8.53E-02 ) -4.41E-01 ( 6.82E-01 )
Halle 1.75E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -3.28E-01 ( 6.53E-01 )
Magdeburg 2.40E-02 ( 6.62E-02 ) -1.88E-01 ( 6.70E-01 )
Merseburg 4.97E-02 ( 7.21E-02 ) -3.11E-01 ( 6.69E-01 )
Sangerhausen -1.47E-02 ( 7.70E-02 ) -3.23E-01 ( 6.57E-01 )
Stendal -1.17E-02 ( 1.06E-01 ) -4.14E-01 ( 6.63E-01 )
Wittenberg 1.51E-01 ( 1.78E-01 ) -4.84E-01 ( 7.57E-01 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -7.76E-02 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -1.96E-01 ( 2.16E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -2.74E-01 ( 1.67E-01 ) 3.53E-01 ( 3.29E-01 )
Female skilled worker -1.05E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) 2.11E-01 ( 1.65E-01 )
Craftswoman -1.11E-01 ( 1.00E-01 ) - ( - )
Female and technical college 1.21E-01 ( 1.55E-01 ) 1.07E-01 ( 1.66E-01 )
Female and university education 1.72E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.51E-01 ( 3.64E-01 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 3.10: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–JC
– Nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.050 ( 0.048 ) -0.008 ( 0.031 )
τ 8.72E-04 ( 1.74E-03 ) -5.70E-04 ( 9.03E-04 )
τ 2 -5.37E-06 ( 1.44E-05 ) 4.76E-06 ( 6.27E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −9) - ( - ) -0.013 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −8) - ( - ) -0.025 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −7) - ( - ) -0.032 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −6) 0.007 ( 0.080 ) -0.027 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.003 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.036 ( 0.079 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.023 ( 0.081 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.025 ( 0.081 ) -0.030 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.031 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) -0.007 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.005 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.046 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.051 ( 0.085 ) 0.013 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.043 ( 0.084 ) 0.002 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.062 ( 0.086 ) 0.006 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.040 ( 0.086 ) 0.002 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.009 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.039 ( 0.085 ) 0.006 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.050 ( 0.085 ) 0.031 ( 0.057 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.024 ( 0.087 ) -0.007 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.037 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) 0.007 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.045 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) 0.014 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.034 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.014 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.029 ( 0.087 ) 0.003 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.033 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
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Table 3.10: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 23) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) -0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.030 ( 0.085 ) 0.059 ( 0.060 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.025 ( 0.086 ) 0.019 ( 0.057 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.019 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.030 ( 0.086 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.016 ( 0.091 ) 0.018 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.036 ( 0.085 ) 0.020 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.021 ( 0.088 ) 0.024 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.048 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.030 ( 0.087 ) 0.006 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.026 ( 0.086 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.031 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.049 ( 0.085 ) 0.035 ( 0.058 )
AD:τ 2.07E-04 ( 2.96E-03 ) 7.82E-04 ( 1.39E-03 )
AD:τ 2 -1.96E-06 ( 2.63E-05 ) -6.50E-06 ( 9.68E-06 )
PO:τ 1.16E-03 ( 3.25E-03 ) 1.53E-04 ( 1.62E-03 )
PO:τ 2 -1.31E-05 ( 3.00E-05 ) -1.98E-06 ( 1.16E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -1.96E-03 ( 3.09E-02 ) -1.85E-02 ( 1.33E-02 )
Age 45–50 -3.19E-02 ( 3.97E-02 ) 3.59E-03 ( 1.78E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.33E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 5.34E-03 ( 2.69E-02 )
Halle -1.63E-01 ( 1.47E-01 ) -4.34E-03 ( 1.97E-02 )
Magdeburg -5.78E-02 ( 4.96E-02 ) -2.13E-02 ( 2.54E-02 )
Merseburg -7.08E-02 ( 5.43E-02 ) -1.21E-02 ( 2.18E-02 )
Sangerhausen -6.33E-02 ( 4.99E-02 ) 1.08E-03 ( 1.79E-02 )
Stendal -3.89E-02 ( 5.44E-02 ) 1.63E-02 ( 3.07E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.09E-01 ( 7.63E-02 ) 2.36E-02 ( 3.27E-02 )
Skilled Worker 1.98E-02 ( 6.64E-02 ) 1.24E-02 ( 1.96E-02 )
Craftsman 7.19E-02 ( 9.11E-02 ) 2.55E-02 ( 4.87E-02 )
Technical college -6.51E-02 ( 8.33E-02 ) -1.71E-01 ( 1.75E-01 )
University education -1.21E-01 ( 1.22E-01 ) 9.95E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Female skilled worker -2.02E-02 ( 6.82E-02 ) -1.39E-02 ( 1.53E-02 )
Craftswoman -7.82E-02 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.68E-02 ( 4.82E-02 )
Female and technical college 7.32E-02 ( 8.06E-02 ) 1.69E-01 ( 1.74E-01 )
Female and university education 1.10E-01 ( 1.09E-01 ) 2.40E-03 ( 1.33E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 3.11: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–JC
– Employment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.021 ( 0.016 ) -0.031 ( 0.026 )
τ -2.03E-03 ( 8.81E-04 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.18E-03 )
τ 2 1.24E-05 ( 9.29E-06 ) 1.34E-05 ( 9.27E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −9) - ( - ) 1.194 ( 0.639 )
I(t1 = −8) - ( - ) 1.234 ( 0.590 )
I(t1 = −7) - ( - ) 1.160 ( 0.571 )
I(t1 = −6) 0.170 ( 0.138 ) 1.261 ( 0.568 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.025 ( 0.150 ) 0.858 ( 0.597 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.031 ( 0.127 ) 0.883 ( 0.366 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.053 ( 0.110 ) 0.635 ( 0.423 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.040 ( 0.090 ) -0.106 ( 0.337 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.116 ( 0.107 ) - ( - )
I(t1 = 1) 0.076 ( 0.118 ) -0.468 ( 0.162 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.075 ( 0.118 ) -0.594 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.073 ( 0.118 ) -0.569 ( 0.176 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.059 ( 0.114 ) -0.449 ( 0.190 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.057 ( 0.114 ) -0.464 ( 0.177 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.075 ( 0.114 ) -0.476 ( 0.172 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.059 ( 0.110 ) -0.510 ( 0.167 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.065 ( 0.116 ) -0.512 ( 0.163 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.062 ( 0.112 ) -0.535 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.060 ( 0.112 ) -0.536 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.074 ( 0.149 ) -0.634 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.055 ( 0.107 ) -0.589 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.019 ( 0.111 ) -0.588 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.081 ( 0.104 ) -0.572 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.078 ( 0.149 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.079 ( 0.103 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.054 ( 0.125 ) -0.580 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.062 ( 0.149 ) -0.652 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.063 ( 0.108 ) -0.584 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.007 ( 0.127 ) -0.575 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.058 ( 0.108 ) -0.576 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.053 ( 0.107 ) -0.577 ( 0.152 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.11: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.108 ) -0.571 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.003 ( 0.120 ) -0.535 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.011 ( 0.114 ) -0.533 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.014 ( 0.118 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.035 ( 0.121 ) -0.537 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.058 ( 0.109 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.061 ( 0.109 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.058 ( 0.133 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.063 ( 0.107 ) -0.610 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.066 ( 0.110 ) -0.539 ( 0.156 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.064 ( 0.109 ) -0.626 ( 0.158 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.028 ( 0.121 ) -0.594 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.012 ( 0.115 ) -0.598 ( 0.155 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.050 ( 0.108 ) -0.615 ( 0.156 )
AD:τ -1.04E-03 ( 4.97E-03 ) -4.16E-02 ( 1.61E-02 )
AD:τ 2 -3.15E-05 ( 5.08E-05 ) 2.65E-04 ( 1.04E-04 )
PO:τ -1.33E-03 ( 6.70E-03 ) 2.92E-02 ( 7.02E-03 )
PO:τ 2 1.04E-05 ( 7.64E-05 ) -2.27E-01 ( 3 .602536E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -3.26E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) - ( - )
Age 45–50 -1.31E-02 ( 5.81E-02 ) -2.13E-01 ( 8.14E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.15E-02 ( 7.68E-02 ) 4.53E-01 ( 1.11E-01 )
Halle -5.17E-02 ( 1.16E-01 ) 4.29E-01 ( 1.37E-01 )
Magdeburg -2.09E-02 ( 4.68E-02 ) 3.89E-01 ( 8.11E-02 )
Merseburg -7.97E-02 ( 6.90E-02 ) 1.61E-01 ( 7.59E-02 )
Sangerhausen -4.35E-03 ( 5.11E-02 ) 3.15E-01 ( 7.61E-02 )
Stendal -8.06E-02 ( 8.23E-02 ) 3.47E-01 ( 1.56E-01 )
Wittenberg -9.75E-02 ( 7.19E-02 ) 5.02E-01 ( 1.14E-01 )
Skilled Worker -1.34E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) -4.80E-01 ( 1.09E-01 )
Craftsman -9.86E-02 ( 1.25E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -2.07E-01 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -1.29E-01 ( 8.24E-02 ) - ( - )
Female skilled worker -3.71E-02 ( 5.94E-02 ) 5.56E-01 ( 1.50E-01 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) - ( - )
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.11: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Female and technical college -2.24E-03 ( 9.76E-02 ) - ( - )
Female and university education -5.84E-03 ( 5.37E-02 ) -1.29E-01 ( 5.93E-02 )
Incremental Effect of JC with conventional, heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors
due to insufficient number of observations.
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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3.B Sensitivity Analysis for the Evaluation Ap-
proach Using Conditional–Double–Difference–in–
ρ–Differences
3.B.1 Employment Dynamics and Conditional Double–
Difference–in–ρ–Differences (CD2iρD)
The conditional Double–Difference–in–ρ–Differences (CD2iρD) method, with which
we conduct a sensitivity analysis for the estimation of treatment effects in the context
of a state dependent employment process, builds upon the following employment
model for any individual i:
Yi,t = ρ(Xi, t)Yi,t−1 + a(Xi, t) + δi,t,τDi,t(τ) + ci + ui,t(3.10)
This autoregressive model is a more restrictive version of our econometric model in
equation 3.5. The differences in the transitions from the two different employment
states are here captured alone by the autoregressive component ρ(Xi, t)Yi,t and not
as in 3.5 by separate components for each previous employment state.
After matching on observables, the following Conditional Double–Difference–in–ρ–
Differences ( CD2iρD) estimator
1
N1
N1∑
i=1
[
(Y 1i,t1 − ρ(Xi, t1)Y
1
i,t1−1)− (Y
0
i,t0 − ρ(Xi, t0)Y
0
i,t0−1)
]
−
1
N1
N1∑
i=1

∑
j
wi,j [(Y
0
j,t1 − ρ(Xj, t1)Y
0
j,t1−1)− (Y
0
j,t0 − ρ(Xj, t0)Y
0
i,t0−1)]


based in non–parametric matching estimates consistently the average treatment–on–
the–treated effect where i now denotes participants and j nonparticipants. Further-
more, t0 denotes some time before and t1 some time after treatment. We suggest
to estimate the unknown parameters ρ(.) in a prior stage based on the sample of
non–participants.
Our CD2iρD estimator is related to the unconditional difference–in–ρ–differences
estimator by Heckman and Robb (1985, p. 171) who suggest to use such an estimator
when a treatment and a control group is available and the outcome variable exhibits
a first order autoregressive component. Our extension is to take the long-run before–
after–difference (to eliminate the permanent component ci) and to use a conditional
version of this estimator based on a matched sample.
For implementation of the CD2iρD we also apply local linear kernel matching on
the estimated propensity score using the Gaussion kernel as for the CDiDHR. How-
ever, we do not use cross validation procedure to choose the bandwidth due to its
computational complexity. We choose Silverman’s Rule of Thumb (ROT) for the
selection of the bandwidth instead, see Silverman (1986, 47f.).
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3.B.2 Implementation Details
3.B.2.1 Data
The data used are the same as described in section 3.4.1 with one exception. Treat-
ment sequences are determined differently due to the inclusion of wage subsidies as
a third treatment type. In the questionnaire of 1999 individuals were asked whether
they ever had an employer that received a wage subsidy in connecting with their
employment relationship. The respondents in 1999 could only give one time period
as an answer. In our main analysis we discharge this information on wage subsidies
due to two considerations. First wage subsidies are a very heterogeneous group and
are not reported in a consistent way in this data source, thus making them difficult
to evaluate. Secondly, part of the wage subsidies might actually already be cov-
ered by the category job creation schemes, as the question on wage subsidies is not
precisely formulated and timing differences are just due to differences in recording
their start date in the two different interview modes, direct question on dates and
chronological calendar.
Table 3.12: Program Participation (number of individuals) in the LMM–SA during
1990 and 1999 when including wage subsidies
One Program JCa FTb WSc
At least once 689 1021 222
As first program 455 883 80
Program Sequencesd JC–JC JC–FT
First and Second 97 105
Program Sequences FT–JC FT–FT
First and Second 163 146
a: Further Training b: Job Creation Scheme c: Wage Subsidy
d: For instance, FT–JC indicates that a first participation in FT and a second
treatment in JC occurred
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3.B.2.2 Specification of Outcome Equation
We estimate the following outcome equation for CD2iρD. The employment outcome
Y (treatment of individual i begins in period τ , time before begin of treatment
t = −18, . . . ,−1 and after end of treatment t = 1, . . . , 36) is modelled as:
(Yi,t − ρiYi,t−1)−
∑
j
wi,j(Yj,t − ρjYj,t−1) = α0 + α1τ + α2τ
2(3.11)
+
36∑
j=ad(τ)
βjD(t = j) + (γ
ad
1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2)D(−ad(τ) < t < 0) + (γpo1 τ + γ
po
2 τ
2)D(t > 0)
where
t month before t < 0 and after treatment t > 0
τ month when the treatment begins (calendar time)
α0, α1, α2 coefficients measuring the long–run preprogram differences
depending upon the month when the program starts (τ)
ad(τ) month before the begin of the program when Ashenfelter’s
Dip starts depending upon τ
βj, γ
ad
j , γ
po
j coefficients modeling the DiD effect relative to the long–run
preprogram differences
Besides the inclusion of ρ–differences instead of estimating the outcome equation
separably for the different employment states in the previous months, the outcome
equation (3.11) differs from the equation 3.7 in the main analysis in two aspects.
Here we estimate the long–run preprogram difference simultaneously with the treat-
ment effects. In the main analysis we first subtracted the average long–run pre-
program difference between participant i and comparable nonparticipants from the
difference during Ashenfelter’s Dip and during the evaluation period, in order to
avoid to capture a potential correlation between the individual specific effect and
the treatment effect with respect to the starting date. However a comparison of
the empirical results, produced by these two different approaches on the basis of
CDiDHR, showed no remarkable differences.
3.B.3 Evaluation Results
For the CD2iρD approach, the ρ–estimation results based upon the sample of non–
participants for each treatment are given in table 3.13 in section 3.B.4. These are
first step GMM–estimates using the Arellano–Bond estimation approach in a non-
linear context. The set of instruments involves second and third lags of employment
interacted with the other strictly exogenous (time–invariant) variables.23 The es-
timated participation probits, which propensity score matching is based upon, can
23Since we have a long panel of 120 monthly observations, we do not use all conceivable instru-
ments.
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Figure 3.21: Employment Effects of FTR – CD2iρD – – Evaluation Starts after End
of Treatment
Start of Treatment: 12/90
Start of Treatment: 12/92
Start of Treatment: 12/94
Start of Treatment: 12/96
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be found in table 3.14 in section 3.B.4. The coefficient estimates for the CD2iρD
outcome equations are reported in table 3.16 in section 3.B.4. In the following, we
rather discuss these estimation results by means of graphical illustrations. However,
a caveat applies as we have not calculated bootstrap standard errors for the CD2iρD
estimates.
Figures 3.21 to 3.25 display graphically the estimated C2iρD–effect of treatment
on the treated depending on τ and t as well as the long–run preprogram difference
α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 depending upon the begin of the program. We put 90%–confidence
interval around the estimates.
The thick line shows the CD2iρD–estimator for the time period during Ashenfelter’s
Dip and until 36 months after the end of the program. Participation takes place in
time 0. This should be taken as an interruption of the curves. The postprogram pe-
riod here shows the average treatment effect on the treated. The horizontal estimate
displays the estimated long–run preprogram differences between the treated individ-
ual and the nonparametrically estimated non–treatment outcome. A program here
can only be considered as successful for the participants if the confidence–intervals
lie in the positive region.
Figure 3.21 shows the CD2iρD estimates of a first training program (FTR). Most
notably, we find a strong positive spike in the first period after treatment and ef-
fects which are close to zero from period 2 to 36. For early starting dates of the
program (12/90 and 12/92), the effects are significantly negative during the first
part of the postprogram period (except for the first month). In contrast, for later
starting dates of the program (12/96), the effects turn significantly positive during
the later part of the postprogram period. The long–run preprogram difference is
not significantly different from zero for early starting dates and turns significantly
negative for later starting dates. We also find evidence for Ashenfelter’s Dip in the
employment dynamics during the months shortly before the begin of the program.24
Figures 3.22 and 3.25 display the CD2iρD estimates for the program sequences TR–
TR and TR–JC. In contrast to our main analysis we start the evaluation after the
treatment sequence considered.
Apart from the initial spikes, we find postprogram effects for both combined treat-
ments which are basically zero and which even turn significantly negative with early
starting dates. In contrast, the incremental effects are somewhat different. For both
program sequences, we find slightly positive postprogram effects during month 2
to 36 after the end of the program and these effects are even significantly positive
(especially for the later starting period).
Naturally, a comparison of the results of CD2iρD and CDiDHR needs undertaken
under the caveat that we did not calculated bootstrap standard errors, we put 10 %
confidence intervals around the estimates and that we started the evaluation period
generally after the end of the program. Nevertheless, we can say that the results
24This corresponds to the results obtained in Fitzenberger and Prey (2000) based on a completely
parametric model.
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Figure 3.22: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CD2iρD – – Evaluation
Starts after End of Treatment
Start of Treatment: 12/90
Start of Treatment: 12/92
Figure 3.23: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CD2iρD – – Evaluation
Starts after End of Treatment
Start of Treatment: 12/94
Start of Treatment: 12/96
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Figure 3.24: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CD2iρD – – Evaluation
Starts after End of Treatment
Start of Treatment: 12/90
Start of Treatment: 12/92
Figure 3.25: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CD2iρD – – Evaluation
Starts after End of Treatment
Start of Treatment: 12/94
Start of Treatment: 12/96
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of CD2iρD confirm our results of the CDiDHR. Training as a first treatment shows
effects which are mainly close to zero and for some selected start dates we find
positive effects. The combined effect of treatment sequences is also close to zero,
whereas the incremental effect (for CDiρD also for the sequence TR–TR ) shows
slightly positive effects.
3.B.4 Tables
Table 3.13: Coefficient estimates of employment equationa
TR as first prog
Variable Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -.227601E-03 (.181104E-03)
∆YT−1 .609992 (.078171 )
∆YT−1·AGE90 .661628E-02 (.224870E-02)
∆YT−1·University -.048539 (.034373 )
TR-TR TR-JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -.236920E-03 (.189910E-03) -.236648E-03 (.191229E-03)
∆YT−1 .709074 (.077189 ) .714254 (.076709 )
∆YT−1·AGE90 .483554E-02 (.219154E-02) .462583E-02 (.218730E-02)
∆YT−1·University -.030825 (.033946 ) -.021289 (.033035 )
a: Included Instruments: YT−2, YT−3, YT−2·SEX, YT−3·SEX, YT−2·AGE90,
YT−3·AGE90, YT−2·University, YT−3·University, YT−2·T, YT−3·T, SEX, AGE90,
University, T
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Table 3.14: Propensity Score Estimations for TR as First
Program
TR as first prog
Variable Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -1.07184 (.1635)
Age 35 – 44 -.094331 (.0471)
Age 45 and older -.315686 (.0583)
Region
Halberstadt -.117374 (.0906)
Halle -.176224 (.0766)
Magdeburg -.126768 (.0726)
Merseburg -.109939 (.0821)
Sangerhausen .217639E-02 (.0873)
Stendal -.224979 (.0970)
Wittenberg -.145804 (.1109)
Professional education (all)
Skilled worker .133797 (.1588)
Craftsman .021812 (.1782)
Technical college .312798 (.1753)
University education .245768 (.1612)
Professional education (women)
Skilled worker .495313 (.0630)
Craftswoman .819274 (.1823)
Technical college .034995 (.1043)
University education .129868 (.0818)
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Table 3.15: Propensity Score Estimations for Treatment
Sequences
TR–TR TR–JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -2.09211 (.141) -1.77539 (.231)
Age 35 – 44 -.100332 (.081) .124494 (.085)
Age 45 and older -.367851 (.111) .213575 (.095)
Region
Halberstadt -.255556 (.164) .010844 (.145)
Halle -.163950 (.129) -.440414 (.141)
Magdeburg -.146524 (.121) -.128937 (.119)
Merseburg -.157698 (.140) -.184040 (.140)
Sangerhausen -.094592 (.148) .135846 (.135)
Stendal -.417601 (.190) -.221477 (.166)
Wittenberg -.183282 (.193) .035717 (.169)
Professional education (all)
Skilled worker – (–) -.484547 (.229)
Craftsman -.149133 (.270) -.751420 (.324)
Technical college .165301 (.222) -.229241 (.260)
University education .301976 (.147) -.193344 (.225)
Professional education (women)
Skilled worker .789295 (.122) .708492 (.122)
Craftswoman .637046 (.397) 1.22173 (.326)
Technical college .454056 (.213) .022239 (.192)
University education .190879 (.146) .338782 (.130)
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Table 3.16: Coefficient estimates for CD2iρD outcome
equation
TR as first prog TR–TR (comb.)
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Const .025501 (.611E-02) .476685E-02 (.017)
τ -.260476E-02 (.277E-03) -.173280E-02 (.819E-03)
τ 2 .192363E-04 (.247E-05) .157837E-04 (.812E-05)
D(t = −6) -.067718 (.023) -.035629 (.073)
D(t = −5) -.101119 (.024) -.027104 (.066)
D(t = −4) -.096935 (.021) -.062193 (.062)
D(t = −3) -.114022 (.020) -.056385 (.057)
D(t = −2) -.111974 (.018) -.103914 (.054)
D(t = −1) -.132194 (.020) -.075035 (.056)
D(t = 1) .257086 (.018) .158988 (.043)
D(t = 2) -.025359 (.953E-02) -.851691E-02 (.024)
D(t = 3) -.025649 (.932E-02) -.971927E-03 (.026)
D(t = 4) -.032286 (.010) -.022399 (.028)
D(t = 5) -.024135 (.952E-02) -.031060 (.026)
D(t = 6) -.027396 (.907E-02) .025162 (.030)
D(t = 7) -.024160 (.010) .608648E-02 (.028)
D(t = 8) -.023151 (.010) .016993 (.030)
D(t = 9) -.016805 (.969E-02) .019329 (.029)
D(t = 10) -.013924 (.950E-02) -.556241E-03 (.028)
D(t = 11) -.013945 (.910E-02) .016333 (.030)
D(t = 12) -.863352E-02 (.969E-02) -.593212E-03 (.027)
D(t = 13) -.847889E-02 (.010) .030753 (.028)
D(t = 14) -.015228 (.918E-02) -.422234E-02 (.025)
D(t = 15) -.736931E-02 (.965E-02) .016124 (.025)
D(t = 16) -.013186 (.010) .925676E-02 (.027)
D(t = 17) -.010642 (.950E-02) .628532E-02 (.023)
D(t = 18) -.853118E-02 (.896E-02) .691260E-02 (.023)
D(t = 19) -.698236E-02 (.943E-02) -.383921E-02 (.025)
D(t = 20) -.015029 (.911E-02) .625561E-02 (.023)
D(t = 21) -.015174 (.937E-02) -.481961E-02 (.025)
D(t = 22) -.295277E-02 (.946E-02) .017932 (.031)
D(t = 23) -.015509 (.910E-02) -.856228E-02 (.026)
D(t = 24) -.021898 (.978E-02) .307831E-02 (.023)
D(t = 25) -.017676 (.994E-02) .028006 (.028)
D(t = 26) -.695260E-02 (.976E-02) .547960E-02 (.029)
D(t = 27) -.703906E-02 (.929E-02) .277416E-02 (.023)
D(t = 28) .366746E-02 (.010 ) .411275E-02 (.024)
D(t = 29) -.891265E-02 (.925E-02) .598257E-02 (.024)
D(t = 30) -.436543E-02 (.942E-02) .799699E-02 (.031)
D(t = 31) -.660747E-02 (.964E-02) -.596325E-02 (.028)
D(t = 32) -.943684E-02 (.965E-02) .781956E-02 (.024)
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.16: Coefficient estimates <continued>
TR as first prog TR–TR (comb.)
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
D(t = 33) -.411337E-02 (.931E-02) .580269E-02 (.024)
D(t = 34) -.775484E-02 (.938E-02) .020363 (.038)
D(t = 35) -.190543E-02 (.951E-02) .852553E-02 (.024)
D(t = 36) -.420573E-02 (.949E-02) .029503 (.031)
AD:τ .148725E-02 (.714E-03) -.240851E-03 (.238E-02)
AD:τ 2 -.131374E-04 (.576E-05) -.407514E-05 (.234E-04)
PO:τ -.246218E-03 (.354E-03) -.162851E-02 (.112E-02)
PO:τ 2 .469095E-05 (.338E-05) .204997E-04 (.121E-04)
TR-JC (comb.) TR–TR (incr.) TR–JC (incr.)
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Const .016426 (.013) -.081200 (.038) -.052980 (.034 )
τ -.197837E-02 (.630E-03) -.538051E-03 (.103E-02) -.813732E-03 (.945E-03)
τ 2 .999392E-05 (.613E-05) .523305E-05 (.687E-05) .440899E-05 (.635E-05)
D(t = −9) – (–) – (–) -.124324 (.064)
D(t = −8) – (–) – (–) -.123017 (.060)
D(t = −7) – (–) – (–) -.107747 (.059)
D(t = −6) -.087147 (.050) -.396631E-02 (.046) -.106373 (.058)
D(t = −5) -.129171 (.059) -.011228 (.048) -.105200 (.060)
D(t = −4) -.111006 (.051) .269935E-02 (.046) -.118560 (.059)
D(t = −3) -.134399 (.049) -.330333E-02 (.047) -.117680 (.059)
D(t = −2) -.113087 (.043) -.010978 (.047) -.119923 (.063)
D(t = −1) -.143205 (.049) -.013837 (.045) -.106905 (.057)
D(t = 1) .062343 (.035) .320118 (.057) .211972 (.054)
D(t = 2) -.083359 (.018) .152757 (.045) .075065 (.040)
D(t = 3) -.082730 (.019) .160186 (.045) .076344 (.040)
D(t = 4) -.089005 (.017) .138687 (.048) .068360 (.040)
D(t = 5) -.089833 (.019) .130026 (.045) .058372 (.040)
D(t = 6) -.089002 (.017) .186340 (.047) .067216 (.040)
D(t = 7) -.080631 (.019) .167150 (.046) .076444 (.040)
D(t = 8) -.087783 (.022) .177978 (.048) .067730 (.042)
D(t = 9) -.095731 (.019) .180582 (.047) .058724 (.041)
D(t = 10) -.088520 (.017) .160426 (.047) .066880 (.040)
D(t = 11) -.104385 (.022) .177386 (.048) .068132 (.041)
D(t = 12) -.080784 (.019) .160520 (.046) .079175 (.042)
D(t = 13) -.050157 (.025) .191798 (.046) .116396 (.045)
D(t = 14) -.082049 (.018) .157069 (.044) .078150 (.040)
D(t = 15) -.072454 (.020) .177551 (.045) .089669 (.042)
D(t = 16) -.088574 (.020) .170822 (.046) .069367 (.041)
D(t = 17) -.088985 (.019) .167828 (.044) .069148 (.041)
D(t = 18) -.070390 (.020) .168319 (.044) .092016 (.042)
D(t = 19) -.091617 (.025) .157405 (.045) .078355 (.043)
<continued on next page>
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Table 3.16: Coefficient estimates <continued>
TR–JC (comb.) TR–TR (incr.) TR–JC (incr.)
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
D(t = 20) -.059711 (.023) .167491 (.044) .093649 (.041)
D(t = 21) -.077627 (.018) .156573 (.045) .083126 (.040)
D(t = 22) -.076532 (.018) .178522 (.049) .083936 (.040)
D(t = 23) -.063903 (.021) .152409 (.046) .083639 (.040)
D(t = 24) -.074740 (.018) .164323 (.044) .083868 (.040)
D(t = 25) -.063750 (.022) .189379 (.047) .098172 (.043)
D(t = 26) -.062509 (.022) .166852 (.047) .100813 (.043)
D(t = 27) -.074511 (.018) .163997 (.044) .083615 (.040)
D(t = 28) -.074088 (.018) .165104 (.044) .085096 (.040)
D(t = 29) -.101618 (.026) .166804 (.044) .044702 (.048)
D(t = 30) -.044225 (.029) .168373 (.049) .126984 (.052)
D(t = 31) -.071983 (.018) .154760 (.046) .085634 (.040)
D(t = 32) -.087333 (.034) .168363 (.044) .088862 (.054)
D(t = 33) -.103977 (.028) .166315 (.044) .065690 (.048)
D(t = 34) -.090151 (.023) .180371 (.051) .062871 (.045)
D(t = 35) -.076411 (.032) .167633 (.044) .057984 (.048)
D(t = 36) -.093931 (.025) .188480 (.047) .053768 (.048)
AD:τ .272967E-02 (.187E-02) .146001E-03 (.129E-02) .282863E-02 (.163E-02)
AD:τ 2 -.199939E-04 (.168E-04) -.179350E-05 (.893E-05) -.174040E-04 (.110E-04)
PO:τ .229227E-02 (.880E-03) -.385941E-02 (.126E-02) -.187046E-02 (.117E-02)
PO:τ 2 -.127798E-04 (.941E-05) .266662E-04 (.925E-05) .157306E-04 (.861E-05)
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ D(ad(τ) ≤ t < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ D(t > 0)
comb.: combined effect of first and second program
incr.: incremental effect of second program
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets.
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Chapter 4
Do Job Creation Schemes Initiate
Positive Dynamic Employment
Effects? Evidence from the East
German State of Sachsen–Anhalt
4.1 Introduction
Since the German unification in 1990 a significant amount of resources has been
spent on job creation schemes (Bescha¨ftigungsschaffende Maßnahmen) in East Ger-
many. For example, in 1995 the budget for job creation schemes was the highest
among all programs of Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP). The German Federal
Government and the German Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Ar-
beit, BA) devoted 4.6 Billion Euro on job creation schemes, which was approximately
18 % of the budget for Active and Passive Labor Market Policies in East Germany
(25.6 Billion Euro) paid for by these two institutions.1 Although the money spent
on job creation schemes was reduced over the years, it is still on quite a high level.
In 2002 the expenditures for job creation schemes added up to 2.2 Billion Euro,
which constituted a share of 8.9 % of the budget for Labor Market Policies.
Job creation schemes, as any other ALMP, seek to fight unemployment by raising the
employment prospects of participants who are unemployed or threatened to become
unemployed. In particular, the German regulations envisage that participation in
job creation schemes should not only increase the rate for participants of leaving
unemployment and but it should also stabilize the future employment situation of
participants.
There are at least two potential channels of how job creation schemes might accom-
plish these goals.2 By providing work experience job creation schemes can increase
1Compare Wolfinger/Brinkmann (1996) and Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1995).
2For a analysis of the effects of ALMP in a theoretical framework see for example Calm-
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the attachment of the participants to the labor market. This stronger bond might
motivate the participants to intensify their search effort for a regular job and increase
their ability to stay on a regular job.
The second channel consists of the potential ability of job creation scheme to increase
the rate at which participants receive a job offer and to decrease the rate at which
they are laid off. Naturally, job seekers become more attractive for employers if their
human capital is raised and job creation schemes offer a number of possibilities
to achieve this. First of all, participation in a job creation scheme, as any other
program of ALMP, might stop the accelerated depreciation of human capital which
would occur if the participants were unemployed. By providing work experience,
job creation schemes also foster noncognitive skills such as motivation, ability to
work regular hours, and communication skills - skills which importance has been
emphasized recently (Heckman, 1999). Participants also acquire cognitive skills
by learning–on–the–job and short training courses, which are sometimes offered in
combination with a job creation scheme. Participation in a job creation scheme
might also offer the possibility to participants to signal their positive work attitude
to potential employers.
This paper evaluates whether job creation schemes indeed display these intended
employment effects. Our time horizon starts in 1990, shortly before the reunification,
and ends in 1999. The data stem from the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt
(LMM–SA), which is a survey on the working age population of the East German
state of Sachsen–Anhalt. This paper uses the last three waves (1997, 1998, 1999)
of the survey which include retrospective calendars on the complete labor market
history including participation in ALMP since the reunification. This calendar offers
unique possibilities for the empirical analysis of program participation, which no
other survey data, at least for Germany provides. Unfortunately, we can not rely on
administrative data in order to evaluate job creation scheme as yet no such data set
is publicly available. Also data from experiments can not be used, as experiments
with job creation schemes have not yet been conducted in Germany.
In the presence of nonexperimental data, microeconomic evaluation of treatment
effects faces methodological challenges. At a specific point in time, neither the
situation of nontreatment is observable for the participants nor the situation of
treatment is observable for the nonparticipants, i.e. the evaluation problem is a
problem of missing data. As individuals differ with respect to observable and un-
observable characteristics one can not use simple comparison groups to construct
the counterfactuals. For example, in order to estimate the nontreatment outcome of
the participants usually one can not use the outcome of the nonparticipants as the
nonparticipants can differ from the participants, e.g. with respect to education and
motivation. Also the situation of participants before the treatment is usually not a
good approximation of the nontreatment outcome after treatment as the potential
nontreatment outcome might change over time, e.g. due to changes of the overall
economy. Consequently, it is necessary to make identifying assumption with respect
fors/Forslund/Hemstro¨m (2001). For a discussion of the theoretical effects of training course as
ALMP, see for example Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2004).
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to the adequate comparison level for the participants and nonparticipants in order
to solve this problem of selection bias.
As Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999, p. 1868) conclude, there is no method of choice
for estimating treatment effects. In fact, the choice of method should depend on the
economics underlying the problem, the data availability and the evaluation question.
At present, the literature suggests four main solutions for the microeconomic eval-
uation problem.3 They all concentrate on the individual employment effect of (po-
tential) participants by which automatically substitution and displacement effects
which might occur by way of market interactions are ignored. As a first estima-
tor for treatment effect the difference–in–differences estimator should be mentioned
which is often applied in the context of a policy reform. It contrasts the change of
the outcome variable for the participants with the change of the outcome variable
in the same time period for a group of nonparticipants. This approach is able to re-
move unobservable individual effects and common macro effect. However, the main
underlying assumptions are that the selection bias is time invariant and that there
are no changes in the composition of the groups.
A second approach consists of matching method which relies on the assumption that
conditional on observables the (non)treatment outcome of the participants is equal
to the (non)treatment outcome of the nonparticipants. Building on this assumption,
the relevant (non)treatment outcome can be estimated nonparametrically.
Starting with Heckman (1979), the class of selection models has been developed. In
contrast to matching methods, they allow for selection on unobservable. However,
here often either very critical assumption concerning the functional form of the model
and/or exclusion restriction have to be made. The exclusion restriction requires a
variable that determines participation in the program but not the outcome of the
program itself.
The fourth method is the timing–to–events–approach which has recently become
popular. This method models jointly the unemployment duration until finding a
job and the unemployment duration until program participation where selection
on unobservable is taken into account by including heterogeneity terms which are
allowed to be correlated. The timing of events conveys the information that helps
to identify the program effects (Abbring/Van den Berg, 2002). The identifying
assumption, however, lies in the independence between the observables and the
unobservables.
This study uses a combination of the matching and the difference–in–differences
approach. This so called conditional difference-in-differences (CDiD) method has
been proposed by Heckman/Ichmura/Smith/Todd (1998). With this method one
is able to control for selection on observables together with a time invariant, addi-
tive linear selection bias on nonobservables. In particular, we apply the in Berge-
mann/Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2004) developed extension of the CDiD estimator.
3For an overviews see for example Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999) or Blundell/Costa Dias
(2000).
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Their estimator emphasizes on the one hand the importance of aligning the estimator
on a long–run preprogram difference, as anticipation effects regarding future par-
ticipation or eligibility criteria (Ashenfelter’s Dip), which require a certain elapsed
duration of unemployment in order to participate, are likely to affect the results of
any difference–in–differences estimator. On the other hand their CDiD estimator
extends the traditional CDiD estimator to use transition rates between different em-
ployment states (Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates, CDiDHR).
They show that the use of transition rates is more appropriate compared to the
use of unconditional employment rates as often done in the literature. The use of
unconditional employment rates can lead to misleading conclusions concerning the
effectiveness of program participation. Furthermore, by estimating the effects on
transition rates the following questions can be answered: Does the program help
the (potential) participant to find regular employment? Does the program prolongs
employment once the (potential) program participant found a regular job?
We do not use selection models as our data is not informative enough for credible
exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, as we are not only interested in the effects of
the program on the transition rate out of unemployment but also on the rate to stay
in employment, we exclude the timing of events approach as a possible evaluation
approach.
This paper also advances on the CDiDHR–estimator. The CDiDHR estimator was
developed to estimate program effects for the actual participants (treatment–on–
the–treated effect), as usually done in evaluation studies. With this parameter
important but restricted conclusions on the effectiveness of programs can be drawn.
Here we will extend the CDiDHR estimator in order to be able to estimate also
population average treatment effects. By also assessing this second parameter we
go beyond existing evaluation studies for Germany. We are able to make statements
on the employment effects for participants in case the participation group would
have been changed into the direction of the average active workforce at the time
of the reunification. By doing so, we will also ignore potential substitution and
displacement effects as usually done in the literature.
Estimation of treatment effects of ALMP different from the treatment–on–the–
treated effect are rarely conducted. The main reasons might be that the timing
of potential treatment of nonparticipants is difficult to set. At the same time it
is important to take into account that programs can start at different times. For
example, changes in institutional regulations of job creation schemes, which took
place in the time period of 1990–1999 in East Germany, might influence the treat-
ment effects significantly. We suggest a solution for distributing potential starting
dates over the whole time range from 1990–1999 and for correcting that participants
with different starting dates are used to estimate the predicted treatment outcome
of nonparticipants.
There are only few studies on the microeconomic evaluation of job creation schemes
in East Germany.4 They all concentrate on the treatment–on–the–treated effect and
4For an overview of evaluation studies of ALMP in Germany, including East Germany see for
example Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2000).
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mainly estimate the effects on unconditional employment or unemployment rates.
They differ in the method and the data set used. The conclusion which the studies
draw concerning the effectiveness of job creation schemes are quite mixed.
Hu¨bler (1997) and Kraus/Puhani/Steiner (2000) for example use the Labor Mar-
ket Monitor for East Germany as a data set. This data set is restricted to the
early 1990’s. Hu¨bler (1997) uses a whole range of parametric models as for example
random effects probit and multinomial logit, but also constructs matched samples
with a distance measure. The last approach is relatively close to the matching
method. His results differ with the different methods used. He concludes, how-
ever, that participation in job creation schemes does not display positive effects.
Steiner/Puhani/Kraus (2000) use a duration model for unemployment where also
program participation is modeled, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, contrary to
the suggestions of the timing–of–events approach. Their results show negative ef-
fects of job creation schemes on the reemployment rate of participants.
Eichler and Lechner (2002) use more recent data. Their empirical analysis builds
as the present study on data of the LMM–SA. However, they do not make use of
the monthly retrospective calendar as it is done here. Instead, they use the panel
structure of the data set by using the waves from 1992 to 1997. With the aid of this
data they can only identify labor market states on a yearly basis. Due to the design
of the LMM–SA which involves one complete redrawing of the sample, attrition and
refreshment samples they have only a small number of participants in job creation
schemes which they can observe before and after participation in a job creation
scheme, which is necessary for their evaluation approach, as they also use a CDiD
estimator. In their man analysis they align the CDiD on the labor market state
observed directly before the participation. By way of this they can not avoid that a
temporary deterioration in the employment situation affects their estimates. Their
results show a significant decline in the unemployment probability of participants
due to participation in a job creation scheme.
The empirical analysis of Bergemann/Fitzenberger/Schultz/Speckesser (2000) is
closest to this study. They use the retrospective calendar of the LMM-SA of the wave
1997 and 1998 for the time 1990-1998 and evaluate the employment effects of job cre-
ation schemes with a CDiD estimator which is aligned on the long–run preprogramm
difference. The outcome variable is in contrast to this study the unconditional em-
ployment probability. They find significant negative effects for participants in a first
job creation scheme in the first 1 1/2 years after the participation. Two years after
the participation the effects become significantly positive, indicating that there are
positive employment dynamics at work.
Hujer/Caliendo/Thomsen (2003) is the only study for Germany on job creation
schemes which is conducted with the aid of an administrative data set to which
they have exclusively access. They use a pure matching framework and evaluate the
treatment–on–the–treated effects of participation in a job creation scheme which
started in February 2000 on two differently defined nonemployment probabilities.
Their general finding is that participation in a job creation scheme does not sig-
nificantly lower the nonemployment probability within a two years period after the
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starting date. However, over time the effects evolve from significantly negative to
close to zero.
As mentioned, estimation of treatment effects differently from the treatment–
on–the–treated effects have until now been rarely conducted. One exception is
Brand/Habaly (2003) for the US. They estimate the population average treatment
effects for attending elite colleges for all college students by applying matching meth-
ods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 lays out the institutional set
up and participation figures of job creation schemes in East Germany. Section 4.3
discusses the evaluation approach. Section 4.4 contains the implementation details
including a description of the data and section 4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6
concludes. The appendix contains detailed results.
4.2 Job Creation Schemes in East Germany
4.2.1 Background and Aims
With the German social and economic union, the West German Labor Promotion
Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG) was transferred to East Germany. To take into
account the special situation of the East German economy a number of additional
regulations were added. These regulations essentially meant less restrictive rules
for participation in programs of ALMP shortly after reunification. Moreover, some
additional instruments like special early retirement schemes were introduced for a
limited number of years.5 Until the replacement of the AFG by the new Social
Law Book III (SGB III) in 1998 a number of changes in the regulations took place.
We will describe regulations and some implementation details of the three main
types of employment subsidies for temporary jobs for the time the AFG was in
force.6 This covers the main part of our observation period. The first two consist of
traditional job creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, ABM, see §§ 91
– 96 AFG) and ordinary productive wage subsidies (trad. produktive Lohnkosten-
zuschu¨sse, LKZ, see §§ 249h AFG),7 which were introduced in January 1993. Ac-
cording to the common use of the word, both programs can be called job creation
scheme, as both programs intend to create additional temporary jobs mainly in the
public or non–profit sector for the time of the subsidy (Bescha¨ftigungsschaffende
Maßnahmen).8 They differ, however, with respect to the level of subsidy and the
activity areas. The subsidy of the traditional job creation scheme covered 30-100%
of the wage costs and was only granted for jobs which are beneficial for the soci-
5For an overview on ALMP in East Germany shortly after the reunification see Ehlers (1996).
6Note, however, that only few additional changes concerning employment subsidies took place
with the introduction of SGB III.
7Since 1998, these subsidies are called structural adjustment measures (Strukturanpassungs-
maßnahmen, SAM).
8See Martin and Grubb (2001) for an classification and overview on the ALMP in the OECD
countries.
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ety and would otherwise be not performed. No further constrains were imposed on
the activity area. Ordinary productive wage subsidies were more restrictive. These
subsidies amounted to the average allowance which the unemployment offices paid
to the unemployed and were typically smaller than the subsidies for traditional job
creation schemes. Furthermore, the activities of ordinary productive wage subsidies
which should also not occur without the subsidies were restricted to specific areas,
such as environmental redevelopment.
The third subsidy type which we will consider is the program of productive wage
subsidies for private firms (Produktive Lohnkostenzuschu¨sse Ost fu¨r Wirtschaftsun-
ternehmen , LKZ OfW, see §§ 249h). The program was introduced in 1997 exclu-
sively in East Germany and offered generous employment subsidies to private firms
in order to employ unemployed individuals for the time of the subsidy. After the end
of the subsidy, there was no requirement for a continuation of the employment re-
lationship. Thus, although the program subsidized private sector jobs, it resembled
relatively closely a job creation scheme.
There was a number of other small scale employment subsidies programs in East
Germany mainly aiming at the permanent integration of the unemployed into the
firm, such as integration subsidies or recruitment subsidies for business start ups
(see Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2000)). As we can rarely identify these program in
our data, we will not consider them here (see section 4.4.1) .
The government pursued several aims by supporting employment subsidies for tem-
porary jobs at a large scale in East Germany (see e.g. Wolfinger/Brinkmann, 1996).
One aim was simply to provide jobs and income during the time of the employ-
ment subsidy for unemployed individuals and those who were at risk to become
unemployed. In this way the social consequences of the transformation process for
individuals could be eased and the official unemployment rate could be lowered.
Another aim was to improve the infrastructure of East Germany. Typical areas of
the activities of job creation schemes were environmental redevelopment, landscape
building and social services. Especially in the time of 1993–1996, this aim was em-
phasized by introducing in 1993 the ordinary productive wage subsidies on a large
scale, where the activity areas consisted primarily of these three areas.
The third aim which gained more and more importance over the years is the tradi-
tional aim of ALMP. The employment subsidies should help the participants to find
regular jobs. In addition, the AFG emphasized, that especially those employment
subsidies scheme should be supported, which help to find or create stable employ-
ment relationships.
Naturally, the first two aims of employment subsidies, alleviation of the social con-
sequences of the transformation process and the improvement of the infrastructure,
were already reached by purely implementing job creation schemes in specific activ-
ity areas - although, it is an open question, whether they were reached efficiently.
However, whether the third aim was achieved at all is far from settled. This pa-
per focuses on this important aspect and evaluates whether employment subsidies
helped to find and retain regular employment. To achieve this, we will evaluate the
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described three program together, as we can only distinguish between them for a
subset of cases (see section 4.4.1). The basic set up and aims of these schemes are
however quite similar, which justifies a joint evaluation. Our evaluation period will
consist of the time between 1990 to 1999 such that the main emphasis will lie on
job creation schemes, and productive wage subsidies for private firms will only be
considered at the margin.
4.2.2 Institutional Provisions 1990–1997
The implementation of the two job creation schemes involved the following steps.
A project organizing institution, which could be a public authority or a charity
organization, had to create one or more jobs within a project which needed to be
beneficial for the community and had to be additional in the sense that it would
not be carried out without the subsidy. In East Germany so called “Societies for
Employment Promotion and Structural Development” (ABS-Gesellschaften) often
acted as large scale organizers of job creation schemes. Formally, after approval of
a project, the local labor office alone should choose participants (i.e. employees)
for this project. However, evidence exists that in the early 90’s large scale ABS-
Societies had significant influence on the selection of participants. The ABS-Societies
preferred young, educated men (Brinkmann/Vo¨kel, 1992). The subsidy given to the
employer covered part of (or fully) the wage costs, but also part of the material and
capital costs could be taken over by the labor offices. Costs which were not covered
by the labor offices, although connected to the project, needed to be covered by
the project organizing institution. Often local governments acted as co–financiers.
Finally, participants and the organizer of the job creation scheme (or delegated firms
by the organizing institution) signed a fixed term work contract, which induced
regular social security contributions. As a consequence the participant renewed or
prolonged his or her eligibility period for unemployment benefits. During the job
creation program, the local labor office and the participant should continue their
search for a regular job. The job creation program ended in case a regular job or a
suitable training program was found.
The implementation details depended on the type of subsidy program and the time it
took place. Formally, a participant in a traditional job creation scheme (ABM) had
to be unemployed, with 6 months of unemployment in the last 12 months and s/he
needed to be eligible for unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) or unemployment
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), since 1994 also social assistance (Sozialhilfe). The
criteria for eligibility of ordinary productive wage subsidies (LKZ) were less strict.
Next to be eligible to one of the three allowances, a participant needed to have been
unemployed with 3 months of unemployment in the last 12 months, or needed to
have had finished a traditional job creation scheme, or enter from short time work
zero.9
The length of traditional job creation schemes (ABM) was typically 12 months, in
9Short time work zero was a benefit based on the last wage which was only given until 1992 in
East Germany to workers for a short period of time, whose firm stopped running.
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some cases of up to 24 months, with possible extensions of up to 36 months, if a
permanent job was offered subsequently by the organizer of the job creation scheme.
The ordinary productive wage subsidy (LKZ) could be granted even longer, up to
48 months if a permanent job was offered.
For traditional job creation schemes (ABM) the organizers received 30-100 % of the
wages costs, whereas for the ordinary productive wage subsidies (LKZ) the local
labor offices paid a fixed lump sum, which is equal to the average unemployment
allowance the labor office would have needed to pay in case the individual had been
unemployed.
4.2.3 Changes in Implementation Rules
The local labor offices could depart from the above mentioned participation criteria.
Especially shortly after the reunification, it was common practice after plants closure
to collectively put the work force of the plant into a so called Mega-ABM’s and let
the workers for example close down the obsolete plant, or clean–up the environmental
damage produced by the plant.
This practice and the influence of the large scale ABS-Societies on the selection of
participants was the main reason for the deviations from the original target group
for job creation schemes. For traditional job creation schemes the group consisted of
disabled individuals, long–term unemployed, unemployed over 50 years, individuals
below 25 years and women. For the ordinary productive wage subsidy it consisted
only of older unemployed individuals. It should be mentioned that for older par-
ticipants a small scale program similar to traditional job creation schemes in order
to bridge the time until retirement existed (Maßnahmen zur Arbeitsbeschaffung fu¨r
a¨ltere Arbeitslose §§97-99 AFG). In order to avoid to evaluate this program, we will
exclude older people from our analysis (see section 4.4.1). Additional subsidies were
given by the East German state governments to the organizing institutions in case
a participant was either youth unemployed, single parent, long–term unemployed or
disabled. In the mid 90’s, the local labor offices started to focus more on the original
target groups of the job creation schemes.
Participation in a job creation scheme was often financially attractive for unemployed
individuals. Until 1993, the wage paid in job creation schemes was equal to the wage
set by collective wage agreements between the unions and employers organizations
for similar but unsubsidized work (Tariflohn). In East Germany, however, employers
often paid wages below the union contract wage. Thus, the wage paid in a job
creation scheme was not only higher than the benefit payment, which participants
would receive without participating, but also it could be higher than the wage in
an unsubsidized job, providing additional incentive to participate and stay in a job
creation scheme. In 1994, the new regulation was that either the wage had to amount
to at most 90% of the union contract wage or the working time to reduced to at
most 80% of the union set working hours.
The most problematic part for the implementation of the regulations of job creation
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schemes was the requirement that the activities of the job would otherwise not have
occurred. For example, explorative studies find displacement effects in the gardening
and landscaping sector (Schneider et. al., 2000). In this sector ABS-Societies and
private firms competed with each other. As ABS-Societies mainly worked with
subsidized workers and private firms rarely had access to these subsidies, ABS-
Societies could often offer lower prices .
The prevention of some of the macroeconomic displacement effects was one reason
to introduce productive wage subsidies for private firms (Lohnkostenzuschu¨sse Ost
fu¨r Wirtschaftsunternehmen, LKZ OfW) in April 1997. With this program private
firms had access to subsidized work. The subsidy was designed in such a way that
it should be given for regular jobs. A firm was only eligible for this subsidy if it did
not reduce its workforce during the last half year before the start of the subsidy and
during the time of the subsidy. The number of employees who could be subsidized
depended on the size of the firm, the maximum amounts to 10 employees. Each
employee could be subsidized for at most 12 months. The only requirements for an
employee to be subsidized were that s/he was eligible for unemployment benefits or
assistance and be unemployed or threatened to become unemployed. At the time
the productive wage subsidies for private firms were introduced no specific target
group was spelled out. This changed in the year 1999. Since then, the subsidies
targeted at similar groups as traditional job creation schemes. Also in 1999, the level
of productive wage subsidies for private firms was reduced to 70% of the average
unemployment benefit.
Naturally, when looking at employment subsidies, especially at subsidies such as
the productive wage subsidy for private firms, the question of direct substitution
effects arises. And indeed, first explorative studies find that part of the jobs would
have been filled also without the subsidy (see Jaenichen 1999; Schneider and Schultz,
2001). However, this strand of research is still in its fledgling stage due to insufficient
data quality such that reliable estimates of the substitution effects could not yet
been calculated. Here we will not estimated the macroeconomic substitution effects
and also not the displacement effects but the individual employment effects of job
creation schemes, including productive wage subsidies for private firms, which were
introduced at the end of our observation period.
4.2.4 Participation and Costs
Entries in traditional job creation schemes already peaked in 1991 (see figure 4.1).
In this year around 422,000 individuals entered in traditional job creation schemes
in East Germany. This was mainly realized by the Mega-ABM’s, where whole firms
were collectively put into job creation schemes. From 1992 until 1997 entries in
the two different job creation schemes together fluctuated around 290,000. After
the introduction of the productive wage subsidies for private firms the maximum of
entries in these three wage subsidy programs was reached in 1998 with over 500,000
entries. Alone 200,000 individuals were granted the new kind of subsidy in 1998.
After defining target groups and reducing the subsidy level, entries into the new
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Figure 4.1: Entries into Job Creation Schemes∗
Figure 4.2: Participation Stocks for Job Creation Schemes, Annual Average∗
∗ Source: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1995, 2001b, 2003b), own calculations.
scheme declined dramatically. At the same time the entries into the two old job
creations schemes were also reduced. In 2002 entries were with around 170,000 on
the lowest level since reunification.
The yearly stocks follow with a time lag a similar but not completely equal develop-
ment as entries (see figure 4.2). The maximum stock was reached in 1992, with on
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Figure 4.3: Participation Stock and Expenditure for Traditional Job Creation
Schemes∗
Figure 4.4: Participation Stocks and Expenditure for Productive Wage Subsidies∗
∗ For 1990 no figures available. Source: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1997, 2001b, 2003b) and
Wolfinger/Brinkmann (1996), own calculations.
average nearly 400,000 individuals participating in a traditional job creation scheme.
Between 1993 and 1997 participation fluctuated around 250,000 individuals. As the
maximum length of the productive wage subsidy for private firms is shorter than for
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the other two schemes, the increase in entries in the new subsidy scheme does not
reciprocate so strongly in the average participation. In 1999 participation increased
to around 350,000 and fell again thereafter.
The costs per participant–year of traditional job creation schemes for the labor office
(without the costs for co–financiers) increased until 1993 to around 20,000 Euro and
staid approximately constant thereafter (see figure 4.3). The average costs of the
two productive wage subsidies are clearly lower than the costs for ABM (see figure
4.4).10 In 1993 costs per participant–year amounted to close to 9,000 Euro. Until
1998 the costs per participant–year were increasing to over 13,000 Euro. Since then
they ares slightly declining with an exception in 2002.
4.3 Evaluation Approach
4.3.1 Econometric Model
When evaluating the treatment effects of job creation schemes we want to take into
consideration that employment is a dynamic process which can exhibit strong state
dependence. For an individual, holding everything else constant, the probability to
stay employed is usually higher than the reemployment probability. The evaluation
approach builds upon the following econometric model which was developed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, which takes state dependence into account by allowing employment of
individual i (Yit) to be determined separately depending on the employment state in
the previous period. Thus, the model allows employment to be determined by a first
order Markov Process where the current employment depends on the employment
state in the previous period but not on periods further in the past. In the rest of the
paper we will consider two different employment situations: employment Yit = 1 and
nonemployment Yit = 0. Therefore, the model consists of two separate employment
equations one for each possible employment states in the previous period, where e
denotes employment in the previous period and n denotes nonemployment in the
previous period.
Yit =


ae(Xi, t) + δ
e
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
e
i + u
e
i,t for Yi,t−1 = 1 (employed before)
an(Xi, t) + δ
n
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
n
i + u
n
i,t Yi,t−1 = 0 (not empl. before)
(4.1)
10Here the part of the costs of productive wage subsidies is included which are covered by transfer
payments from the Federal Government to the Labor Offices.
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The model uses the following notation:
ae(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t) systematic part of state dependent employment probabili-
ties as a flexible function of observed time invariant char-
acteristics Xi and month t
τ time of treatment
Di,t(τ) dummy variable for treatment in period τ
δei,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ individual specific, state dependent effects of treatment on
the employment probabilities
cei , c
n
i state dependent, permanent individual specific effects
uei,t, u
n
i,t idiosyncratic, period specific effects.
For expositional reason, treatment in this model only takes place in one period τ .
The model allows the individual treatment effects δki,t,τ (k = e, n) to be correlated
with a number of other model determinants. They are allowed to depend upon
observed characteristics Xi and the individual specific effects c
k
i . Furthermore, δ
k
i,t,τ
is allowed to vary by i, t, and τ if we condition upon Xi and c
k
i .
The idiosyncratic error terms uei,t, u
n
i,t, however, are assumed to be conditionally
mean independent of treatment in the past and of the covariates Xi, i.e. E(u
e
i,t|D =
1, Xi) = E(u
e
i,t|D = 0, Xi) = E(u
n
i,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(u
n
i,t|D = 0, Xi) = 0 for t ≥ τ . It
is also assumed that treatment affects the outcome only after treatment, such that
δki,t,τ = 0 for t < τ and k = e, n, although it is widely found that shortly before the
treatment the employment situation of the participants deteriorates for example due
to anticipation effects or participation rules. This phenomenon is called Ashenfelter’s
Dip following Ashenfelter (1978), who discovered this relationship first in connection
with earnings. We interpret Ashenfelter’s Dip as temporary phenomenon and not
as treatment effects. Therefore, we allow for a correlation of Di,t(τ) with u
k
i,τ−s
(k = e, n) with s = 1, . . . , ad and ad is the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip. Before
the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip we also assume that uei,t, u
n
i,t are conditionally mean
independent of the treatment. Furthermore, the temporary deterioration of the
employment situation of participants is not connected to the outcome variable after
treatment took place i.e. uki,τ−s (k = e, n) are not correlated with u
k
i,t with s ≥ 1 and
t ≥ τ . In our implementation we set the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip (ad) according
to institutional features of the program (see section 4.4.5).
Naturally, the econometric model should take into account the basic evaluation
problem, i.e. is that participants and nonparticipants are different with respect
to observables and unobservables. Expressed in this model, treatment Di,t(τ) is
influenced by the observed covariates (Xi, t) and by the individual specific effects
cei , c
n
i . Furthermore, we also want to allow for Di,t(τ) to be influenced by the size of
the treatment effects δei,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ and that Xi is correlated with c
k
i for k = e, n. Finally,
we do not want to put strong functional form restrictions on the specification of
ae(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t).
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This econometric model can be estimated by the conditional difference–in–
differences in hazard rates estimator (CDiDHR) as developed in section 3.3.3
and will be laid out again in the following sections. This CDiDHR advances on
the previous CDiD estimators by taking into account the state dependence of the
employment process by conditioning on the employment status in the previous
period.11 We do not want to take employment states of periods further in the
past into account (i.e the duration dependence) in contrast to the timing–of–events
approach (Abbring/Van den Berg, 2003). In order to evaluate one treatment per
individual, as done here, and taking account of duration dependence in the employ-
ment process, the timing–of–events approach needs to assume that Xi and c
k
i with
k = e, n are independent. We do not want to impose such a restriction here.
4.3.2 Potential–Outcome–Approach to Causality
The empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality
(Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974). We focus on two treatment effects which are interest-
ing from a policy point of view. We not only estimate the widely used average
treatment–on–the–treated effect (TT), but also the population average treatment
effect (ATE). Although extensively treated in the theoretical literature (see e.g.
Imbens (2003)), ATE is rarely estimated.
Commonly treatment effects are defined without referring to the employment state
in the previous period. In this case TT is given by
E(Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1) ,(4.2)
and ATE is given by
E(Y 1)− E(Y 0)(4.3)
where Y 1 denotes potential treatment outcome, Y 0 potential nontreatment outcome
for some time after treatment D = 1. With the aid of these definitions of the
treatment parameters, it becomes obvious that an evaluation method needs to solve
the problem of estimating E(Y 0|D = 1) and E(Y 1|D = 0) as the nontreatment
outcome for the participants and the treatment outcome for the nonparticipants
can not be observed.
11The CDiD approach has recently become popular, compare e.g. Heckman/
Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998); Blundell/Costa-Dias/Meghir/Van Reenen (2003), Bergemann/
Fitzenberger/Schultz/Speckesser (2000).
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However, we want to estimate each treatment parameter with respect to each pos-
sible employment state in the previous period. In this case TTk, where index k
indicates the employment state in the previous period, with k = e, n, is given by
E(Y 1,k − Y 0,k|D = 1) ,(4.4)
and ATEk is given by
E(Y 1,k)− E(Y 0,k)(4.5)
When estimating the treatment parameters with respect to the employment states
in the previous period in the presence of an employment process which follows a
state dependent process as formulated in equation 4.1, then the evaluation method
has not only to solve the above mentioned evaluation problem that the nontreatment
outcome for the participants and the treatment outcome for the nonparticipants can
not be observed. It also has to address that the same person can not be observed in
both employment states in the previous period. Individuals sort in specific employ-
ment groups according to Xi and c
k
i . But Xi and c
k
i also influence the treatment
effect. Thus, when only considering the individuals in observed employment states
we would get biased estimates for the treatment effects TTk and ATEk.
We apply the CDiDHR approach to estimate the above defined parameters. The
CDiD method combines matching to control for selection on observables with the
difference–in–differences approach to control for time invariant, additive separable
selection effects on unobservables. In our econometric model (see equation 4.1)
selection on observables is captured by ae(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t) and the time invariant
selection effect on unobservables is represented by cei , c
n
i .
4.3.3 Matching under the Conditional Mean Independence
Assumption
For clarity reasons, let us first consider the case that selection only occurs due to
observables. In the next section we will widen the scope and discuss how we will
take account of selection on unobservables.
If selection purely occurs due to observables, one can estimate TTk and ATEk by
solely applying the matching method. Formally, the following Conditional Mean
Independence Assumptions (CIA) has to be imposed.12
E(Y ω,k|D = 1, X) = E(Y ω,k|D = 0, X) , with ω = 0, 1 and k = e, n(4.6)
12Usually, the CIA is formulated without reference to the employment state in the previous
period (see e.g. Imbens (2003)). This is due to the fact that usually also the treatment parameters
do not refer to the employment state in the previous period.
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It implies that the nontreatment (respective treatment) outcome of the participants
and of the nonparticipants with respect to the same employment state in the previous
period are comparable in expectation when conditioning on X.
Under the CIA the expected potential nontreatment outcome for participants with
the observable characteristics X can be estimated by averaging over the nontreat-
ment outcome for the nonparticipants with the same X and with the same em-
ployment state in the previous period. Similar, the expected potential treatment
outcome for the nonparticipants with characteristics X can be estimated by averag-
ing over the treatment outcome for the participants with the same X and the same
previous employment state. The different matching estimators differ with respect
to how the averaging is conducted.
We make use of the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which states that CIA
is also valid when conditioning on the treatment probability P (X) as a function of
observable characteristics X given that 0 < P (X) < 1:
E(Y ω,k|D = 1, P (X)) = E(Y ω,k|D = 0, P (X)) ,(4.7)
again with ω = 0, 1 and k = e, n.
In order to construct estimators for the treatment effects, it is necessary to define
who is a participant and who is a nonparticipant. Are for example participants only
those who are treated at a specific point in time or those who received treatment
at some point during a predefined time period? Due to the small sample size we
choose to define participants as those who participated during the observation period
where the treatment itself consist of the first participation of the participant in the
program considered, and nonparticipants as those who never participated during
the observation period.
Although defining treatment with respect to a time period we will take into con-
sideration that treatment effects can depend on the time of treatment. Thus, we
take account that job creation schemes shortly after reunification might have other
effects on the employment process than job creation schemes later in the 90’s. We
expect for example that changes in the implementation of job creation schemes (e.g.
set–up problems shortly after reunification), changes in the regulations, introduc-
tion of new program types, and changes in the economic environment can influence
the treatment parameters. Furthermore we will investigate whether the treatment
effects are temporary, long–lasting or wether they need time to evolve.
To capture that treatment effects can vary with respect to these different aspects
of time, we need to be clear about the time concepts used. We capture with τ the
calendar time of treatment (here for expositional reasons treatment occurs only for
one time period). T1 denotes in calendar time points in time after treatment and
t1 denotes time elapsed since treatment. Consequently, the following relationship is
valid: T1 = t1+ τ . When estimating the treatment we take account of the variation
with respect to different treatment times and with respect to elapsed time since
treatment, i.e. we want to estimate TTk(τ, t1) and ATEk(τ, t1).
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Average Treatment–on–the–Treated Effect
If the CIA holds we can formulate the matching estimator of TTk(τ, t1) in the
following way:
1
Nk1,τ
∑
i∈N k1,τ
gi

 Yi,T1 − ∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1

(4.8)
where from now on i always refers to treated individuals and j always to nontreated
individuals, contrary for the econometric model in section 4.3.1 where i denoted a
random individual. N k1,τ is the number of individuals in the set of treated individuals
at time τ (N k1,τ ) for whom Y
k
i,T1 can be observed, i.e. for whom Yi,T1−1 = l where
l = 0 if k = n and l = 1 if k = e. N l0 is the number of individuals in the set of never
treated individuals (N k0 ) for whom Y
k
j,T1 can be observed i.e. for whom Yj,T1−1 = l
where l = 0 if k = n and l = 1 if k = e. For expositional reasons we suppressed the
subscript T1 for N and N although they depend on T1. gi is a set of weights with
respect to the observable characteristic X to account for the fact that N l1,τ does not
include the entire treatment sample (for details compare section 4.3.4). For each
participant i in his/her previous employment state k, the weights wk
N0
(i, j) sum up to
one over j (
∑
j wN0(i, j) = 1). Note that when estimating TT
k(τ, t1) the outcomes
of participants Yi,T1 are always contrasted with outcomes of nonparticipants Yj,T1
with respect to the same calendar time T1.
Equation (4.8) gives an estimate for TT for treatment in τ and elapsed time t1 since
treatment with t1 = T1− τ with respect to the reemployment probability if k = n
and with respect to the probability to remain employed if k = e.
The different matching estimator differ with respect to how the weights wkN0 are
constructed (Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd, 1998). Matching estimators give a
higher weight to individuals which are closer in their characteristics to the individual
whose expected potential outcome should be estimated. The most intuitive matching
estimator is the nearest neighbor matching, where only the outcome of the closest
counterpart in terms of X, p(X) respectively, is used. Here we apply a kernel
matching approach, which uses a nonparametric local linear kernel regression on the
estimated propensity score to estimate the unobservable outcomes.13
The basic idea of this kernel matching method should be presented exemplarily for
the case of estimating TT (see equation 4.8). Concerning TT the challenging task
is to estimate
∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1. The local linear regression estimator obtains a
solution for this problem with the aid of the following minimization problem:
(mk(i, T1), βki ) = argmin
{m,β}
∑
j∈N k0
{Yj,T1 −m− β
′(pj − pi)}
2K
(
pj − pi
h
)
(4.9)
13We do not bootstrap our result as for the estimation of the ATE it would be computationally
too demanding.
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where p denotes the estimated propensity score, K((pj − pi)/h) is a kernel that
downweights distant observations from pi and h is the bandwidth parameter. The
minimization problem consists in minimizing locally the weighted sum of squares
with respect to the location parameter m and the slope parameters β. The lo-
cal linear estimator is equivalent to a weighted least squares regression including
a constant and the deviation (pj − pi). The expected nontreatment outcome for
participant i is then estimated by the value of the estimated intercept m(pi).
Formally, m(i, T1) is a weighted average of Yj,T1, for all j ∈ N
k
0 , where the weights
depend both on the kernel weights and the differences (pj − pi) i.e. the resulting
estimator mk(i, T1) represents then
∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1.
In contrast to nearest neighbor matching which would only use the nearest neighbor
among those who have the same employment state in the previous month, kernel
matching uses the outcomes of all nonparticipant (with the same employment state
in the previous months) to estimate the expected nontreatment outcome of the par-
ticipants. The Nadaraya–Watson kernel regression estimator is another common
matching estimator (see e.g. Pagan/Ullah 1999). Compared to the Nadaraya–
Watson our estimator differs by including the differences (pj − pi) into the mini-
mization problem. In this way it takes stronger the mismatch into consideration
which occurs between the estimated propensity score between participant and non-
participants. The local linear kernel regression estimator corrects for this mismatch
locally.
For the local linear kernel regression, we use the Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth
choice according to Silverman’s rule of thumb (ROT). In order to minimize the
mean squared error of the kernel estimate, Silverman (1986, 47f) recommends the
following bandwidth in case there is only one explanatory variable.
hROT = 0.9 · A · n
−1/5(4.10)
where A = min(s, iqr/1.34), in which s is the standard deviation and iqr the
interquartile range of the explanatory variable, here the estimated propensity
score p, in the sample (n is the sample size). For the prediction of Y 0i,T1 by∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1 we base our choice of hROT on the sample of nonparticipants
(also as is the kernel regression).
Population Average Treatment Effect
As made already explicit in formulating the matching estimator for TT, we want to
allow for the possibility that the treatment effects depend on the time the treatment
took place. Therefore, in order to estimate the population average treatment effects
we first have to set potential treatment times τ in the time path of the nonpartic-
ipants. We take random draws from the empirical distribution of treatment times
of the participants conditional on time invariant characteristics (for more details
compare section 4.4.4).
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The matching estimator of ATEk(τ, t1) under the CIA is given by:
1
Nkτ
∑
i∈N k1,τ
hi

 Yi,T1 − ∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1

(4.11)
+
1
Nkτ
∑
j∈N k0,τ
hj

 ∑
i∈N k1
wNk1 (i, j)Yi,t1 − (Yj,t1)


where Nkτ is the number of individuals m = i, j with (partly imputed) treatment
time τ for whom Y km,t1 can be observed, i.e. for whom Ym,t1−1 = l where l = 0 if
k = n, l = 1 if k = e and T1 = t1 + τ . For each participant i, the weights wkN0(i, j)
sum up to one over j (
∑
j w
k
N0
(i, j) = 1) and similarly for each nonparticipant j
over i (
∑
i w
k
N1
(i, j) = 1).
The first part of equation 4.11 resembles TT. Here we also calculate for each partic-
ipant with treatment in τ and previous employment state k the difference between
his or her outcome variable at time T1 (Yi,T1) and a weighted average of the non-
treatment outcome at time T1 (Yj,T1) of all nonparticipants with the same previous
employment state. Now, however, the weights hi do not correct for the fact that
N k1,τ does not include the entire sample of participants with treatment in τ , as done
with gi in the estimator for TT, but that participants in N
k
1,τ are not representative
for the whole population.
In the second part of equation 4.11 we calculate for each nonparticipant with im-
puted treatment in τ and employment state k in the previous period the difference
between a weighted average of all the treatment outcome of participants at time t1
(Yi,t1) with the same employment state in the previous period and the his or her
nontreatment outcome at time t1 (Yj,t1). We also attach weights hj to this difference
as nonparticipant being part of N k0,τ are not representative for the whole population.
A remark is in order here, why in the second part of equation 4.11 the outcomes
at t1, i.e. outcomes at times relative to the treatment at τ , are used. In our
application we have only few participants starting the program at the same time
τ . Therefore, for a given employment state in the previous period, we can not
exclusively use outcomes at calendar time T1 of participants with treatment in τ in
order to estimate the expected treatment outcome at T1 of nonparticipants with the
same, but imputed treatment time τ . Instead, we have to use all participant with the
respective employment state in the previous period, although starting at different
τ . This also implies that we can not use the outcomes for the participants at T1 to
estimate the expected treatment outcomes of the nonparticipants at the same T1 as
participant’s time distance to the treatment time is in most cases different than to the
nonparticipant imputed treatment time. The time difference naturally matters as we
should not use e.g. outcomes before treatment to estimate the expected treatment
outcomes. Furthermore, we also want to allow elapsed time since treatment to play
a role with respect to treatment effects. Thus, to estimate the expected treatment
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outcome of nonparticipants with the employment state k in the previous period, we
match on the time t1 relative to treatment τ , while taking the discrepancy between
the treatment times into account when calculation the weights wNk1 (i, j), see equation
4.12.
We apply the following local linear kernel regression to receive estimates of the
expected treatment outcomes of the nonparticipants (
∑
i wNk
1
(i, j)Yi,t1) separately
for all different i, k, and t1. This estimator is obtained as the result of the following
minimization problem:
(mk(j, t1), βlk) = argmin
{m,β}
∑
i∈N k1
{Yi,t1 −m− β
′
1(pi − pj)− β
′
2(τi − τj)(4.12)
−β′3(τi − τj)
2 − β′4(τi − τj)(pi − pj)}
2K
(
pi − pj
h
)
Note that for calculating mk(j, t1) we use the outcomes of participants at the same
elapsed time since treatment (t1) measured with respect to their individual treat-
ment time τi. To take account that treatment times τi of participants are in most
cases different from the imputed treatment time of the nonparticipant j, τj, we in-
clude correction terms resembling a Taylor series expansion of second order around
the imputed treatment time τj of the nonparticipants. By doing so we follow the idea
of the basic local linear regression estimator (see equation 4.9) where the difference
between the estimated propensity score between nonparticipants and the participant
is include. With the aid of these correction terms the estimates for the expected
treatment outcome for the nonparticipants with a given employment state k in the
previous month is corrected locally from the influence of the deviation of treatment
times of the participants and the imputed treatment time for the nonparticipants.
Formally, mk(j, t1) is a weighted average of Yi,t1 for all i ∈ N
k
1 , where the weights
depend not only on the kernel weights and the differences (pj − pi) as for m
k(i, t1)
in equation 4.9 but also on τi − τj. The resulting estimator m
k(j, t1) of equation
4.12 represents then
∑
i∈N k1
wNk
1
(i, j)(Yi,t1).
Also in this case, we follow Silverman’s Rule of Thumb in order to choose the
bandwidth. Naturally, for the estimation of the expected treatment outcome of the
nonparticipants with the aid of observations on the outcome of the participants, the
choice of the bandwidth hROT should be based on the sample of participants.
4.3.4 Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard
Rates
Additionally to selection bias due to observables, for which matching estimators can
take account of, we want to allow for selection bias due to unobservables. We build
on the conditional difference–in–differences in hazard rates estimator (CDiDHR) of
section 3.3.3 which is developed in order to estimate the treatment–on–the–treated
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effect.14 This CDiDHR estimator is is able to take account of permanent unob-
served selection effects as represented by cei , c
n
i in equation 4.1, in case they are time
invariant and additively separable.
The basic idea of CDiD estimators is to extend matching estimators by analyzing
before–after changes in the outcome variable instead of its level. In this way pre-
program differences in the outcome variable after matching are used to control for
remaining unobservable differences.
The CDiDHR estimator for TTk(τ, t1) as proposed in section 3.3.3 takes the follow-
ing form (notation is adjusted):
1
Nk1,τ
∑
i∈N k1,τ
gi

Yi,T1 − Yi,T0 − ∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)(Yj,T1 − Yj,T0)

(4.13)
where T0 is some time before possible preprogram effects can take effect (Ashenfel-
ter’s Dip, see section 4.3.1). Now, N k1,τ is the number of individuals in the set of
participants with treatment at time τ (N k1,τ ) for whom Yi,T1−1 = Yi,T0−1 = l is valid,
where l = 0 if k = n, l = 1 if k = e and N k0 is the number of individuals in the set
of nonparticipants (N k0 ) for whom Yj,T1−1 = Yj,T0−1 = l is valid.
Under the assumption of the econometric model (see equation 4.1) the CDiDHR
estimator properly accounts for the selection bias in the nonparticipation outcome.
In particular, with respect to the idiosyncratic error term the only two necessary
assumptions are that they need to be conditionally mean independent of treatment
status D and they need to be conditionally mean independent of the covariates
Xm with m = i, j, i.e. E(u
e
m,T |D = 1, Xm) = E(u
e
m,T |D = 0, Xm) = E(u
n
m,T |D =
1, Xm) = E(u
n
m,T |D = 0, Xm) = 0 for T ≥ τ and T < τ − ad. Note that for example
the individual specific effects ckm do not have to be conditionally mean independent
of treatment status Dm and covariates Xm.
The following estimator for ATEk(τ, t1) is an extension of the idea of the CDiDHR
estimator for TTk(τ, t1):
1
Nkτ
∑
i∈N k1,τ
hi

 Yi,T1 − Yi,T0 − ∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j) (Yj,T1 − Yj,T0)

(4.14)
+
1
Nkτ
∑
j∈N k0,τ
hj

 ∑
i∈N k1
wNk1 (i, j)(Yi,t1 − Yi,t0)− (Yj,t1 − Yj,t0)


where t0 is some time before treatment, but in contrast to T0 measured relative time
to treatment. Thus t0 always takes on negative values, i.e. T0 = τ + t0 with t0 < 0,
14Note that here the the word ‘rate’ is used, although the model is defined in discrete time, as
it can be aggregated to probabilities
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whereas t1 always takes positive values with T1 = τ+t1 and t1 > 0. Naturally, with
respect to choosing t0 the same caveat as for choosing T0 is in order. For aligning
the estimator, time t0 should be chosen in the same way as T0. It should also lie
before the start of Ashenfelter’s Dip, i.e. t0 < −ad.
At this point it is necessary to discuss the role of the weights gi, hi and hj. As
mentioned in section 4.3.2 individuals sort according to their characteristics into
specific employment states. Expressed in terms of the econometric model, equation
4.1, individuals sort with respect to Xm, c
e
m, c
n
m into the different employment states.
As we allow the treatment effect δem,t1,τ , δ
n
m,t1,τ also to depend on these parameters,
the unconditional TT E(δkm,t1,τ |D = 1) is most likely different from the conditional
TT E(δkm,t1,τ |D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l) and similar the unconditional ATE is
most likely different E(δkm,t1,τ ) different from the conditional TT E(δ
k
m,t1,τ |Yt1−1 =
l, Yt0−1 = l).
We therefore define the weights to integrate out the distribution of Xm with respect
to the population for which we want to estimate the treatment parameters. With the
proposed estimators we are able to estimate the unconditional TT or ATE under two
conditions: First, the treatment effects δkm,t1,τ are conditionally mean independent
of the individual specific effects cem, c
n
m, when also conditioning on Xm. Second,
we observe each treated individual in both employment states before the start of
Ashenfelter’s Dip, so that the before–and–after difference can be calculated for some
t0 in the past. The second assumption is nearly always fulfilled, as we consider the
preprogram situation of up to 18 months in the past.
The first condition is violated if the selection into treatment still depends upon
the treatment effect δkm,t1,τ conditional upon Xm by way of the individual specific
effects cem, c
n
m. It is not possible to rule out such a relationship. However, the
following relationship seems to be plausible. Conditional on Xm, the individual
specific effects of the reemployment probability and the probability to stay employed
are positively correlated. Furthermore, the treatment effects are positively correlated
with the individual specific effects. In this case, we will overestimate the effect on the
probability to remain employed and underestimate the effect on the reemployment
probability.
4.4 Implementation
4.4.1 Data
The data used stem from the last three years (1997-1999) of the Labor Market
Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (LMM–SA). The LMM–SA is a survey of the working–
age population of the state (Bundesland) of Sachsen–Anhalt with around 6.000
participants each year. The LMM–SA is a unique data set in the sense that in the
last three waves of its existence it provides a retrospective monthly employment
calendar that goes back until 1990. The labor market states, which are asked for
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in this calendar, include information on participation in the two main programs of
ALMP in East Germany, job creation schemes (comprising traditional job creation
schemes and productive wage subsidies including private firms) and training. In our
empirical analysis we make use of this calendar information and combine it with
time invariant individual characteristics asked in the cross–sectional dimension of
the questionnaire. We do not include waves before 1997 in our analysis as they do
not offer information on employment states on a monthly basis which is crucial for
our approach.
Of course, it would be interesting to include additional types of wage subsidies in
the analysis. However, only in 1999 an explicit question concerning wage subsidies
was posed. Individuals were asked whether they ever had an employer that received
a wage subsidy in connecting with their employment relationship. The respondents
in 1999 could only give one time period as an answer. With this new data source
only few additional time periods of wage subsidies could be identified, potentially
encompassing very heterogeneous types of wage subsidies. We therefore decided to
discard this additional information and evaluate a relatively homogeneous treatment
which consists of traditional job creation schemes, ordinary productive wage subsi-
dies together and since April 1997 also productive wage subsidy for private firms.
In the following we will call them jointly job creation schemes (JC), by keeping in
mind that at the end of our observation period also productive wage subsidies for
private firms are included, which are elsewhere sometimes defined differently.
We only include individuals who gave complete information on their labor market
history starting with January 1990 until the time the fist interview was conducted
in September 1997. The last interview took place in December 1999 thus giving us
an observation period of up to 120 months.
Table 4.1: Program Participation (number of individuals) in the LMM–SA during
1990 and 1999
One Program JCa TRb
At least once 689 1021
As first program 484 889
Program Sequencesc JC–JC JC–TR JC alone
First and Second 105 113 266
Program Sequences TR–JC TR–TR TR alone
First and Second 176 150 563
a: Training b: Job Creation Scheme
c: For instance, TR–JC indicates that a first participation in training and a
second treatment in JC occurred
In order to avoid to evaluate programs which had the aim to bridge the time until
retirement we choose individuals aged between 25 and 50 years in January 1990.
With the aim to receive a sample which is representative for the active labor force
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of the former GDR, we only include individuals in the analysis who were employed
in June 1990, the months before the Social and Economic Union came into effect.
Furthermore, we exclude individuals completely from our analysis who went into
education and maternity leave, as well as individuals with missing values on those
individual characteristics on which we base the matching. Our sample is likely to
be representative for the active labor force of the former GDR which was fully hit
by the transformation shock. In the following this group will be called population.
In the empirical analysis we will analyze three labor market states. Employment
which comprises part–time and full–time employment, nonemployment which com-
prises unemployment, out of the labor force and participation in training programs,
and participation in job creation schemes.
After our selection process we are left with 5,165 individuals of whom 689 partici-
pated at least once in an job creation scheme (see table 4.1). For 484 individuals of
these 689 job creation scheme was the first participation in a program of ALMP. As
mentioned above, training programs is the second program of ALMP which can be
identified in the data. We observe 1,021 individuals with at least one training spell
for 889 individuals this was a first participation in a program of ALMP.15
4.4.2 Choice of Program Type
Here, we will consider participation in a first job creation scheme irrespectively of
whether it was observed to be the first, second, etc. participation in a program of
ALMP. Thus, we analyze 689 participating individuals and 4476 nonparticipation
individuals.
Distinguishing for example first and second participation in a program of ALMP
is appealing when one intends to evaluate multiple participation in a programs of
ALMP (see e.g. chapter 3). Here, however, it is not possible to estimate a separate
population average treatment effect of JC for more than the first participation in a
program of ALMP. This is due to the fact that the individuals whom we observe to
participate in more than one program are very selective. As a consequent, we do not
find fitting counterparts in terms of estimated propensity score for a non–negligible
number nonparticipants in the group of participants (see next section).
In order to evaluate a large part of program participation in JC, despite not being
able to estimate the separate effects of JC as second, etc. participation in a program
of ALMP, we choose to evaluate participation in a first JC irrespectively in which
position in the sequence of participation in ALMP it took place. This approach offers
another advantage. Except for the random draws from the conditional distribution of
treatment time of the participants we do not have to make additional assumptions on
the start of potential participation. Whereas additional assumption would be needed
in case we evaluated JC as a first participation in ALMP. Then the treatment time
would have to be set before or during any other participation in ALMP.
15For more details on the data set see Ketzmerik (2001) and section 3.4.1. See also the latter for
a discussion of the relative small risk of recall errors in this data set compared with other studies.
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4.4.3 Propensity Score Estimation and Common Support
The propensity to participate in a first JC is estimated with the aid of a probit
estimation. We include all relevant time invariant information that is available in
the data set as covariates into the estimation. These variables include age in 1990,
professional education, local labor market area at the time of the interview, and
gender interacted with professional education (see table 4.2 in the appendix 4.A).
The validity of propensity score matching rests on the existence of a common support
of the propensity score for the participants and the nonparticipants. If the common
support condition is fulfilled we can estimate TT and ATE without reducing the
groups that the estimates should represent (Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd, 1998).
Figure 4.5 shows that a high degree of overlap of the estimated propensity score of
participants and nonparticipants is given with respect to the first JC. The overlap of
the distribution of the estimated propensity score index for four representative points
of time and for the two different possible employment states in the previous months
is calculated. To illustrate, why we can not estimate population average effects
for treatment sequences, figure 4.6 shows the overlaps for the treatment sequence
JC–JC. The values of the propensity score index of this treatment sequence is also
estimated on the basis of a probit estimation with the same covariates as in table
4.2, appendix 3.A. The group of nonparticipants of the treatment sequence JC–
JC consists of all individuals who did not follow this specific treatment sequence.
Figure 4.6 displays an insufficient overlap of the estimated propensity score index
for JC–JC. We can not find treated counterparts for a non–negligible part of the
nonparticipants with low values of estimated the propensity score index.
4.4.4 Imputation of Treatment Times and Further Settings
For the imputation of the potential start dates of participants in a first JC, we
estimate the start dates for the group of participants by way of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) depending on time invariant individual characteristics (see table 4.3,
appendix 4.A). We choose OLS due to its insensitivity concerning distributional
assumptions. With the incorporation of time invariant characteristics in the estima-
tion of the start dates it is possible to take account of the changing selection rules
for individuals to participate in a JC over time. The potential start date for each
nonparticipant is calculated by using the predicted start date of the OLS model
depending on his/her time invariant characteristics and by adding a random draw
from the residuals of the OLS estimation. This procedure is justified under the
assumption of exchangeability of residuals, which requires that the residuals are ho-
moscedastic. Homoscedasticity seems to be a plausible assumption as all groups of
the labor market in East Germany were exposed to the same randomness concern-
ing the selection process into programs of ALMP. An additional formal requirement
for the assumption of exchangeability of residuals consists in an unbounded range
of possible values of the dependent variable, which is not fulfilled in this applica-
tion. We think, however, that the assumption of exchangeability of the residuals is
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Figure 4.5: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for First Participation
in JC
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Figure 4.6: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for Sequence JC–JC
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approximately justified.
Accordingly, in the rare cases that a calculated start date lies outside the observation
period of the nonparticipant, we set it to the closest border value of the observation
period.
Following the institutional rules of JC, program participation is viewed as time
searching for a job. Therefore, the evaluation period starts directly after the start
date of program. With respect to the evaluation criterion ‘reemployment probability’
(‘probability to remain employed’) the evaluation period starts one months (two
months) after the treatment started.
Theoretically, also a less strict point of view with respect to the evaluation period
would be possible. If treatment is understood as time spend outside the labor
market, the evaluation should start after the treatment ended. We do not consider
this option here, as it is opposite to the intention of job creation schemes in East
Germany. Furthermore, this perspective seems somewhat unrealistic as labor market
history continues during participation. To contrast these two points of view, the data
offers not sufficient information. Is is not possible to model the program duration
for the nonparticipants in a satisfactory way, especially as program duration itself is
partly a treatment effect. Some participants might choose to end a program because
they found a job.
The evaluation period comprises 36 months and the preprogram period 18 months.
Time spend in any program of ALMP is understood as nonemployment.
4.4.5 Specification of Outcome Equation
In the matched samples, the CDiDHR estimators of TT and ATE are based on a
flexible semiparametric linear probability model. Employment dummies serve as
outcome variables.16 The average employment effects of a program are estimated
relative to all possible nonemployment states for either the treated resulting in TT
or jointly for the treated and the nontreated individuals resulting in ATE, where
we condition on the employment state in the previous month. We also control
for observed, time–invariant characteristics Xm in the outcome equation. The Xm
variables enter the equation for TT as deviations from their averages in the treatment
sample and for ATE as deviation from their sample averages. Treatment takes place
in period τ . With respect to the treatment effects on the reemployment probability
(probability to remain employed) τ stands for the start month of the program (start
months of the program and the following month). We consider the employment
outcome Y before the begin of treatment t0 = −18, . . . ,−ad− 1, as well as during
the time of Ashenfelter’s Dip and the evaluation period of 36 months which consists
of t1 = −ad, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 36. Note that t1 is here differently defined as in section
4.3.4, where t1 did not include the time of Ashenfelter’s Dip.
16The basic idea for this outcome equation and the specification of Ashenfelter’s Dip was devel-
oped in the context of estimating treatment–on–the–treated effects, see chapter 3.
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We estimate TT and ATE with CDiDHR in the following steps (separately depend-
ing on the employment status in the previous month):
1. The average long–run preprogram difference is calculated between participant
i (treatment starts in τ) and comparable nonparticipants (aˆi,τ ) as well as the
average long-run preprogram difference between nonparticipant j and compa-
rable participants (aˆj,τ ).
aˆi,τ =
1
18− ad(τ)
−ad(τ)−1∑
T0−τ=−18

Yi,T0 − ∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T0


aˆj,τ =
1
18− ad(τ)
−ad(τ)−1∑
t0=−18

 ∑
i∈N k1,t0
wNk1 (i, j)Yi,t0 − Yj,t0


2. Then, a ‘raw treatment effect’ is calculated by subtracting the relevant long–
run preprogram difference from the employment difference during Ashenfelter’s
Dip and during the evaluation period .
∆m,t1(τ) =
{
Yi,T1 −
∑
j∈N k0
wNk
0
(i, j)Yj,T1 − aˆi,τ for m = i ∈ N
k
1,τ , T1 = t1 + τ∑
i∈N k1
wNk0 (i, j)Yi,t1 − Yj,t1 − aˆj,τ for m = j ∈ N
k
0,τ
3. With the following model the treatment effects are estimated. For TT m ∈
N k1,τ and for ATE m ∈ N
k
1,τ ∪m ∈ N
k
0,τ (I(.) denotes the indicator function)
∆m,t1(τ) =
36∑
r=−ad(t)
δkI(t1 = r)(4.15)
+ (γad1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2 + γad3 τ t1 + γ
ad
4 τ
2 t1)I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
+ (γpo1 τ + γ
po
2 τ
2 + γpo3 τ t1 + γ
po
4 τ
2 t1)I(t1 > 0) + νm,t1
For TT, we also include deviations of the Xm characteristics from their aver-
ages in the treatment sample as additional regressors in equation (4.15) and
for ATE the deviations of the Xm characteristics from their sample averages.
4. The average long–run preprogram differences aˆm,τ are regressed on a second
order polynomial in the start month of the treatment. We will report the
predictions from this regression
αˆ(τ) = α0 + α1τ + α2τ
2(4.16)
where m ∈ N l1,τ for TT and m ∈ N
l
1,τ ∪m ∈ N
l
0,τ for ATE.
The average long–run preprogram differences are reported to illustrate how
the average long–run preprogram differences (≡ residual selection effect due
to permanent individual specific effects) between participants and nonpartici-
pants after matching depend upon the timing of the program.
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In this linear probability model we let the effects of the program depend in a very
flexible way on the time since treatment (t1 > 0) and upon the begin of the program
τ . We also take account of the decline in the employment perspectives shortly before
Ashenfelter’s Dip by including dummies for the time of Ashenfelter’s Dip −ad ≤
t1 < 0 and interacting this time period with the start of treatment τ . It should
also be noted, that when estimating the treatment outcome of the nonparticipants
before (during) [after] Ashenfelter’s Dip, we made sure that we only used outcomes
of participants which were observed also before (during) [after] Ashenfelter’s Dip.
Naturally, the long–run preprogram employment differences aˆm,τ are crucial when
aligning the CDiDHR estimator. Therefore, we model the start of Ashenfelter’s Dip
conservatively in order to obtain a lower bound for the program effects. On the basis
of the following observation we let the time period of Ashenfelter’s Dip vary with
the program start date: Shortly after the reunification participation could not have
been anticipated a long time in advance. Therefore, the dip should be very short
here. Later with a more widespread knowledge of the regulation of ALMP and the
occurrence of high unemployment, participation could be anticipated a longer time in
advance. Also, more strictly enforced participation rules made unemployment more
often to a requirement for participation. With the aid of these considerations we
set the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip in the following heuristic way. Before November
90, we set ad(τ) = 1. Between November 1990 and July 1994, ad(τ) increases
linearly from 2 months to 9 months, where ad(τ) is rounded to the nearest integer.
After July 1994, ad(τ) remains constant. When taking the program structure and
participation rules of job creation schemes into consideration, we think that we
are generous in allowing for a these anticipation periods. As using shorter time
periods for the difference–in–differences estimates would deliver higher estimates,
we estimate a lower bound for the program effects.
4.5 Results
The estimation results are discussed by way of graphical illustrations, see figures 4.7
to 4.12. The coefficient estimates for the CDiDHR outcome equations are reported
in tables 4.4 to 4.5 in the appendix 4.A.
The basic set up of the figures is the following: The thick curved line displays the
CDiDHR–estimates for the time period during Ashenfelter’s Dip and the evaluation
period of a maximum of 36 months. The success criterion differs with respect to the
type of conditional probability, we either use the reemployment probability or the
probability to remain employed.
Depending on the success criterion, time 0 stands for the first month of the program
(reemployment probability) or the first and the following month (probability to
remain employed). To illustrate program participation the curves are interrupted at
time 0. Before time 0 the development of the conditional probabilities in the time
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period of Ashenfelters’ Dip is displayed. After time 0 the thick line displays either
the estimates of TT or ATE, that is, the effects of interest. The figures also show the
estimated long–run preprogram difference in the matched samples depending upon
the begin of the program τ . We put 95%–confidence intervals around the estimates.
For TT, ATE, and each success criterion we show a maximum of five different start-
ing dates (December 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997). These five points in time are
exemplary for the development of JC (see also section 4.2). December 1990 was a
year in which the infrastructure for JC was still being built up. In December 1992
the program organizing institutions, being mostly ABS-Societies, had gathered ex-
perience with organizing JC. At that time JC still only consisted of traditional JC. In
December 1994, ordinary productive wage subsidies were already a significant part of
newly started JC. Subsequently, participation became financially less attractive and
the focus turned more to the problem groups of the labor market. December 1996
represents these changes. In April 1997 the productive wage subsidies for private
firms were introduced and participation increased rapidly in the first months after
their introduction. Therefore, we choose December 1997 as the fifth representative
starting date. For this starting date we will only show an evaluation period of 2
years as our observation period ends in December 1999.
Let us first discuss the estimates for TT for a first JC on the reemployment prob-
ability of formerly nonemployed (figures 4.7 and 4.9). For programs starting in
December 1990 the effect is significantly negative shortly after the program started
( -5 percentage points). After one year the effect fluctuates around zero. Two years
later the effect becomes negative again, although not significant. For programs
starting later, the program effect seems to improve continuously. The negative level
of the effect shortly after the program started disappears. In addition, the effect
displays some increasing tendency the more time elapsed since the program started.
At the end of our observation window these two developments lead to a significantly
positive program effect on the reemployment probability for the actual participants
in a first JC. For example, participating in a first JC in December 1997 increases
the reemployment probability of the actual participants by five percentage points
two years later.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 display the estimated TT on the probability to remain employed.
Programs in December 1990 have a positive although mainly insignificant effect for
the actual participants on the probability to remain employed. With later start
dates, this effect increases and becomes significant. Already programs in December
1992 show a permanently significant effect during the third year after the program
started. For example, at the end of the evaluation period the probability to remain
employed increases by 8 percentage points for the actual participants. It seems,
however, that for later programs this positive effect on the probability to remain
employed relocates to times which are closer to the start dates. For example, the
effect on the probability to remain employed is significantly positive throughout 6
to 33 months after the program started, but it vanishes after that.
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Figure 4.7: Treatment–on-the–Treated Employment Effects of First Participation
in JC – Nonemployment in the Previous Month
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Figure 4.8: Treatment–on–the–Treated Employment Effects of First Participation
in JC – Employment in the Previous Month
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Figure 4.9: Treatment–on–the–Treated Employment Effect of First Participation in
JC in December 1997
We find negative long–run preprogram differences between the participants and the
matched nonparticipants. These differences are relatively constant with respect to
the different program start dates for the success criterion reemployment probability.
It is increasing in absolute value for the success criterion probability to remain
employed, which might reflect a stricter targeting on problem groups of the labor
market over time.
Let us now turn to estimates for ATE. Figures 4.10 and 4.12 summarize the results
for ATE on the reemployment probability. With respect to this success criterion,
the estimated ATE resembles very closely the estimated TT. For example, the ATE
of programs in December 1990 are negative and partly significant in the first few
months. One year after the program started, the effect increases to close to zero.
After another year the effect become again negative. Also for later starting dates,
the ATE changes in a similar fashion as the TT. Thus, for programs in December
1997, the estimated ATE on the reemployment probability is significantly positive
two years after the program started. A similar result can be found for TT.
The estimated ATE for the evaluation criterion probability to remain employed are
displayed in figures 4.11 and 4.12. To be able to display the the tight confidence
intervals we choose a broader scaling for these graphs.
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Figure 4.10: Population Average Employment Effects of First Participation in JC –
Nonemployment in the Previous Month
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Figure 4.11: Population Average Employment Effects of First Participation in JC –
Employment in the Previous Month
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Figure 4.12: Population Average Employment Effect of First Participation in JC in
December 1997
ATE with respect to the probability to remain employed seem to be slightly lower
compared to the TT, except for the very early starting dates. But note that we do
not conduct a formal test here. Nevertheless, the effect is in most cases positive
and also significant, due to confidence intervals which lie quite tight around the
estimates.
As one would expect, the long–run preprogram differences when estimating ATE
are negative, similarly as they were when estimating TT.
When comparing the effects on the two different success criteria (irrespectively
whether for TT or for ATE) a certain disparity becomes obvious. The effect on
the probability to remain employed is on average higher than the effect on the
reemployment probability.
It is conceivable that the relative small success of JC to increase the reemployment
probability arises from the feeling of participants to be already reintegrated into
the labor market by purely participating in a JC. Especially, the relative high wage
which participants received in the early 90’s might have supported this view. As a
consequence, participants might decide to reduced their search effort for a regular
job during participation.
That former participants in JC schemes are attractive for employers could be a
conclusion from the positive effects of JC on the probability to remain employed
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which in turn might give some evidence for the ability of JC to raise human capital.
Here, especially the noncognitive skills which JC mainly provides might play a role.
That the estimates for ATE on the reemployment probability seem to be lower than
for TT suggests that the actual participants gain most from this increase in human
capital.
However, these interpretations are under the provision that the following two limi-
tations do not influence the results qualitatively: First, it should be noted that the
results are still conditioned on the employment state in the previous month (see
also section 4.3.4). Given the assumptions concerning the correlation of the pro-
gram effects and the individual specific effects, we might overestimate the effects on
the probability to remain employed and we might underestimate the effects on the
reemployment probability. Furthermore, we did not take into account the estima-
tion error from the estimation of the propensity score, which might especially widen
the confidence interval on the ATE for the probability to remain employed. Here we
had to base the estimates for the predicted treatment outcome of nonparticipants
on a small number of observations of participants.
Even if these limitations would influence the results qualitatively, we can conclude,
that it is unlikely that a first JC has negative effects for the actual participants.
Furthermore, it can be noted that the most favorable effect occurs for programs
which started in the end of the 90’s. Thus, the change towards a stricter targeting
on problem groups of the labor market, reduced financial incentives to participate
in the programs and changes toward subsidizing jobs which are closer or equal to
jobs in the private sector seem to improve the effects of job creation schemes.
4.6 Conclusions
This study estimates average treatment–on–the–treated and population average
treatment effects for participation in a first job creation scheme in East Germany.
It uses a recently developed approach for the treatment–on–the–treated effect which
extends the conditional difference–in–differences method for estimating transition
rates. The paper advances this approach in order to be able to estimate the pop-
ulation average treatment effect. We propose a solution for setting hypothetical
starting dates for the nonparticipants and for taking account that starting dates
vary when estimating the predicted treatment outcome of nonparticipants on the
basis of outcomes of participants.
We find a zero to positive effect on the reemployment probability and often signif-
icantly positive effect on the probability to remain employed for the actual partici-
pants. We therefore conclude that is unlikely that job creation schemes reduce the
employment chances for the participants. We also find that the effects improve for
programs which started later. These programs were financially less attractive for
the participants, partly stricter targeted towards problems groups and subsidized
more often jobs which were closer or equal to jobs in the private sector.
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The estimated population average treatment effect does not deviate strongly from
the results for the treatment–on–the–treated effect. Thus, a change of the group
of participants towards the population average would not have had negative conse-
quences from the view point of the individual employment chances of the (potential)
participants. However, with respect to the probability to remain employed there are
indications that the population average treatment effect is not as positive as the
treatment–on–the–treated effect. This suggests that the human capital, which is
provided by JC, is especially relevant for the actual participants.
Former results of evaluation studies of job creation schemes should be contrasted to
ours, by keeping in mind that those did not take into account employment dynamics,
which, however, can be very informative and more appropriate as chapter 3 shows.
In chapter 3 we found for the case of training programs on the one hand a zero to
positive effect on the reemployment probability and on the probability to remain
employed. On the other hand, chapter 3 shows that an evaluation approach which
does not take account of state dependency can find a negative effect on in the em-
ployment chances. Under the light of these considerations, the negative treatment–
on–the–treated effect of job creation schemes in Bergemann/Fitzenberger/Schultz/
Speckesser (2000) and Hujer/Caliendo/Thomsen (2003) on the employment prob-
ability shortly after participation which is later improving can be interpreted as
positive dynamics which could be attributed to JC. The positive effect of Eich-
ler/Lechner (2002) can be interpreted as a kind of upper bound for the treatment–
on–the–treated effect of job creation schemes on the unemployment probability due
to the aligment of their estimates.
For a complete evaluation of job creation schemes a number of further questions need
to be answered. Before a cost–benefit analysis can be conducted, it is necessary to
know the extend of the macroeconomic displacement and substitution effects. Only if
these effects are not too large, the individual benefits of participating can outweigh
the costs of the program. To take account of these macroeconomic effects seems
especially relevant as we find the highest individual employment effects at a time
where our variable for job creation schemes also include wage subsidies for private
sector jobs. Naturally, here we would also expect the largest substitution effects.
Unfortunately, macroeconomic studies which could shed some light on this issue have
not yet come to clear conclusions. (Speckesser 2004, Hujer/Blien/Caliendo/Zeiss,
2002).
Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Detailed Tables
177
178
Table 4.2: Propensity Score Estimation for a First Par-
ticipation in a Job Creation Scheme
Variable Coef. (s.e.)
Constant 10.326 ( 2.693 )
Age in 1990: Age 25–34 is omitted category
Age 35–44 2.098 ( 1.244 )
Age 45–50 3.092 ( 1.325 )
Labor Market Region: Dessau is omitted category
Halberstadt -0.866 ( 2.334 )
Halle 6.319 ( 1.968 )
Magdeburg 2.743 ( 1.744 )
Merseburg 4.339 ( 1.879 )
Sangerhausen 1.410 ( 2.001 )
Stendal 0.926 ( 2.379 )
Wittenberg 2.350 ( 2.416 )
Professional Education (All):Unskilled, semi–skilled and
other skills is omitted category
Skilled Worker 1.700 ( 2.398 )
Craftsman 1.941 ( 3.143 )
Technical college 3.663 ( 2.939 )
University education 2.042 ( 2.500 )
Professional Education (Women):
Female skilled worker 0.807 ( 1.506 )
Female Craftsman -5.474 ( 4.457 )
Female and technical college -4.178 ( 2.645 )
Female and university education -1.784 ( 2.004 )
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Table 4.3: OLS Estimation of the Start Date of Job Cre-
ation Scheme
Variable Coef. (s.e.)
Constant 57.294 ( 5.795 )
Age in 1990: Age 25–34 is omitted category
Age 35–44 6.243 ( 2.678 )
Age 45–50 7.822 ( 2.852 )
Labor Market Region: Dessau is omitted category
Halberstadt -3.525 ( 5.023 )
Halle -1.377 ( 4.234 )
Magdeburg -8.187 ( 3.754 )
Merseburg -3.032 ( 4.043 )
Sangerhausen -8.226 ( 4.305 )
Stendal -7.183 ( 5.121 )
Wittenberg -8.573 ( 5.200 )
Professional Education (All):Unskilled, semi–skilled and
other skills is omitted category
Skilled Worker -4.698 ( 5.162 )
Craftsman -8.765 ( 6.765 )
Technical college -4.794 ( 6.325 )
University education 2.020 ( 5.380 )
Professional Education (Women):
Female skilled worker 4.641 ( 3.240 )
Female Craftsman 10.620 ( 9.592 )
Female and technical college 3.774 ( 5.693 )
Female and university education -1.746 ( 4.312 )
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Table 4.4: Coefficient Estimates for the Average
Treatment–on–the–Treated Effect of a First Job Creation
Scheme
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Constant -0.016 ( 0.015 ) -0.013 ( 0.004 )
τ -7.37E-04 ( 4.24E-04 ) -1.81E-04 ( 2.30E-04 )
τ 2 6.76E-06 ( 2.87E-06 ) -3.48E-06 ( 2.24E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
D(t1 = −9) 0.013 ( 0.053 ) 0.057 ( 0.142 )
D(t1 = −8) 0.013 ( 0.045 ) 0.016 ( 0.116 )
D(t1 = −7) -0.003 ( 0.034 ) 0.039 ( 0.095 )
D(t1 = −6) -0.010 ( 0.027 ) -0.004 ( 0.073 )
D(t1 = −5) -0.006 ( 0.020 ) -0.064 ( 0.065 )
D(t1 = −4) -0.022 ( 0.016 ) -0.051 ( 0.040 )
D(t1 = −3) -0.031 ( 0.016 ) -0.116 ( 0.035 )
D(t1 = −2) -0.035 ( 0.020 ) -0.129 ( 0.038 )
D(t1 = −1) -0.041 ( 0.028 ) -0.140 ( 0.048 )
D(t1 = 1) -0.076 ( 0.036 ) -0.037 ( 0.067 )
D(t1 = 2) -0.060 ( 0.033 ) -0.121 ( 0.102 )
D(t1 = 3) -0.066 ( 0.029 ) 0.000 ( 0.050 )
D(t1 = 4) -0.056 ( 0.025 ) 0.000 ( 0.077 )
D(t1 = 5) -0.053 ( 0.023 ) 0.010 ( 0.051 )
D(t1 = 6) -0.043 ( 0.021 ) 0.056 ( 0.042 )
D(t1 = 7) -0.038 ( 0.020 ) 0.048 ( 0.037 )
D(t1 = 8) -0.039 ( 0.019 ) 0.051 ( 0.034 )
D(t1 = 9) -0.036 ( 0.019 ) 0.026 ( 0.032 )
D(t1 = 10) -0.031 ( 0.018 ) 0.021 ( 0.038 )
D(t1 = 11) -0.031 ( 0.019 ) 0.021 ( 0.022 )
D(t1 = 12) -0.005 ( 0.021 ) 0.020 ( 0.021 )
D(t1 = 13) -0.027 ( 0.021 ) -0.017 ( 0.030 )
D(t1 = 14) -0.016 ( 0.021 ) 0.011 ( 0.024 )
D(t1 = 15) -0.023 ( 0.022 ) 0.026 ( 0.019 )
D(t1 = 16) -0.001 ( 0.025 ) 0.015 ( 0.020 )
D(t1 = 17) -0.009 ( 0.023 ) 0.020 ( 0.024 )
D(t1 = 18) -0.010 ( 0.024 ) -0.014 ( 0.027 )
D(t1 = 19) -0.009 ( 0.025 ) 0.006 ( 0.021 )
D(t1 = 20) -0.016 ( 0.024 ) -0.014 ( 0.027 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 4.4: Coefficient Estimates <continued>
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
D(t1 = 21) -0.007 ( 0.025 ) 0.004 ( 0.025 )
D(t1 = 22) 0.006 ( 0.026 ) 0.004 ( 0.022 )
D(t1 = 23) -0.025 ( 0.024 ) 0.021 ( 0.018 )
D(t1 = 24) 0.016 ( 0.028 ) 0.019 ( 0.019 )
D(t1 = 25) -0.005 ( 0.026 ) 0.013 ( 0.020 )
D(t1 = 26) -0.008 ( 0.025 ) -0.017 ( 0.024 )
D(t1 = 27) -0.020 ( 0.026 ) -0.002 ( 0.019 )
D(t1 = 28) -0.002 ( 0.028 ) 0.003 ( 0.017 )
D(t1 = 29) -0.023 ( 0.028 ) -0.003 ( 0.017 )
D(t1 = 30) -0.010 ( 0.032 ) -0.028 ( 0.019 )
D(t1 = 31) -0.014 ( 0.035 ) -0.034 ( 0.021 )
D(t1 = 32) -0.031 ( 0.034 ) -0.036 ( 0.021 )
D(t1 = 33) -0.023 ( 0.038 ) -0.063 ( 0.022 )
D(t1 = 34) -0.036 ( 0.041 ) -0.048 ( 0.022 )
D(t1 = 35) -0.034 ( 0.043 ) -0.074 ( 0.030 )
D(t1 = 36) -0.024 ( 0.046 ) -0.078 ( 0.027 )
AD:τ 1.16E-03 ( 1.07E-03 ) 3.32E-03 ( 2.41E-03 )
AD:τ 2 -8.36E-06 ( 7.50E-06 ) -1.60E-05 ( 2.02E-05 )
AD:τ ∗ t1 1.84E-04 ( 2.62E-04 ) 7.69E-04 ( 6.52E-04 )
AD:τ 2 ∗ t1 -1.30E-06 ( 1.81E-06 ) -4.69E-06 ( 4.85E-06 )
PO:τ 2.13E-03 ( 1.18E-03 ) 2.65E-03 ( 3.17E-03 )
PO:τ 2 -1.48E-05 ( 8.15E-06 ) -2.58E-05 ( 2.88E-05 )
PO:τ ∗ t1 -1.38E-04 ( 1.63E-04 ) -3.96E-04 ( 3.17E-04 )
PO:τ 2 ∗ t1 9.07E-07 ( 1.19E-06 ) 5.12E-06 ( 2.99E-06 )
PO:τ ∗ t12 2.48E-06 ( 4.54E-06 ) 1.42E-05 ( 7.27E-06 )
PO:τ 2 ∗ t12 -9.98E-09 ( 3.45E-08 ) -1.80E-07 ( 7.10E-08 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -0.011 ( 0.003 ) -0.003 ( 0.007 )
Age 45–50 0.006 ( 0.004 ) 0.007 ( 0.008 )
Halberstadt -0.014 ( 0.004 ) 0.019 ( 0.012 )
Halle -0.012 ( 0.004 ) -0.016 ( 0.011 )
Magdeburg -0.048 ( 0.005 ) 0.003 ( 0.012 )
Merseburg -0.002 ( 0.004 ) -0.004 ( 0.013 )
Sangerhausen 0.010 ( 0.004 ) -0.004 ( 0.013 )
Stendal -0.004 ( 0.004 ) -0.040 ( 0.018 )
Wittenberg 0.006 ( 0.005 ) 0.016 ( 0.015 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 4.4: Coefficient Estimates <continued>
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Skilled Worker 0.022 ( 0.005 ) -0.053 ( 0.020 )
Craftsman 0.002 ( 0.006 ) -0.037 ( 0.022 )
Technical college -0.109 ( 0.013 ) -0.036 ( 0.023)
University education 0.000 ( 0.005 ) -0.027 ( 0.020)
Female skilled worker -0.019 ( 0.004 ) 0.038 ( 0.010)
Craftswoman 0.028 ( 0.008 ) 0.045 ( 0.045 )
Female and technical college 0.089 ( 0.014 ) -0.008 ( 0.018 )
Female and university education 0.012 ( 0.005 ) -0.014 ( 0.010 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets.
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates for Average Treatment
Effect of a First Job Creation Scheme
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.095 ( 0.015 ) -0.036 ( 0.001 )
τ 1.52E-03 ( 4.25E-04 ) 4.38E-04 ( 3.92E-05 )
τ 2 -8.01E-06 ( 2.90E-06 ) -7.80E-06 ( 3.40E-07 )
Outcome–Equation
D(t1 = −9) -0.088 ( 0.055 ) -0.046 ( 0.020 )
D(t1 = −8) -0.069 ( 0.047 ) -0.049 ( 0.016 )
D(t1 = −7) -0.069 ( 0.037 ) -0.019 ( 0.013 )
D(t1 = −6) -0.071 ( 0.030 ) -0.055 ( 0.011 )
D(t1 = −5) -0.064 ( 0.022 ) -0.074 ( 0.009 )
D(t1 = −4) -0.066 ( 0.017 ) -0.037 ( 0.006 )
D(t1 = −3) -0.066 ( 0.018 ) -0.088 ( 0.006 )
D(t1 = −2) -0.049 ( 0.020 ) -0.084 ( 0.005 )
D(t1 = −1) -0.045 ( 0.026 ) -0.075 ( 0.007 )
D(t1 = 1) -0.063 ( 0.026 ) -0.016 ( 0.008 )
D(t1 = 2) -0.050 ( 0.024 ) -0.069 ( 0.009 )
D(t1 = 3) -0.056 ( 0.022 ) 0.035 ( 0.006 )
D(t1 = 4) -0.041 ( 0.019 ) 0.021 ( 0.005 )
D(t1 = 5) -0.038 ( 0.017 ) -0.073 ( 0.005 )
D(t1 = 6) -0.029 ( 0.016 ) 0.048 ( 0.004 )
D(t1 = 7) -0.025 ( 0.016 ) 0.051 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 8) -0.029 ( 0.016 ) 0.055 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 9) -0.019 ( 0.016 ) 0.042 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 10) -0.008 ( 0.015 ) 0.044 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 11) -0.013 ( 0.016 ) 0.043 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 12) 0.013 ( 0.017 ) 0.065 ( 0.002 )
D(t1 = 13) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) 0.017 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 14) -0.007 ( 0.018 ) 0.058 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 15) -0.011 ( 0.018 ) 0.064 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 16) 0.017 ( 0.019 ) 0.062 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 17) 0.009 ( 0.019 ) 0.024 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 18) -0.002 ( 0.020 ) 0.043 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 19) 0.010 ( 0.020 ) 0.047 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 20) 0.002 ( 0.019 ) 0.035 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 21) 0.003 ( 0.020 ) 0.052 ( 0.003 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates <continued>
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
D(t1 = 22) 0.017 ( 0.020 ) 0.046 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 23) -0.003 ( 0.018 ) 0.065 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 24) 0.030 ( 0.021 ) 0.062 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 25) 0.004 ( 0.020 ) 0.069 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 26) -0.006 ( 0.021 ) 0.054 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 27) -0.009 ( 0.021 ) 0.058 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 28) 0.006 ( 0.022 ) 0.076 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 29) -0.008 ( 0.022 ) 0.068 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 30) -0.003 ( 0.026 ) 0.056 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 31) -0.009 ( 0.028 ) 0.048 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 32) -0.025 ( 0.029 ) 0.055 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 33) -0.026 ( 0.032 ) 0.035 ( 0.003 )
D(t1 = 34) -0.033 ( 0.036 ) 0.061 ( 0.004 )
D(t1 = 35) -0.042 ( 0.039 ) 0.034 ( 0.004 )
D(t1 = 36) -0.018 ( 0.041 ) 0.037 ( 0.004 )
AD:τ 8.46E-04 ( 9.86E-04 ) 1.30E-03 ( 3.22E-04 )
AD:τ 2 -5.45E-06 ( 6.88E-06 ) -4.69E-06 ( 2.83E-06 )
AD:τ ∗ t1 -4.44E-05 ( 2.48E-04 ) 1.28E-04 ( 8.58E-05 )
AD:τ 2 ∗ t1 2.23E-08 ( 1.65E-06 ) -8.82E-07 ( 6.41E-07 )
PO:τ 1.64E-03 ( 8.94E-04 ) 8.81E-04 ( 3.36E-04 )
PO:τ 2 -1.14E-05 ( 6.41E-06 ) -6.18E-06 ( 3.20E-06 )
PO:τ ∗ t1 -2.08E-04 ( 1.33E-04 ) -2.87E-04 ( 3.88E-05 )
PO:τ 2 ∗ t1 1.64E-06 ( 1.01E-06 ) 2.91E-06 ( 3.86E-07 )
PO:τ ∗ t12 4.98E-06 ( 3.91E-06 ) 6.65E-06 ( 9.56E-07 )
PO:τ 2 ∗ t12 -3.63E-08 ( 3.09E-08 ) -7.00E-08 ( 9.79E-09 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -0.006 ( 0.003 ) -0.005 ( 0.001 )
Age 45–50 0.007 ( 0.003 ) -0.008 ( 0.001 )
Halberstadt -0.012 ( 0.004 ) 0.010 ( 0.001 )
Halle -0.019 ( 0.004 ) 0.012 ( 0.001 )
Magdeburg -0.029 ( 0.004 ) 0.006 ( 0.001 )
Merseburg -0.007 ( 0.004 ) -0.001 ( 0.002 )
Sangerhausen 0.003 ( 0.004 ) 0.010 ( 0.002 )
Stendal -0.014 ( 0.004 ) 0.007 ( 0.002 )
Wittenberg 0.003 ( 0.005 ) 0.001 ( 0.002 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates <continued>
Employment Status Nonemployment Employment
in the Previous Month:
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Skilled Worker 0.004 ( 0.004 ) 0.017 ( 0.004 )
Craftsman -0.013 ( 0.008 ) 0.012 ( 0.004 )
Technical college -0.088 ( 0.010 ) 0.010 ( 0.005 )
University education -0.003 ( 0.005 ) 0.006 ( 0.004)
Female skilled worker -0.005 ( 0.004 ) -0.018 ( 0.001 )
Craftswoman 0.019 ( 0.010 ) -0.048 ( 0.005 )
Female and technical college 0.068 ( 0.011 ) 0.001 ( 0.002 )
Female and university education 0.001 ( 0.005 ) -0.001 ( 0.001)
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets.
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